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1 Introduction 
In this dissertation, I analyze the business cycle effects of severe economic crises, such as 
financial crises or housing crises. The dissertation is a collection of five papers. It contributes 
to the empirical literature on the effects of severe economic crises. The results found are 
particularly relevant for economic policy and macroeconomic forecasting, and in some cases 
they also may serve as the empirical foundation for theoretical business cycle models. 
In the literature, the effects of severe economic crises and in particular the effects of 
financial crises have been analyzed by several authors. Well-known early examples are 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001). The onset of the Great Recession of 
2008/2009 has increased the interest in the analysis of the effects of such crises 
considerably. A series of papers finds that financial crises lead to particularly deep and long-
lasting recessions (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2008 and 2009a, IMF 2009a, Cecchetti et 
al. 2009). Moreover, there is strong evidence that such crises also have considerable long-run 
effects on GDP (see, e.g., Cerra and Saxena 2008, Furceri and Mourougane 2009, IMF 
2009b). Since the Great Recession has been mainly perceived to have been triggered by a 
financial crisis, most of the papers analyzing the effects of severe economic crises have 
focused on the financial crises. However, even though the financial crisis was preceded by a 
housing crisis in the United States, the more recent literature on the effects on housing crises 
is relatively scarce. A notable exception is Claessens et al. (2009), who show that housing 
crises lead to particularly deep and long-lasting recessions as well. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several dimensions. It has a special focus 
on housing crises, which have been analyzed in the literature much less frequently than 
financial crises, and on the business cycle effects and possible international spillover effects 
of housing crises (Chapter 2). Moreover, it analyzes the economic conditions under which 
housing crises are particularly costly (Chapter 4). It proposes a method of dealing with the 
problem of heterogeneity in the sample that frequently occurs when the effects of severe 
economic crises are analyzed (Chapter 3). Finally, it analyzes the strength of recoveries 
following recessions associated with severe economic recessions compared to ordinary 
recessions (Chapter 5). In this context, it analyzes the relevance of international 
synchronization of recessions and recoveries for the strength of recessions and for the 
strength and the dynamics of recoveries (Chapter 6). 
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Review of Chapter 2: National and International Business Cycle Effects of 
Housing Crises 
In this chapter, I analyze the national and international business cycle effects of housing 
crises empirically. While most of the recent literature on the effects of severe economic crises 
focus on financial crises (or banking crises), the literature on the effects of housing crises is 
relatively scarce. I contribute to the literature by reexamining the effects of housing crises 
using a sample of historical housing crises for 15 industrial countries and analyze whether 
they generated international spillover effects. 
As regards the national effects of housing crises, I analyze the typical behavior of several 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., GDP, the output gap, private consumption, or residential 
investment) during historical housing crises. I find that housing crises usually lead to long-
lasting recessions and have the most severe effects in the first two years. When comparing the 
results for the historical housing crises with more recent housing crises that began in the 
years 2006 and 2007 in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain I show 
that the more recent housing crises were followed by exceptionally strong recessions in terms 
of GDP growth. However, when comparing the results in terms of the output gap, I find that 
the more recent crises were very similar to the historical housing crises, with the United 
States as a notable exception. 
As regards the international spillover effects, I show by means of a panel data model that 
housing crises in general have significant negative international spillover effects. Further, I 
use a international business cycle model to perform a case study for the four more recent 
housing crises. I show that if these four housing crises had evolved like a normal historical 
housing crisis in terms of GDP growth, they would have led to significant negative 
international spillover effects in nearly all other countries in the sample. However, the model 
is not able to explain the strength of the recessions observed in the other countries in the 
sample in the years 2008 and 2009. 
Review of Chapter 3: Estimating the Shape of Economic Crises under 
Heterogeneity 
In this chapter (joint work with Jonas Dovern), we propose a method of dealing with 
heterogeneity in a sample of severe economic crises. Analyses of severe economic crises 
usually have to rely on large samples because they are rare events. This raises the problem of 
heterogeneity that can occur in the sample, for example, when macroeconomic conditions, 
institutions, or economic policy regimes differ considerably across countries or over time. 
Heterogeneity in the sample may bias the results. 
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We propose using two measures of heterogeneity, namely the time dependent mean and 
the time dependent volatility of GDP growth, to account for heterogeneity in a sample of 
severe economic crises. Our proposal is backed by strong empirical and theoretical evidence 
that differences in macroeconomic institutions or economic policies are reflected in the mean 
and the volatility of GDP growth. We use two related approaches to illustrate the relevance of 
our proposal that have been frequently used to analyze severe economic crises, namely 
estimating the costs of severe economic crises and estimating the shape of severe economic 
crises. In most of our analysis, we use a sample of 40 countries, including industrial and 
developing countries as well as emerging economies, and focus on the effects of financial 
crises. 
The first approach frequently used in the literature to analyze the effects of severe 
economic crises is to estimate their costs. It captures the effects of severe economic crises—
usually in terms of GDP—in a single scalar measure. We use six different measures of costs 
that are taken from the literature and show that our measures of heterogeneity usually can 
help significantly to explain the estimated costs. We show further that the correlation of the 
six cost measures increases once we account for heterogeneity. Finally, we demonstrate that 
using the suggested measures to account for heterogeneity improves forecasting accuracy 
when performing a (quasi) out-of-sample forecasting exercise.  
The second approach frequently used in the literature to analyze the effects of severe 
economic crises is to estimate their shape. This method calculates the average of particular 
variables before, during, and after severe economic crises in the sample. We show that the 
estimated shape of financial crises is much less dependent on the available sample of crises 
when we account for heterogeneity with our suggested measures. The gains of accounting for 
heterogeneity are smaller when we estimate the shape of housing crises. However, this result 
supports our hypothesis that our suggested method is particularly useful with samples that 
exhibit a considerable degree of heterogeneity, but less useful with samples that exhibit a 
lower degree of heterogeneity, because the sample of housing crises is much more 
homogeneous than the sample of financial crises (see Chapter 2). Finally, we compare the 
shape of financial crises with the shape of housing crises. When we do not account for 
heterogeneity in the samples, we find that the shape in terms of GDP growth of both types of 
crises is similar. However, once we account for heterogeneity, we find that housing crises are 
considerably more severe than financial crises. 
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Review of Chapter 4: Costs of Housing Crises—International Evidence 
In this chapter (joint work with Christian Aßmann and Jens Boysen-Hogrefe), we analyze the 
economic conditions under which housing crises are particularly costly. The literature on the 
effects of housing crises finds that housing crises usually cause deep and long-lasting 
recessions, but also shows that this finding is subject to remarkable uncertainty (see, e.g., 
Chapter 2). Moreover, this literature is usually silent on the links between the housing market 
and overall economic activity. We suggest three possible links between the housing market 
and overall economic activity and test empirically whether they are particularly important for 
the costs that a housing crisis causes. 
The first two links we take from the literature that analyzes the links between the housing 
market and overall economic activity in general. Even though some of the empirical results in 
the literature are contradictory, there is some evidence that the housing market influences 
overall economic activity via wealth effects and via the construction sector. The third possible 
link is the link via the banking sector, since activity in the housing market usually goes hand 
in hand with a high degree of leverage financed by the banking sector. This link became 
obvious during the Great Recession of 2008/2009, which originated in the housing market in 
the United States, and which in turn affected the financial sector considerably. 
We construct interaction terms between proxies that capture the relevance of these links 
and a housing crisis indicator and estimate the relevance of the three links in a panel model 
that includes 16 industrial countries. We find strong evidence for the relevance of the banking 
sector link. Housing crises that are associated with banking crises lead to significantly lower 
GDP growth in the first two years of a crisis. In addition, we find some evidence for the 
relevance of the link via wealth effects. Housing crises that occur in countries with a high 
homeownership rate lead to lower GDP growth rates. However, models that control for the 
relevance of wealth effects do not explain the variation in the data better than models that do 
not. Finally, we find no evidence for the relevance of the link via the construction sector. 
Housing crises that occur in countries with a large construction sector relative to overall 
economic activity do not lead to lower GDP growth rates during the first two years of a crisis. 
Our results are robust when we choose alternative identification criteria for housing crises 
and when we control for the possibly endogeneity of housing crises. 
Review of Chapter 5: The Ugly and the Bad: Banking and Housing Crises 
Strangle Output Permanently, Ordinary Recessions Do Not 
In this chapter (joint work with Jens Boysen-Hogrefe and Carsten-Patrick Meier), we 
estimate the strength of recoveries following recessions. The results in the literature on the 
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strength of recoveries are ambiguous. While some of the literature finds that recoveries 
following recessions—in particular in the United States—are considerably strong, some of the 
literature implies that recoveries following recessions associated with severe economic crises 
are weak. We reconcile the contradicting results of the literature by differentiating between 
different types of recessions. 
We differentiate between recessions associated with banking or housing crises and 
recessions that are not associated with such crises (ordinary recessions) and estimate the 
strength of following recoveries using a panel model. The panel model includes 16 industrial 
countries. To estimate the strength of recoveries, we include a current-depth-of-recession 
term—taken from the literature—in our model that takes positive values during recessions 
and is equal to zero otherwise. We find that recoveries following ordinary recessions are 
particularly strong and are stronger the deeper the preceding recession was. We do not find 
evidence that recoveries following recessions associated with severe economic crises are 
particularly strong. Consequently, the permanent effects of ordinary recessions on GDP are 
considerably smaller than the permanent effects of recessions associated with severe 
economic crises. This result is robust when we use alternative identification criteria for 
housing crises, when we include additional variables that control for the influence of a global 
business cycle, or when we control for outliers in our sample. Moreover, our results are not 
driven by the possible endogeneity of housing crises. 
Review of Chapter 6: International Recessions, Crises, and the Dynamics of 
Recoveries 
In this chapter, I analyze the relevance of international synchronization of recessions and 
recoveries for the strength of recessions and the strength and the dynamics of recoveries. 
While there is a rich literature that analyzes international business cycle synchronization, the 
literature on the relevance of international synchronization during recessions and recoveries 
is relatively scarce. Overall, there is some evidence that internationally synchronized 
recessions are deeper and longer than other recessions and that the following recoveries are 
more sluggish than other recoveries. I contribute to the literature by providing additional 
stylized facts on the relevance of international synchronization of recessions and recoveries. 
In particular, I differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions associated with 
severe economic crises. 
First, I analyze the relevance of international synchronization during recessions. Several 
measures are used to estimate the degree of international synchronization. Overall, the 
results are sensitive to the measure that is used to estimate the degree of international 
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synchronization and to outliers in the sample. I find some evidence that internationally 
synchronized recessions are stronger in terms of GDP growth. Countries hit by severe 
economic crises tend to be more vulnerable to internationally synchronized recessions. 
Ordinary recessions seem to have larger international spillover effects. There is only limited 
evidence that the degree of international synchronization has to pass a certain threshold to 
become relevant for the strength of a recession. 
Second, I analyze the relevance of international synchronization for the strength and the 
dynamics of recoveries. For this purpose, I augment the model of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. 
(2010) (see Chapter 5) using an open economy model and estimate it using a panel model. 
Based on the estimation results, I build a stylized two-region model consisting of a small 
open economy and a large rest-of-the-world economy. The two-region model is used to run 
simulations when one or both regions are in a recovery following an ordinary recession or 
alternatively following a recession associated with a severe economic crisis. The results of 
Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) are largely confirmed for the open economy model. Moreover, I 
find that recoveries that are internationally synchronized tend to be stronger than recoveries 
that are not internationally synchronized. However, a country benefits only from 
international synchronized recoveries when the foreign recoveries following ordinary 
recessions. The benefits are larger when the country itself country itself is hit by a severe 
economic crisis.  
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2 National and International Business Cycle Effects of 
Housing Crises1 
2.1 Introduction 
Developments in the housing market can have an enormous influence on the business cycle 
of a country. Housing wealth accounts for a big share of overall private household wealth, so 
that large movements in house prices influence the overall wealth of private households 
dramatically. Also, owning houses or residential apartments usually goes along with high 
leverage. Moreover, the residential construction sector has been proved to be highly 
important for the overall economy. Leamer (2007) demonstrates for the United States that 
recessions have frequently been preceded by downswings in residential construction. 
Therefore, housing crises defined as exceptionally strong downswings in the housing market 
should have the potential to depress the economic activity of a country considerably.  
This is, indeed, the assessment of a number of studies. The IMF (2003) shows that housing 
crises in industrial countries between 1960 and 2002 led, on average, to severe recessions, 
albeit there was a considerable degree of heterogeneity between housing crises. Further, 
housing crises are usually followed by long-lasting negative output gaps that need more than 
five years to turn positive again. This result was confirmed by Ahearne et al. (2005), who 
used a similar approach. Related studies that investigate the consequences of asset price 
busts in general but also differentiate between equity price busts and housing crises confirm 
these results. For instance, Jonung et al. (2006) find that a strong decline in asset prices 
usually has long-lasting negative effects on GDP growth and the output gap. Further, Detken 
and Smets (2004) show that asset price busts causing an above average loss in output usually 
go along with a previous above average asset price increase. Finally, Bordo and Jeanne 
(2002) find that boom and bust cycles occur more frequently in housing markets than in 
stock markets. Studies that compare the consequences of housing market crises with equity 
price busts usually conclude that housing market crises are followed, on average, by more 
severe recessions, in terms of length of the recession and output loss. 
The onset of the Great Recession of 2008/2009 brought the analysis of the consequences 
of severe economic crises back into the focus of macroeconomic research. The consequences 
of severe economic crises were analyzed in a series of papers initiated mainly by the work of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008). Overall, these papers conclude that severe economic crises are 
____________________ 
1 This Chapter is based on the paper: N. Jannsen (2010). National and International Business Cycle Effects of 
Housing Crises. Applied Economics Quarterly, 56(2): 175-206. 
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followed by particularly long-lasting and deep recessions (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009a and 2009b, Claessens et al. 2008, Cecchetti et al. 2009) that lead to permanent output 
losses (Cerra and Saxena et al. 2008, IMF 2009b, Furceri and Mourougane 2009).  
Since the Great Recession of 2008/2009 was mainly perceived to be a financial crisis, the 
literature focuses in general on financial or banking crises. However, the financial crisis in 
the United States was preceded by a boom and bust cycle in the housing market, which 
strongly affected the financial sector. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and 
Spain, also suffered from housing crises in 2008/2009. Given these, it is reasonable to build 
not only on the experience of historical financial crises but also on the experience of historical 
housing crises to gain further insights into the behavior of the economy during the Great 
Recession and thereafter. 
One exception in the current literature is Claessens et al. (2008), who compare the 
consequences of housing crises with those of credit crunches and equity price busts. They 
find that housing crises are followed, on average, by recessions that are roughly as severe as 
recessions triggered by credit crunches, whereas the consequences of equity price busts are 
considerably milder. We start from this observation and try to investigate the role of housing 
crises during the Great Recession of 2008/2009 against the background of the historical 
experience concerning housing crises. Therefore, we first re-examine the evidence on the 
consequences of such crises in industrial countries that has been presented by the IMF 
(2003) and the literature that followed. Then we put the recent experience in countries that 
were hit by housing crises, such as the United States or Spain, into a historical perspective. 
We find that these housing crises were followed by exceptionally strong recessions. Based on 
these findings, we test whether housing crises have the potential to lead to significant 
negative spillover effects to other countries. First, we make the general point that housing 
crises have significant negative spillover effects by applying a panel model. Then, we affirm 
this result by applying an international business cycle model. We show that the housing 
crises that occurred in several industrial countries beginning in 2006 and 2007 are able to 
explain a significant downturn in many industrial countries, in particular in Europe. 
However, according to our international business cycle model, the housing crises are not 
sufficient to explain the steepness of the downturn in the winter half year 2008/2009. We 
conclude that even if we do not take the—compared to historical housing crises—probably 
exceptionally strong spillover effects to the financial sector into account, housing crises on 
their own played an important role during the Great Recession of 2008/2009.  
The paper is structured as follows. After the introduction, Section 2.2 provides a 
comparison of historical housing crises with the housing crises that began in 2006 and 2007 
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in several industrial countries. In Section 2.3, the international spillover effects of housing 
crises are investigated. Section 2.3.1 illustrates the general relevance of the international 
spillover effects. In Section 2.3.2, the spillover effects during the Great Recession are 
analyzed. Section 2.4 summarizes and interprets our results.       
2.2 Historical Housing Crises 
Severe economic crises, such as housing crises, are rare events and potentially lead to 
nonlinear dynamics that differ considerably from normal times. Thus, their effects are hard 
to model empirically using time-series techniques, which capture the average behavior of the 
economy. Therefore, nonparametric historical comparisons of a panel of countries that have 
faced severe economic crises have become a standard tool for assessing the impact of such 
severe crises on the business cycle in the literature on housing crises (see, e.g., IMF 2003) as 
well as in the literature on financial crises (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2008, Claessens et 
al. 2008). To make our historical comparison, we first define a housing crisis using two 
criteria and then analyze the typical behavior of macroeconomic variables during a crisis. 
Finally, we compare the housing crises beginning in 2006 and 2007 in four industrial 
countries with historical patterns.  
2.2.1 Methodology for Identifying Housing Crises 
Basically two methods are used in the current literature to identify housing crises. One looks 
for deviations from the trend in house prices (Detkens and Smets 2004 or Bordo and Jeanne 
2002), while the other one looks for turning points in price movements and regards strong 
price declines as crises (Ahearne et al. 2005 or IMF 2003). In the following, we draw on an 
approach related to the latter by using two criteria to define a housing crisis. Namely, we 
define the start of a housing crisis as the peak in house prices within a rolling window of eight 
years, followed by a price decline from the peak of at least 7.5 percent during the next four 
years. In doing so, we deviate from the existing literature. While Ahearne et al. (2005) 
analyze economic trends around in peaks in house prices identified in a moving window of 
six years, we impose a restriction on the size of the price decrease following the price peak, 
since we are interested more in crises than in cyclical movements. The IMF (2003) identifies 
only 25 percent of the most severe price declines following price peaks as housing crises, 
which limits the number of housing crises identified considerably.   
Historical Housing Crises 
11 
 
Using our definition and a dataset of 15 industrial countries with quarterly data for real 
house prices between 1970 and 2004, we identify 27 housing crises.2 Our approach is robust 
to moderate modifications of both criteria. When we relax our criteria and interpret, in 
analogy to Ahearne (2005), each identified turn in house prices as a housing crisis, we 
identify 30 housing crises. When we tighten our criteria and interpret only those price peaks 
as the beginning of housing crises that were followed of a price decline of at least 15 percent, 
then we remain with 18 identified housing crises.3 
Figure	2.1:			
Real	House	Prices	in	Selected	Countries	
 
Most of the crises took place during the 1970s and 1980s. During the last 20 years, no 
housing crisis can be observed in the dataset. Moreover, housing crises seem to cluster within 
certain time periods. For instance, eight countries faced housing crises in the period from 
1989 to 1991, while seven countries were affected in the period from 1979 to 1981, and four in 
the period from 1973 to 1974. Further, the United States, while fulfilling the above-mentioned 
criteria for a housing crisis in 1979, were also confronted with decreasing real house prices in 
1973 (with a price decrease of 4.3 percent) and in 1989 (with a price decrease of 7.3 percent).  
____________________ 
2 The dataset consists of data for Great Britain, Canada, Spain, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Ireland and was kindly provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). Quarterly house prices in France and the United States as well as land prices in Japan were 
added from national sources (see Appendix A).  
3 The robustness of the results with respect to the identification criteria for housing crises is tested in Appendix B. 
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In the following, we compare the typical economic development during historical crises 
with more recent developments in countries hit by a housing crisis. We consider the following 
four countries: the United States, Great Britain, Spain, and France. Figure 2.2 illustrates that 
these countries faced a housing crisis beginning in 2006 or 2007 according to our criteria.4 
While the United States reached the price peak already in the first quarter of 2006, the price 
peaks in the other three countries occurred at the end of 2007; in Great Britain and Spain in 
the third quarter and in France in the fourth quarter of 2007.  
Figure	2.2:		
Real	House	Prices	in	Selected	Countries	from	2003	to	2008	
 
2.2.2 Historical Comparison 
To extract the typical business cycle behavior of economies during housing crises, we derive 
the median values of several macroeconomic variables within a time span running from 20 
quarters before a crisis to 20 quarters after the onset of a housing crisis, based on the 27 
identified historical crises. In the following figures, the quarter in which the price peak 
occurred is set to zero, so that quarter one is the first quarter with declining house prices. 
Figure 2.3 shows that GDP growth declines sharply, on average, at the beginning of the 
housing crisis and requires more than four years to reach the old level again. The trough is 
usually reached five to eight quarters after the price peak. The shaded area around the 
median value marks the one standard error band over all crises. The figure shows that GDP 
____________________ 
4 Until the first quarter of 2010, our criteria are matched only exactly in case of the United States. For the other 
three countries, we assume that house prices will not exceed their peak value within four years. Also, some other 
countries, such as Ireland, are affected by shrinking house prices or even housing crises. Here we focus on the 
economically most important countries. 
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growth during housing crises is surrounded by remarkable uncertainty. Housing crises that 
were not followed by a quarter of negative GDP growth are just as possible as housing crises 
followed by an even stronger decline in GDP growth. However, even if the uncertainty 
surrounding the business cycle fluctuations during housing crises is taken into account, the 
assessment is that housing crises are followed by a considerable weakening of GDP growth. 
Since most of the historical housing crises took place in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
macroeconomic conditions differed crucially from today’s conditions, it seems sensible to 
adjust GDP for its trend. The deviation of trend reveals a pronounced business cycle pattern 
in which it peaks contemporaneously with house prices which is followed by a long-lasting 
bust with a negative deviation of trend for a period of five years (Figure 2.4).5  
Figure	2.3:		
Gross	Domestic	Product	during	a	Housing	Crisis	
 
Notes:	Percentage	change,	year	to	year;	includes	data	up	to	the	first	quarter	2010;	shaded	area	marks	the	
one‐standard‐error	confidence	band.		
____________________ 
5 The trend was estimated with the Hodrick-Prescott filter based on all available data for GDP from the first 
quarter 1970 up to the fourth quarter 2009 with a standard value of 1600 for lambda. To estimate the most recent 
values for the output gap, the GDP time series were extended using forecasts of autoregressive models to lessen 
the end-point bias problem. 
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Figure	2.4:		
Output	Gap	during	a	Housing	Crisis	
 
Notes:	Calculated	based	on	a	Hodrick‐Prescott	filter	with	a	value	of	1600	for	lambda;	includes	data	up	to	
the	first	quarter	2010;	shaded	area	marks	the	one‐standard‐error	confidence	band.	
On a yearly basis, GDP growth reaches its lowest level in the second year after the price 
peak with an average growth rate of 0.1 percent (Table 2.1). This is far below the average 
growth rate of all the considered countries, which amounts to 2.0 percent. At –1.1 percent, 
the output gap reaches its lowest value in the second and third year of the crisis. 
Table	2.1:	
Average	Growth	Rates	of	GDP	and	Average	Output	Gap	during	a	Housing	Crisisa	
Year	 Real	domestic	productb Average	output	gapc	
Median Lower	quantile Upper	quantile Median
Lower	
quantile	 Upper	quantile
–4	 3.3	 1.1	 5.8 –0.5 –1.2	 0.2
–3	 3.4	 1.5	 5.7 –0.4 –1.4	 0.5
–2	 4.1	 1.5	 6.2 0.2 –0.3	 1.2
–1	 4.1	 2.0	 6.1 1.7 1.1	 2.5
0	 2.3	 0.2	 4.5 1.8 0.4	 2.6
1	 0.1	 –2.4	 2.4 –0.1 –1.2	 0.7
2	 1.0	 –1.7	 3.5 –1.1 –1.9	 –0.2
3	 1.7	 –0.2	 3.7 –1.1 –1.9	 –0.4
4	 3.3	 1.6	 4.8 –0.5 –1.1	 0.0
aHousing	 crisis	 starts	 in	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 year	 0.	— bGrowth	 rates	 calculated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 yearly	
averages	of	quarterly	GDP	in	levels.	—	cYearly	average	over	quarterly	values.
 
Additionally, the results suggest that an increase in house prices previous to a crisis could 
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increases notably before the crisis.6 The monetary and financial indicators react significantly 
to housing crisis as well. On average, real house prices deteriorate sharply at the beginning of 
a housing crisis (Figure 2.5), by even more than is induced by the criteria that were chosen to 
define a housing crisis. Further, share prices decline considerably at the beginning of a 
housing crisis (Figure 2.6). They drop by 15 percent, on average, within the first year.  
 
Figure	2.5:		
Real	House	Prices	during	a	Housing	Crisis	
 
Notes: Percentage change, year to year; includes data up to the first quarter 2010; shaded area marks the one-
standard-error confidence band. 
Figure	2.6:		
Nominal	Share	Prices	during	a	Housing	Crisis	
 
Notes: Percentage change, year to year; includes data up to the first quarter 2010; shaded area marks the one-
standard-error confidence band. 
____________________ 
6 While the output gap is well suited to capture the dynamics of the business cycle, it is not necessarily well suited 
to calculate the costs of a housing crisis compared with the gains of a housing boom that usually takes place before 
the crisis, because for a longer time span, by definition, the output gap adds up to zero and thus is biased to the 
result of no costs.   
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Volatility seems to increase significantly as the crisis surges; however, the uncertainty 
surrounding share price development is extremely high. The short-run real interest rate 
starts to rise roughly two years before house prices reach their peak (Figure 2.7). One 
explanation for this could be that central banks tighten monetary policy to dampen a boom 
that was to some extent induced by rising house prices. Right after the turning point, when 
the crisis becomes visible, monetary policy is eased. 
Figure	2.7:		
Real	Interest	Rates	during	a	Housing	Crisis	
 
Notes:	Calculated	as	the	difference	between	short‐term	interest	rate	and	year‐to‐year	percentage	change	
of	the	headline	consumer	price	index;	includes	data	up	to	the	first	quarter	2010;	shaded	area	marks	the	
one‐standard‐error	confidence	band.	
A comparison of the historically typical business cycle pattern during a housing crisis with 
the current patterns in the United States and in the three European countries shows that 
GDP growth in all four countries was significantly below average for several months. Even if 
we take into account that GDP growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, and France 
before the housing crises was already below the historical average, growth in these countries 
during the housing crisis was exceptionally weak. While GDP growth in the three European 
countries loses momentum roughly when the historical comparison suggests, the downturn 
in the United States occurs with a delay of about 1.5 years.  
Concerning the onset of the downturn in comparison to the historical experience, the 
output gap exhibits a similar pattern to GDP growth: while the downturn in the three 
European countries is in line with the historical comparison, it began in the United States 
with some delay. Even though the swing between the peak and the trough of the output gap is 
relatively large in all four countries and in particular in the United Kingdom and Spain, the 
output gap indicates that the downturn is more in line with the historical experience when 
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compared to GDP growth. While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France are 
likely to have passed the trough by the fourth quarter 2009, this assessment cannot be made 
for Spain.  
The increase in real interest rates starts in all of our four underlying countries about two 
years prior to the price peak. In the United States, the real interest rate begins to decline four 
quarters after the price peak and turns negative after two years. In the European countries, 
the real interest rates fall at the beginning of the crisis. However, this is mainly due to a 
commodity price hike at that time, which led to an acceleration of the inflation rate. The 
nominal interest rates do not start to decline until the fourth quarter 2008 in these countries. 
In the United States, Spain, and France, we can also observe long-lasting phases of very low 
or even negative real interest rates before the price peak, but also in the United Kingdom real 
interest rates were relatively accommodative in the pre-crisis phase. At the same time, house 
prices increased significantly above average in these countries, which indicates a close 
relationship between house prices and monetary conditions. However, in the United 
Kingdom, where the real interest rate was in line with the historical comparison, we can 
observe exceptionally strong house price increases in this period as well. During the crisis, 
the house price declines in the United Kingdom and, with some delay, in the United States 
are particularly strong, while the price declines in Spain and France are, on average, roughly 
as strong as during previous housing crises. Share prices decrease at the beginning of the 
housing crisis in the three European countries and with some delay in the United States. The 
magnitude of this decrease is roughly in line with the historical comparison. During the last 
observable quarters share prices start to increase again in all four countries.  
2.3 International Business Cycle Effects of Housing Crises 
The previous section provided evidence that housing crises usually go hand in hand with 
long-lasting and deep recessions on the national level. This result gives rise to the hypothesis 
that housing crises may lead to significant negative spillover effects to other countries. We 
test this hypothesis by means of two approaches. First, we extend the panel model approach 
introduced by Cerra and Saxena (2008) to estimate the effects of severe economic crises by 
adding a variable that captures the onset of housing crises in foreign countries. Second, we 
use a parsimonious international business cycle model and impose the typical business cycle 
pattern during housing crises on countries suffering from such crises during the Great 
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Recession of 2008/2009. Further, we use the latter approach to estimate to what extent 
housing crises can explain negative spillover effects to other countries in this period.   
2.3.1 Panel Model Approach 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) use a panel model to estimate the impact of severe economic crises, 
such as banking crises or currency crises, on GDP. Therefore, they construct qualitative 
indicators of severe economic crises in the spirit of Romer and Romer (1989), who 
introduced a similar approach to capture the effects of monetary policy shocks on output. 
Then they extend an autoregressive panel model by these indicators and are thereby able to 
estimate the impact of severe economic crises on output. The baseline model is given by 
   
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where tiy ,  is GDP growth of country i in year t, tid ,  is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of one when a severe economic crisis, in our case a housing crises, begins in country i, and ic  
captures country fixed effects.7 Since we are interested in the international spillover effects of 
housing crises, we extend the baseline model by a variable that captures the occurrence of 
housing crises in foreign countries. Obviously, the size of the countries suffering from 
housing crises is relevant for the strength of international spillover effects. Therefore, we 
construct an individual export-weighted foreign housing crises measure, tid , , for all 
countries, i, by multiplying the domestic housing crises indicator, tkd , , with the respective 
export weight of country k for country i, tikw , , and adding up over all p countries in our 
sample: 
  

 p
k
tktikti dwd
1
,,, . (2.2) 
The variable tid ,  takes the value of zero when no trading partner of country i is facing a 
housing crisis and a value of one when all trading partners of country i are facing a housing 
crisis; therefore, this variable is usually expected to take values much smaller than one. 
____________________ 
7 We deviate from the baseline model of Cerra and Saxena (2008) in two aspects. First, while Cerra and Saxena 
(2008) set the dummy variable equal to one for the whole period of a severe crisis, we set the dummy variable 
equal to one only for the first year of a housing crisis, since we have not identified the end of a housing crisis. 
Second, we do not allow for a contemporaneous effect of the housing crises on GDP growth, because the analysis 
in Section 2 revealed that, given our identification criteria, we usually do not have to expect a strong decline in 
GDP growth before the second year of a housing crisis. 
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Extending the baseline model (2.1) by the foreign housing crises variable tid ,  yields to the 
model 
   
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We estimate this model for a panel of the 15 countries for which we identified housing crises 
in Section 2.2. By keeping the dummy variable, tkd , , in the model, we control for the effects 
of domestic housing crises, which seems appropriate, since the analysis in Section 2.2 
revealed that housing crises frequently occurred at the same time in several countries. We 
choose a lag length of 2m , since lags of a higher order are insignificant at the five percent 
level. 
Figure 2.8 shows the effects on GDP growth for a country if ten percent of its trading 
partners were suffering from a housing crisis ( 1.0, tid ). On average, foreign housing crises 
reduce domestic GDP growth for four years. The confidence bands show the 95 percent 
significance level drawn from one thousand Monte Carlo simulations. The strongest effect is 
estimated for the second year after the onset of foreign housing crises, with a decline in GDP 
growth of roughly half a percentage point. 
Figure	2.8:		
Effects	of	Foreign	Housing	Crises	on	Domestic	GDP	Growth	
 
Note:	 Dashed	 lines	 mark	 the	 95	 percent	 confidence	 bands	 based	 on	 1,000	 draws	 from	 a	 Monte	 Carlo	
simulation.		
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2.3.2 International Business Cycle Model 
As a second approach to determine the relevance of international business cycle effects of 
housing crises, we adopt a multi-country model. Usually, the estimation of multi-country 
models in a VAR framework with an increasing number of countries soon becomes infeasible 
due to the exponentially increasing numbers of parameters. Therefore, the empirical 
investigation of international transmission mechanisms concentrated for a long time only on 
models that include a very limited number of countries or on bilateral models. Abeysinghe 
(2001a), Abeysinghe (2001b), and Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) introduced an approach 
that makes the estimation of multi-country models in a VAR framework feasible. Basically, 
they use trade weights to aggregate foreign GDP growth—or other variables of interest—from 
the domestic perspective to single variables and thereby reduce the number of variables to be 
estimated dramatically. Using a similar approach, Pesaran et al. (2004) developed a Global 
VAR model that includes more macroeconomic variables than the former models and 
accounts for cointegration relationships. In a series of papers, this model has been used, for 
example, to investigate the international linkages of the Euro Area (Dees et al. 2007) or to 
run counterfactual simulations (Pesaran et al. 2007). 
Here, we stick to a model that includes only GDP growth and therefore is more in line with 
the approach of Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001), which is sufficient for our purpose to obtain 
rough estimates of international spillover effects of housing crises by imposing the typical 
GDP growth path during housing crises that was developed in Section 2.2. We are aware that 
this simulation strategy is by far not costless. In particular, we implicitly deny the importance 
of transmission channels other than the trade channel and do not model the housing crises 
explicitly. However, by using this highly stylized simulation method we can circumvent—in 
the spirit of the analysis in Section 2.2—the problems that arise when modeling housing 
crises dynamics and are able to straightforwardly obtain the results we are interested in.           
Model Description   
We draw on a multi-country model, that explains domestic GDP growth, tiy , , by means of 
own lags and foreign GDP growth. In its most extensive form, the model is given by 
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where tiD ,  describes the deterministic part of the equation and can consist of a constant and 
a trend term. The key feature of model (2.4) is that it allows domestic GDP to depend on the 
foreign GDP of all other countries included in the model and therefore provides a very 
flexible framework to simulate the international transmission of shocks. Estimation of the 
model becomes feasible by assuming that the relative importance of GDP growth in the 
foreign country, k, for GDP growth in the domestic country, i, is adequately described by the 
export share, tikw , , of country i  to country k. Further, it is assumed that the foreign GDP 
growth elasticity of domestic GDP growth for country i, ij , , is equal over all p countries in 
the sample. Therefore, the individual country equations can be summarized as  
 ti
m
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,,,,     
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where foreign GDP growth,  tiy , , is aggregated via the export shares, tikw , , over all p 
countries 
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and the export shares for the country i sum up to unity. The implicit assumption underlying 
the model structure is that international transmission works mainly through the trade 
channel, while domestic economic activity can be explained adequately by an autoregressive 
process. The former assumption is rationalized by Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), who found 
bilateral trade linkages to be a robust driver of business cycle comovement between 
countries. By allowing the weights to be time-dependent, we account for the varying 
importance of trading partners over time because, for example, demand in some countries 
grows faster than in other countries or the composition of demand changes over time. The 
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export weights are calculated as an average over the last four quarters, such that short-term 
fluctuations do not influence the results.  
We assume for each country that the contemporaneous foreign variable in equation (2.5) is 
weakly exogenous, which is basically equivalent to the small open economy assumption.8  
Based on this assumption, the model can be estimated equation by equation with the method 
of least squares. In this paper, we adopt a model with 25 countries, among which are the 
most important industrial countries.9 The model is estimated on the basis of quarterly data 
from 1985:1 to 2007:4. The choice of the country sample and the estimation period was 
guided by the aim to include as many countries as possible in order to cover all the regions of 
the world on the one hand and to have sufficiently long times series for the estimation of the 
model on the other hand. For all 25 countries included in the model, GDP data are available 
beginning in 1985.10 We estimate the model for quarterly data and allow for five lags for 
domestic and foreign GDP growth at maximum.  
The equations are estimated with a model reduction method.11 This estimation method 
reduces the uncertainty surrounding the simulation exercises and, thus, leads to smaller 
confidence bands.12 We apply a testing procedure which was proposed by Brüggemann and 
Lütkepohl (2001), among others, and that sequentially deletes, equation by equation, the 
regressors with the smallest significance level until a certain threshold of the significance 
level is reached.13 The threshold is set to the ten percent significance level. 
  
____________________ 
8 This is a standard assumption in the Global VAR literature and has been demonstrated frequently to hold in 
general (see, e.g., Dees et al. 2007).   
9 The countries are Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Israel, Turkey, Singapore, and Mexico.  
10 The choice of 1985 as the starting year has the further advantage that it covers the period of the Great 
Moderation and therefore avoids possible instabilities if the model were be estimated with pre-Great Moderation 
data, as well. 
11 The model selection method deletes, based on the complete model with all lags, the variable with the smallest 
significance level until all remaining variables are significant at the ten percent level. All included deterministic 
terms are structurally stable at the five percent level. We test for autocorrelation in the first, second, fourth, and 
eighth lag of the residuals. The country equation for Greece is allowed to include the maximum number of eight 
lags to ensure that the residuals are free of autocorrelation. For the United Kingdom, autocorrelation is detected 
for the eighth lag. All other residuals are free of autocorrelation.  
12 Brüggemann and Lütkepohl (2001) show that model reduction methods also improve forecasting performance 
compared to the unrestricted model. However, they suggest that their results depend strongly on the underlying 
data-generating process and should not be generalized. Therefore, we test our results by providing the simulation 
results for the unrestricted VAR in Appendix C. In general, the test results are qualitatively identical to those of 
the restricted VAR. 
13 A more elaborate, but also complex, model reduction method is the PCGets method proposed by Hendry and 
Krolzig (2001). However, Brüggemann et al. (2001) demonstrate that for simulation exercises, the testing 
procedure applied here leads to comparable results. 
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Simulation Method 
We simulate the transmission effects of housing crises in the four countries where we were 
able to identify a crisis according to our criteria, namely the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and France. Therefore, we compare a baseline scenario to a crisis scenario. 
The consequences of a housing crisis in the four countries for other countries are then 
measured by impulse response functions, calculated as the difference in GDP growth in both 
scenarios. The baseline scenario is the unconditional model forecast, which soon converges to 
the long-run average GDP growth rate (Figure 2.9). For the crisis scenario, we assume that 
the GDP growth in the four countries will develop as during a typical housing crisis—derived 
in Section 2.2—and then forecast GDP growth in the other countries conditional on this 
assumption.  
Figure	2.9:		
Baseline	Forecast,	Crisis	Scenario,	and	Implicit	Shocks	
  
Instead of imposing GDP growth exactly as during historical housing crises, we calculate 
GDP growth for the crisis scenario in the four countries by adding the difference between 
GDP growth in the first period of the housing crises and GDP growth in the respective 
quarter, t, of a housing crisis (“implicit shocks”) to the baseline forecast. Basically, this 
method yields the same patterns of GDP growth as during historical housing crises, but tries 
to correct somehow for different potential growth rates. This could be relevant, because many 
housing crises took place in the 1970s and 1980s, when macroeconomic conditions were 
different from today’s conditions. Most notably, the potential growth rates were usually 
higher, such that the average GDP growth of a historical housing crisis could still be “too 
high” compared to the forecast of GDP growth in the baseline scenario. This method ensures 
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a reasonable replication of the typical business cycle pattern during a historical crisis while 
taking into account the various trend growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s.14  
We start the simulation in the first quarter of 2006, since the housing crises in the United 
States started in that quarter. The implicit shocks for the United Kingdom, Spain, and France 
before the beginning of housing crises are set to zero. The housing crisis in the United States 
is expected to have its largest negative impact in 2007. The housing crises in the three 
European countries are expected to have their largest negative impact in the winter half year 
2008/2009. Naturally, this simulation exercise can only provide a broad measure of the 
international effects of housing crises. However, due to its simplicity, this method is 
appropriate to translate the historical comparison in Section 2.2 directly into an estimate of 
the strength and the length of international effects of housing crises.15  
International Effects of Typical Housing Crises 
Figure 2.10 illustrates that housing crises in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, 
and France lead to a significant decline of GDP growth in most European countries.16 Most 
countries face lower GDP growth rates for several years, beginning in 2007 and testing until 
the end of the simulation period at the end of 2010. Exceptions with only a few quarters of 
significant negative impact or generally small effects are South Korea, Singapore, Australia, 
and Turkey. The biggest decline for most of the European countries and South Africa is 
expected to occur between the third quarter 2008 and the first quarter 2009 and thus in the 
same time period as the three countries in Europe that are directly affected by a housing 
crisis. The housing crisis in the United States leads only to a relatively small decline in GDP 
growth in those countries. In contrast, Canada and Mexico are more affected by the housing 
crisis in United States and thus face the largest decline in GDP growth in 2007, while the 
crises in the European countries have only small spillover effects. Japan faces a relatively 
constant decline in GDP growth between the third quarter of 2007 and the end of 2009.  
Overall, the result obtained in Section 2.3.1, namely that housing crises potentially lead to 
significant international negative spillover effects, is supported.  
 
____________________ 
14 The results are qualitatively the same when we impose average GDP growth during historical housing crises in 
the four countries. In general, the international transmission effects are estimated to be somewhat lesser. 
15 Since the housing market is not modeled explicitly, the following results for the international transmission 
mechanisms hold also for comparable phases of economic downturns in the discussed countries. 
16 Estimation with the model selection method results in no significant effects of the foreign variable on GDP 
growth in Israel and Greece. Therefore, these countries are excluded from the figures.   
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Figure	2.10:		
International	Impact	of	Housing	Crises	on	GDP	Growth	
	
Note:	Dashed	lines	mark	the	95	percent	confidence	bands	calculated	via	bootstrap	simulation	with	1,000	
replications.	
To test how well the international business cycle model can explain GDP growth during the 
Great Recession of 2008/2009, we ran a forecasting experiment beginning in the first 
quarter of 2006, given the housing crises in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, 
and France. Figure 2.11 illustrates that the model by far cannot explain the pronounced 
downturn of the winter half year 2009/2009, which occurred in most countries of our 
sample. In general, the model predicts, for most countries, a longer-lasting but less 
pronounced downturn than observed. Indeed, in several countries, such as Italy, Japan, and 
Portugal, observed GDP growth beginning in the second half of 2009 is higher than predicted 
by the model. While the mean forecast includes several quarters of negative GDP growth for 
many countries within the sample, the confidence bands indicate that in general GDP growth 
is expected to be significantly negative at the five percent level for very few countries, such as 
Italy, Belgium, and Portugal. Further, the model tends to underestimate GDP growth in the 
beginning of the simulation period.  
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Figure	2.11:		
Model	Prediction	of	GDP	Growth	from	2006	to	2010		
Note:	Dashed	lines	mark	the	95	percent	confidence	bands	calculated	via	bootstrap	simulation	with	1,000	
replications.	
One reason for this might be the unusual behavior of GDP growth in the United States 
compared to the historical experience. The comparison between GDP growth during 
historical housing crises and GDP growth during the housing crisis in the United States 
beginning in 2006 revealed that GDP growth in the United States is subject to a delay of 
roughly six quarters. However, if we account for this observation in our forecasting 
experiment, the results do not change dramatically. In general, the model then under-
estimates GDP growth in 2006 and 2007 only to a somewhat lesser degree. Further, it 
explains the decline in GDP growth in the winter half year 2008/2009 somewhat better, as 
well, however, without being able to explain the downturn completely.17  
During the Great Recession, international transmission mechanisms that work through the 
financial sector obviously played an important role. Therefore, the assumption that inter-
national transmission during housing crises works mainly through the trade channel might 
be too restrictive for this period. Therefore, we augment model (5) with a variable that 
aggregates foreign GDP growth with an indicator of financial openness and then re-estimate 
the model. We find that the predicted GDP growth rates of the model for nearly all countries 
____________________ 
17 A figure with the results can be found in Appendix D. 
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in our sample are higher than compared to the baseline model.18 Hence, the augmented 
model fails to explain the downturn during the Great Recession. 
2.4 Conclusion 
A historical comparison shows that housing crises usually lead to long-lasting and deep 
recessions. On average, a housing crisis has the most severe effects in the first two years and 
particularly between the fifth and the seventh quarter after house prices have reached their 
peak. In a typical historical housing crisis, the output gap is not expected to close for five 
years. According to our identification criteria of housing crises the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and France are likely to have faced housing crises beginning in 2006 and 
2007. These housing crises were followed by exceptionally strong recessions when compared 
to the historical experience. While the patterns of GDP growth and the output gap in the 
three European countries were quite similar to the historical comparison, the downturn in 
the United States seems to have started after a delay of roughly six quarters. The observation 
that housing crises do have the potential to trigger recessions on the national level gives rise 
to the hypothesis that they have negative international spillover effects, as well. We show by 
means of two models that emphasize the trade channel as the most important international 
transmission mechanism that housing crises lead to significant negative spillover effects to 
other countries. Further, we show that the housing crises in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and France are sufficient to explain a severe downturn, in particular in 
European countries during the Great Recession, but fail to explain the steep downturn of the 
winter half year 2008/2009. Since we explicitly do not take the spillover effects of the 
housing sector to the financial sector into account—effects that are likely to have been much 
more severe during the Great Recession than during the historical crises—we demonstrate 
the importance of housing crises on their own during the Great Recession. 
  
____________________ 
18 A figure with the results and a more detailed explanation can be found in Appendix D. 
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2.6 Appendix A: Data Description 
The real house prices used in Section 2.2 primarily for the historical comparison were taken 
from a dataset provided by the Bank of International Settlements. House prices for France, 
Spain, and Belgium were interpolated from yearly to quarterly data. House prices for the 
United States (House Price Index – All Transactions, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise) 
and land prices for Japan (Nationwide Land Price Index, Japan Real Estate Institute), 
deflated by consumer prices taken from the national statistical agencies, were added. All 
other data for the historical comparison were taken from the OECD Economic Outlook 
database. All current data in the figures were taken from various national sources to ensure 
that the most recent data were used.19   
GDP data for the model in Section 2.4 were mainly obtained from the OECD Economic 
Outlook database. Data for Singapore, South Africa, and Israel were taken from the 
International Financial Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund. Seasonal 
adjustment was performed with Census X11 for GDP data for Singapore and Israel. Bilateral 
export data for calculating the weights for the foreign variables were taken from the 
International Financial Statistics Database of the International Monetary Fund. 
2.7 Appendix B: Robustness of Identification Criteria for Housing Crises 
The baseline criteria chosen for identifying housing crises were, even though based on 
criteria already applied in the literature, rather ad hoc. They identify housing crises when real 
house prices reach a price peak within a period of eight years and decline in the following 
four years by at least 7.5 percent. In the following, we compare the results based on these 
criteria with those based on the criteria of Ahearne et al. (2005) on the one hand and those 
based on the criteria of the IMF on the other hand. These two alternative identification 
methods can be interpreted as extreme cases. While Ahearne et al. (2005) base their results 
on every price peak within a certain time period, the identification method of the IMF is 
much tighter and only identifies the 25 percent most severe price declines following price 
peaks as housing crises. Applying these identification methods to our sample, we identify 30 
housing crises if we only take every price peak within a period of eight years into account and 
8 housing crises if we apply the identification method of the IMF (2003), compared to the 27 
crises that we identify with our baseline method. Therefore, our identification method seems 
____________________ 
19 Detailed sources of the current data are available upon request.   
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to be much more closely related to that of Ahearne et al. (2005). The baseline method would 
lead to similar results as the IMF method if we tightened the necessary price decline 
following a price peak to roughly 40 percent. Therefore, the comparison between the baseline 
results and those based on the IMF method displays a large range of criteria that could 
possibly be chosen with respect to the minimum price decline.    
A comparison of the typical GDP growth during housing crises shows that the three 
different identification methods yield similar results (Figure 2.B.1). The baseline method and 
the method used in Ahearne et al. (2005) lead to nearly exactly the same results. The method 
used in IMF (2003) assesses GDP growth during housing crises to be considerably weaker 
only between the third and the fourth quarter following the price peak. For the rest of the 
observed period, the IMF method yields, despite there being some quarters before the onset 
of a housing crisis, roughly the same results as the other two methods. 
Figure	2.B.1:		
Comparison	between	Different	Identification	Methods	for	Housing	Crises	Based	on	GDP	Growth	
 
A comparison of the results for the output gap shows that the development of the output 
gap is nearly identical with all three identification methods (Figure 2.B.2). The IMF (2003) 
estimates the output gap to be persistently lower than the other two methods. However, with 
respect to overall uncertainty, the deviation is very small. Overall, we conclude that our 
results are absolutely robust to modifications of our housing crisis identification criteria.   
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Figure	2.B.2:	
Comparison	between	Different	Identification	Methods	for	Housing	Crises	Based	on	the	Output	Gap	
 
2.8 Appendix C: Comparison of the Results of the Restricted and the 
Unrestricted Model 
The results presented for the international business cycle effects of housing crises are based 
on a restricted model in which regressors that are not significant according to a certain 
threshold are set to zero. Brüggemannn and Lütkepohl (2001) claim that this method might 
fail to appropriately represent the data generating process. Therefore, we compare the results 
based on the restricted model with the results of the unrestricted model to ensure that the 
dynamics of the impulse response function are not driven by the model selection method 
applied. 
We compare the results of both models for housing crises in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and France. Figure 2.C.1 shows that the dynamics of the impulse response 
functions qualitatively for both models are nearly identical for all countries. However, for 
many countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan the restricted model assesses the negative 
impact of foreign housing crises to be much more severe than the unrestricted model. The 
confidence bands, which are computed based on the unrestricted model, illustrate that the 
results are usually not significantly different from each other at the five percent level. Most of 
the exceptions to this observation occur at the end of the simulation period from the end of 
2009 until the end of 2010. Because the confidence bands, which are now considerably 
broader than with the restricted model, still points to a significant decline in GDP growth for 
the same set of countries as with the restricted model, we conclude that our results are 
qualitatively robust irrespective of whether we apply a model reduction method or not. 
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Figure	2.C.1:	
	International	Impact	of	Housing	Crises	Based	on	the	Restricted	and	the	Unrestricted	Model	
Note:	Dashed	lines	mark	the	95	percent	confidence	bands	calculated	via	bootstrap	simulation	with	1,000	
replications	based	on	the	unrestricted	model.	
2.9 Appendix D: Additional Results 
In Appendix D, we provide two additional results of forecasting exercises to test how well the 
international business cycle model in Section 2.3.2 can explain GDP growth during the Great 
Recession. 
Section 2.2 shows that GDP growth in the United States during the housing crisis 
beginning in 2006 was subject to a delay of roughly six quarters when compared with 
historical housing crises. If we account for this observation in our simulation exercise, the 
housing crises in all four countries occurred nearly parallel to each other, reaching the trough 
of GDP growth between the fourth quarter 2008 and the third quarter 2009. However, while 
the forecast improves somewhat by accounting for this observation, the model still fails to 
explain the strong decline in GDP growth in the winter half year 2008/2009 (Figure 2.D.1). 
During the Great Recession, international transmission mechanisms that work through the 
financial sector obviously played an important role. Therefore, the assumption that inter-
national transmission during housing crises works mainly through the trade channel might 
be too restrictive for this period. Consequently, we augment model (2.5) with a variable that 
aggregates foreign GDP growth with an indicator of financial openness and then re-estimate  
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Figure	2.D.1:		
Forecast	with	Delayed	Recession	in	the	United	States	
	Note:	Dashed	lines	mark	the	95	percent	confidence	bands	calculated	via	bootstrap	simulation	with	1,000	
replications.	
the model. To calculate the financial openness indicator, we use the data set described in 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). We calculate the financial openness indicator as the ratio of 
the sum of total foreign assets and total foreign liabilities relative to GDP for all countries in 
our sample. These ratios are then used as weights for calculating foreign GDP growth in 
equation 2.6. To calculate foreign GDP growth for country i, we set the financial openness 
indicator of country i equal to zero and then rescale the other financial openness indicators to 
sum to zero. However, since we do not have bilateral financial openness indicators, the 
weights used to calculate foreign GDP growth are, in contrast to the export weights, basically 
the same for all countries, leading to nearly identical foreign GDP growth variables. We find 
that the predicted GDP growth rates of the model are higher for nearly all countries in our 
sample than with the baseline model (Figure 2.D.2). Hence, the augmented model fails to 
explain the downturn during the Great Recession.20 
____________________ 
20 These results remain valid when we do not augment the model with the financial openness indicator for 
aggregated foreign GDP growth, but rather use an indicator for the export-weighted foreign GDP growth. 
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Figure	2.D.2:		
Forecast	of	a	Model	Including	Foreign	GDP	Weighted	with	a	Financial	Openness	Indicator	
	Note:	Dashed	lines	mark	the	95	percent	confidence	bands	calculated	via	bootstrap	simulation	with	1,000	
replications.	
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3 Estimating the Shape of Economic Crises under 
Heterogeneity21 
3.1 Introduction 
The Great Recession of 2008/2009 has increased the interest of economic researchers, 
forecasters, and policy makers in the analysis of severe economic crises and in particular in 
the analysis of financial crises. A series of studies has investigated the shape and the costs of 
financial crises and found, among other things, that such crises usually lead to severe 
recessions. However, the analysis of financial crises as of other severe economic crises, like 
housing crises, has to rely on large panel data sets, because such crises are rare events. This 
raises the problem of heterogeneity within the panel, which can occur in several dimensions: 
The overall macroeconomic conditions, institutions, and economic policy regimes can differ 
substantially across countries and over time. These heterogeneities potentially bias the 
estimates of the shape and the costs of severe economic crises considerably.  
In the literature several methods have been applied to investigate the shape and the costs 
of severe economic crises. Since such crises are extraordinary events, during which the 
‘ordinary’ interdependencies might not apply, researchers do not rely only on times series 
models, but frequently use event-study approaches.22 Within these event-study approaches 
historical episodes of severe economic crises are identified and investigated separately. Two 
closely related approaches are (i) to estimate the shape of severe economic crises or (ii) to 
estimate the costs of severe economic crises. First, the shape of economic crises is estimated 
by calculating the average of the variables of interest before, during, and after a crisis over all 
crises in the sample. Well-known early examples are Eichengreen et al. (1995) and Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1999). With the onset of the financial crisis of 2008/2009 a series of studies 
analyzed the shape of financial crises, housing crises, and credit crunches. Reinhart and 
Rogoff used this approach in a number of papers to illustrate that financial crises usually 
have a dramatic negative impact on output (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 
2009). A series of other studies relies on this method to establish stylized facts of financial 
crises or other severe economic crises and to draw conclusions for recent developments 
(Claessens et al. 2008 and 2010, IMF 2009a and 2009b, Jannsen 2010). Second, a closely 
____________________ 
21 This Chapter is based on the paper: J. Dovern and N. Jannsen (2009). Estimating the Shape of Economic Crises 
Under Heterogeneity. Kiel Working Papers 1520, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
22 Examples for studies that rely on time-series models to investigate severe economic crises are Cerra and Saxena 
(2008) and Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010). 
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related approach used in the literature is to estimate the costs of severe economic crises—
usually in terms of GDP—capturing the consequences of crises in a single scalar measure 
(Bordo et al. 2001, Cecchetti et al. 2009, Claessens et al. 2008, Hoggarth et al. 2002). The 
options to control for heterogeneity in the sample of severe economic crises within these 
approaches are limited. One well-known and frequently used option is to adjust the data by 
eliminating their trend. Furthermore, the problem of heterogeneity can be dampened to 
some extend by choosing a homogeneous panel. However, these options might be—in 
dependence on the specific research question—not appropriate, not feasible, or not sufficient 
to account for heterogeneity in a formal and consistent way.  
In this paper, we suggest an alternative option to deal with heterogeneities in the panel. We 
propose that time dependent mean growth rates and volatilities of the variable of interest are 
reasonable measures to account for heterogeneity inherent in a panel of crises. In this paper, 
we focus on the effects of severe economic crises on real GDP. There is strong theoretical and 
empirical evidence that differences in macroeconomic conditions, institutions or economic 
policy regimes are reflected in the mean growth rate of GDP and its volatility. For example, it 
is well-established that better institutions lead on average to higher growth rates of GDP and 
that independent central banks with a strong focus on inflation stabilization usually dampen 
the volatility of GDP growth. Therefore, accounting for heterogeneity with these measures 
might lead to more reliable results for the shape and the costs of severe economic crises.  
We illustrate the relevance of our approach by demonstrating that the estimated costs of 
crises—measured with several concepts based on GDP—crucially depend on time dependent 
mean growth rate and the time dependent volatility of GDP for a large panel of financial 
crises. Furthermore, we show that forecasts of the costs of crises are significantly improved 
by accounting for heterogeneity across countries and historical episodes. Then, we apply our 
approach to the analysis of the shape of severe economic crises. We show that our approach 
leads to results that are much less dependent on the available data panel used to estimate the 
shape. Thus, our approach provides more reliable information. Moreover, we show that 
accounting for heterogeneity considerably changes the assessment when comparing different 
types of severe economic crises. We conclude that accounting for the heterogeneity by time 
dependent means and volatilities of growth rates is a relevant issue when estimating the costs 
and the shape of severe economic crises. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data set, 
the measures we use to account for heterogeneity, and the methods we use to estimate the 
shape and the costs of severe economic crises. In Section 3, we illustrate the relevance of 
accounting for heterogeneity when analyzing the costs of financial crises. In Section 4, we 
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show that accounting for heterogeneity is relevant when we analyze the shape of severe 
economic crises. Finally, Section 5 summarizes our results. 
3.2 Data Set and Measures of Heterogeneity  
We use yearly data for GDP per capita for 40 countries between 1960 and 2006 provided by 
Barro and Usura (2008). The countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. Overall, our sample exhibits a considerable degree of heterogeneity, since 
industrial countries as well as emerging markets and developing countries are included. 
Regarding the dating of financial crises, we rely on the dating scheme described in 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2008b). Overall, we identify 58 financial crises in our data set. While 
most of our analysis is based on this sample of financial crises at a later stage we compare 
financial crises with housing crises. We identify housing crises based on a data set of real 
house prices provided from the Bank for international Settlements. This data set is available 
only for 16 industrial countries from 1970 to 2009.23 We identify housing crises as price peak 
within a rolling window of nine years, when prices fall at least by 7.5 percent following the 
peak. These identification criteria have been used in the literature (see, e.g. Aßmann et al. 
2010, Jannsen 2010) and are similar to alternative identification criteria used in the 
literature (see, e.g., IMF 2003, Ahearne et al. 2005). They have been proved to provide 
considerably stable results. Overall, we identify 29 housing crises in our sample.24 We define 
that a housing crisis begins in the year house prices have peaked.   
We propose to use two measures, namely the time dependent mean and the volatility of 
GDP growth, to account for heterogeneity in our panel of severe economic crises. Even 
though these measures are hardly sufficient to comprehensively control for all types of 
heterogeneity and other variables might be useful as well, they have the advantage that they 
are usually available and can be easily calculated. This is particular true when we estimate the 
typical shape of crises, where it is difficult to use other variables to control for heterogeneity. 
____________________ 
23 The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
24 For a more detailed description of the identified housing crises and robustness checks with respect to the 
identification criteria, see Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010). 
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However, other control variables are also frequently not available when the costs, of severe 
economic crises are calculated for panels that include, e.g., many developing or emerging 
economies or when they cover long time spans. We calculate the time dependent mean and 
the volatility of GDP growth before a severe economic crisis begins to guarantee that these 
two measures are not influenced by the crisis itself. 
3.3 Heterogeneity and the Costs of Severe Economic Crises 
We illustrate the relevance of accounting for heterogeneity when calculating the costs of 
crises threefold. First, we show that there is a significant relationship between the strength of 
a financial crisis and our measures of heterogeneity. Second, we demonstrate that the 
correlation of different measures for the strength of financial crises increases, once we 
account for heterogeneity. Finally, we perform an out-of-sample forecasting exercise and 
illustrate that using our measures of heterogeneity improves the forecasting accuracy. Before 
we illustrate the relevance of accounting for heterogeneity, we describe the methods we use to 
calculate the costs of financial crises. 
3.3.1 Costs of Financial Crises 
Several methods to calculate the costs of severe economic crises haven been used in the 
literature. Therefore, we do not exclusively focus on a single method, but calculate the costs 
of severe economic crises with six different measures. First, we calculate the sum of negative 
output gaps until the output gap becomes positive. The output gap is calculated as difference 
between GDP and trend GDP estimated with a Hodrick-Precott filter using a value of 100 for 
the smoothing parameter lambda (Costs I). Second, we calculate the sum of the differences 
between the former peak of GDP and GDP until it reaches its old peak again (Costs II, 
Cecchetti et al. 2009). Next, we calculate the sum of the differences between the pre-crisis 
trend growth of GDP and GDP growth until it reaches the first time its trend growth again. 
Trend growth is calculated for the three years preceding the financial crisis (Costs III, Bordo 
et al. 2001) and alternatively for the five years preceding the crisis (Costs IV, Hoggarth et al. 
2002). Finally, we estimate the trend growth of GDP for the year t-1 (when a financial crisis 
starts in year t) with a HP-Filter using a value of 100 for lambda. Then, we extrapolate trend 
GDP with the trend growth rate in t-1 and calculate the sum of differences between trend 
GDP and GDP (Hoggarth et al. 2002). While Hoggarth et al. (2002) used a defined end of the 
financial crises to determine the period for which they calculate the costs, we use—because 
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the end of the financial crises for our data set is not available—two different approaches to 
determine the period: We calculate the sum until GDP growth reaches the first time the trend 
growth of t-1 again (Costs V) and alternatively, we follow Laeven and Valencia (2008) and 
calculate the sum for the first four years of the crisis (Costs VI). The first year of the period 
for that we calculate the cost is the first year when output gap becomes negative, the first year 
when GDP is below its pre-crisis peak or the year a severe economic crisis begins. When a 
cost measure signals no costs, we delete the observation from our sample of crises.  
3.3.2 Relevance of Accounting for Heterogeneity 
We use a linear regression framework to illustrate the relevance of accounting for 
heterogeneity when estimating the costs of financial crises:  
 i
n
i
m
i
j
i volmeant εccos  , (3.1) 
where jitcos  is cost measure j calculated for crisis i, 
m
imean  is the mean of GDP growth 
calculated for the period from t-m to t-1 before crisis i, and nivol is the volatility calculated for 
the period from t-n to t-1 before crisis i. The fitted values of the linear regression (3.1) are the 
measures of the costs of financial crises that account for heterogeneity. 
We start, by investigating whether our measures of heterogeneity have some explanatory 
power for the cost measure described above. Since there is no strong empirical or theoretical 
evidence which period should be used to calculate the mean growth rate or the volatility of 
GDP growth to account for heterogeneity, we use ad-hoc a period of 10 years preceding a 
crisis. Usually at least one of these two variables has some explanatory power for the costs of 
a financial crisis (Table 3.1). Moreover, likelihood ratio tests indicate that models that 
incorporate mean and volatility are in most cases superior in explaining the costs of a crisis 
compared to the commonly used models that incorporates only a constant. An exception is 
cost measure II, which calculates the cost by taking the sum of the difference between the 
former peak of GDP and GDP until it reaches its former peak again. 
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Table	3.1:		
Dependence	of	Costs	of	Financial	Crises	on	Mean	and	Volatility	of	GDP	Growth		
	 Mean	and	volatility	calculated	for	10	years	
I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
Constant	 2.9	ሺ1.2ሻ	 57.0	ሺ0.7ሻ 0.4	ሺ0.2ሻ –0.0	ሺ0.0ሻ 35.7	ሺ0.6ሻ	 14.9	ሺ1.3ሻ
Mean		 1.0	ሺ1.1ሻ	 3.3	ሺ0.2ሻ –0.1	ሺ0.2ሻ 0.3	ሺ1.1ሻ 24.3	ሺ2.4ሻ	 5.2	ሺ2.7ሻ
Volatility	 1.9	ሺ1.7ሻ	 –1.1	ሺ0.1ሻ 1.7	ሺ3.5ሻ 1.3	ሺ3.5ሻ –6.6	ሺ0.5ሻ	 1.7	ሺ0.7ሻ
AIC	 379.0	 470.5	 220.8 207.4 567.1	 367.6
LR‐test	 0.22 0.95	 0.00 0.00 0.01	 0.02
Observations	 50	 37	 40 40 46	 41	
Notes:	t‐values	in	parenthesis;	LR‐test	indicates	the	p‐value	of	the	hypothesis	that	the	model	is	better	than	
a	model	that	includes	only	a	constant.		
The period of 10 years for calculating mean and volatility preceding the crises is chosen 
rather ad-hoc. Therefore, we run a grid search over alternative periods. Within the grid 
search, we compare models over alternative periods for calculating mean and volatility up to 
10 years preceding a crisis and chose the model with the best fit according to the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). We calculate the p-values of the estimated parameter values 
with a bootstrap simulation over 1,000 draws. The results that we received with our ad-hoc 
measures are largely affirmed. Usually at least one of our two measures of heterogeneity 
turns out to have a significant explanatory power for the costs of a crisis and for five of six 
cost measures the model is significantly better compared to the standard model according to 
likelihood ratio tests (Table 3.2). Again only the cost measure based on GDP compared to its 
former peak (costs II) is an exception. Overall, the grid search chooses periods for calculating 
mean and volatility of GDP growth preceding a crisis that are somewhat shorter than our ad-
hoc choice. 
The different measures, we use to calculate the costs of financial crises are positively 
correlated, but are not unique, e.g. when we calculate the rank of the crises in terms of their 
costs. However, when our hypothesis that macroeconomic conditions are at least to some 
extent relevant for the measured costs of financial crises is true, the correlation of the 
different cost measures should in tendency increase, once we account for these conditions. 
Therefore, we compare the correlation between the different cost measures based on 
Spearman’ rank correlation when we do not account for heterogeneity with the correlation 
when we account for heterogeneity. Spearman’ rank correlation is based on the rank that is 
appointed by the cost measures to the crises. It has the advantage that it is more robust to 
outliers than simple correlation measures of the costs. We find that the correlation increases 
in 11 out of 15 cases, once we account for heterogeneity (Table 3.3). However, the increase in 
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correlation is usually not significantly different from zero according to conventional 
significance levels; only in one case the correlation is significantly lower. 
Table	3.2:		
Dependence	of	Costs	of	Financial	Crises	on	Mean	and	Volatility	of	GDP	Growth:	Grid	Search	
	 I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
Constant	 2.5	ሺ0.5ሻ	 18.9	ሺ0.4ሻ –1.2	ሺ0.9ሻ –0.2	ሺ0.2ሻ 63.7	ሺ1,7ሻ	 7.7	ሺ0.8ሻ
Mean		 1.5	ሾ0.13ሿ	 11.4	ሾ0.41ሿ 0.6	ሾ0.57ሿ 0.4	ሾ0.18ሿ 23.2	ሾ0.07ሿ	 7.1	ሾ0.01ሿ
Volatility	 2.8	ሾ0.11ሿ	 4.7	ሾ0.53ሿ 1.6	ሾ0.00ሿ 1.2	ሾ0.00ሿ –21.0	ሾ0.69ሿ	 2.7	ሾ0.27ሿ
Best	mean	 5	 1	 3 3 2	 7	
Best	lag	 8	 3	 4 6 6	 3	
AIC	 375.6	 468.7	 209.4 215.4 561.8	 361.8
LR‐test	 0.04 0.40	 0.00 0.00 0.00	 0.00
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	 parenthesis;	 p‐values	 in	 square	 parenthesis;	 p‐values	were	 calculated	 by	 simulations	
with	1,000	draws;	LR‐test	 indicates	the	p‐value	of	 the	hypothesis	 that	the	model	 is	better	 than	a	model	
that	includes	only	a	constant.		
Table	3.3:		
Difference	between	Spearman’s	Rank	Correlation	when	Cost	Measures	are	adjusted	for	Mean	and	
Volatility	and	Original	Cost	Measures	
	 I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
I	 	 	 	
II	 0.12	ሺ0.5ሻ	 	 	
III	 0.30	ሺ1.2ሻ	 –0.22	ሺ0.9ሻ 	
IV	 0.36	ሺ1.5ሻ	 –0.04	ሺ0.1ሻ 0.02	ሺ0.1ሻ 	
V	 –0.24	ሺ1.1ሻ	 0.29	ሺ1.2ሻ 0.08 ሺ0.4ሻ 0.17	ሺ0.7ሻ 	
VI	 0.14	ሺ0.6ሻ	 0.15	ሺ0.6ሻ 0.21	ሺ0.9ሻ 0.17	ሺ0.7ሻ –0.44	ሺ1.9ሻ	 	
Notes:	Positive	value	indicates	that	the	correlation	coefficient	is	higher	for	the	adjusted	data;	z‐values	in	
parenthesis;	 z‐values	 were	 calculated	 based	 on	 a	 Fisher	 transformation	 of	 the	 calculated	 correlation	
coefficients.	
The relevance of accounting for heterogeneity can be proved further with a forecast 
comparison. When accounting for heterogeneity is relevant it should improve the forecasting 
performance of a model that includes our measures of heterogeneity. We showed already that 
models that include these measures are in most cases significantly better than models that do 
not according to a likelihood ratio test and therefore exhibit a better in-sample forecasting 
performance. However, this does imply that the out-of-sample forecasting performance is 
better as well. To test the (quasi) out-of-sample forecasting performance, we chose randomly 
a subsample of financial crises, estimate models that include our measures of heterogeneity 
and models that include only a constant and compare the forecasting performance of both 
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models for the remaining crises.25 We randomly draw 2/3 of the crises in our sample to 
estimate the models and compare the forecasting performance for the remaining 1/3 of the 
crises. This procedure is repeated 1,000 times. We find that the forecasting performance 
improves significantly when we account for heterogeneity (Table 3.4). For all cost measures 
the models that account for heterogeneity provide a better forecasting performance for more 
than 95 percent of all draws than the models based on the (unadjusted) average cost 
measure. 
Table	3.4:		
Forecasting	Costs	of	Financial	Crises	with	Mean	and	Volatility	
	 I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
Relative	RMSE	 0.91 0.91	 0.70 0.75 0.82	 0.82
p‐value	 0.97 0.99	 0.97 0.97 1.00	 0.99
Notes:	Relative	RMSE	denotes	the	RMSE	of	the	models	including	mean	and	volatility	relative	to	the	RMSE	
with	the	models	that	only	include	a	constant;	p‐values	indicate	the	likelihood	that	the	RMSE	for	the	model	
that	includes	mean	and	volatility	is	lower;	p‐values	were	calculated	by	simulations	with	1,000	draws.		
3.4  Accounting for Heterogeneity When Estimating the Shape of Severe 
Economic Crises 
For estimating the typical shape of severe economic crises, we follow the literature and take 
the average of the variable of interest over all crises in our sample (see, e.g., Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2008c, Claessens et al. 2008, or IMF 2009a). Consider a variable ity  that is observed 
for different countries i  over different time periods t . Furthermore, assume that a number of 
C  crises are identified. Denote as  ci  and  ct  the country and time at which crisis c  
occurred. The typical shape of ity  in a window of size 12 S  around a crisis is then 
estimated as 
     
C
c
sctcis yC
y
1
,
1ˆ , for SSs ,..., .26 (3.2) 
However, this approach disregards the fact that usually the identified historical episodes of 
severe economic crises exhibit fundamentally different overall macroeconomic conditions, 
____________________ 
25 When estimating the models, we use the periods for calculating mean and volatility of GDP growth the grid 
search proved to be optimal. This approach is equivalent to account for parameter uncertainty, but not for model 
uncertainty, what is standard in the literature that investigates the forecasting performance of models. 
26 We present our approach in terms of the mean but all results carry over to the case, where the median serves as 
the preferred measure. 
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institutions, or economic policy regimes. Consequently, the estimates of syˆ  in (3.2) might be 
sensitive to the composition of the sample used to identify severe economic crises.  
To this end, we suggest to account for heterogeneity by standardizing the variable of 
interest tiy ,  with measures that account for the heterogeneity in the sample. We propose to 
subtract from tiy ,  the “local” mean of GDP growth    w ctciy ,  and then divide by the “local” 
standard deviation    w ctci , , each calculated over the w  periods before the crisis c  begins. 
The standardized typical shape of y  can then be obtained by 
 
        
   




 C
c w
w
sctci
s
sctci
sctci
yy
C
y
1
,
,
,1~
  , for SSs ,..., . (3.3) 
The result can be calibrated to a crisis 1C , for which we want to estimate the path of 
   1,1  CtCiy  for SSs ,...,  that is in line with the average behaviour of this variable during 
other financial crises. The calibrated path sy~  for the crisis 1C  can be calculated with the 
“local” mean    w CtCiy 1,1   and standard deviation    w CtCi 1,1   over the most recent w  periods:  
            w CtCiw CtCissCtCi yyy 1,11,11,1 ~ˆ    , for SSs ,..., . (3.4) 
Local means and local standard deviations can be calculate for single countries or 
alternatively for particular country groups, e.g., for industrial countries, and for certain time 
periods, e.g., only taking periods after a particular year into account. 
As an example for standardization, we compare the shape of financial crises with the shape 
of housing crises. For this comparison, the standardization could be particular useful, 
because due to data availability housing crises can be identified only for a subsample of our 
sample of financial crises. Furthermore, the subsample differs considerably from the overall 
sample, because it includes only industrial countries from 1970 to 2008. An alternative 
would be to scale the sample of financial crises down to the sample of housing crises. 
However, then we would end up with only 16 financial crises in our subsample, with only 8 of 
them associated with a downturn of economic activity.27 Moreover, these 8 financial crises 
were associated with housing crises, so that one might not receive conclusive results when 
using only the subsample to estimate the shape of financial crises.28 
____________________ 
27 In this context we define a downturn as at least one year with negative GDP growth rate.  
28 Even if there would have been enough financial crises in the subsample to estimate the shape, the case of for 
standardization could arise again when financial crises occurred only in countries and during periods that were 
very different from those when housing crises occurred. 
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We calculate our two measures to standardize the data during the financial and housing 
crises for a period of 10 years before a crisis begins. When we compare GDP growth during 
financial crises and housing crises, it seems to evolve nearly similarly in the first years of a 
crises (Figure 3.1). A small difference is that GDP growth before and after the crisis seems to 
be somewhat higher in the case of housing crises. However, once we use the standardized 
results housing crises apparently are more severe than financial crises. When we compare the 
output gap during financial and housing crises, the differences between the original result 
and the standardized result is considerably smaller. This result illustrates that estimating the 
output gap is already some kind of standardization of the data, which might be appropriate 
for our sample. However, the standardized results show a somewhat more pronounced 
business cycle movement during housing crises, with a higher output gap before the crisis 
begins and a lower output gap during the crisis.  
Figure	3.1:	
GDP	Growth	and	the	Output	Gap	during	Financial	Crises	and	Housing	Crises	
 
Notes:	Year	0	indicates	the	first	year	of	a	financial	or	a	housing	crisis.	
Even though the results revealed that our approach can lead to different conclusions this 
does not mean necessarily that it is useful concept. In the following, we illustrate the 
usefulness by demonstrating that the standardization of data leads to more homogeneous 
results when we estimate the shape of crises for different samples. Consequently the results 
are less dependent on the sample one has at hand to estimate the shape of severe economic 
crises. We draw randomly 75 percent of our financial crises and calculate the average of GDP 
growth during crises based on this subsample and compare the results for the original data 
and the standardized data. We repeat this procedure 1,000 times and check whether the 
standard deviation of the 1,000 results is lower for the standardized data. However, the 
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standardized data should exhibit a lower standard deviation by construction. Therefore, in 
our 1,000 draws we do not collect mean growth rates for a particular year, but calculate the t-
value as ratio of the mean growth rate and the standard deviation of the 75 percent of crises, 
which are in its size not systematically dependent on differences in the standard deviations in 
different data sets. 
When we compare the distribution of t-values obtained in 1,000 random draws of financial 
crises, we find that the distribution for the standardized data is closer centered around its 
mean (Figure 3.2).29 Moreover, based on the original data we receive more extreme results 
when we change the sample used to estimate the shape of financial crises.  
Figure	3.2:	
Distribution	of	t‐values	for	the	Deviation	of	GDP	Growth	Based	on	Original	Data	and	on	Standardized	Data	
 
Notes:	Distribution	based	on	t‐values	of	the	men	growth	rate	of	GDP	for	particular	years	of	subsamples	of	
financial	crises;	Distributions	were	calculated	by	simulations	with	1,000	draws.		
These findings are supported by formal tests. An F-test reveals that the variance of the 
results based on the original data is significantly higher compared to the variance of the 
results of the standardized data (Table 3.5). Moreover, the (excess) kurtosis is considerably 
higher and significantly different from zero for the results based on the original data, while 
the results based on the standardized data in several cases do not exhibit significant excess 
kurtosis at conventional significance levels.30 When we adjust our rather ad-hoc chosen 
period of 10 years to calculate the two measures to standardize the data to 15, 10, and 5 years 
our results remain valid. 
____________________ 
29 We report the mean-adjusted t-values. 
30 Tests on skewness of the distribution and on Normal-distribution show for both cases that the distributions are 
skewed and not normal distributed.   
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Table	3.5:		
Variance	and	Kurtosis	of	Distributions	Based	on	Original	Data	and	Standardized	Data	
Year	 	 Financial	Crises Housing	Crises	 Output	Gap
	 5 10 15 20 10	 10
1	 Variance	 0.00	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03	 0.00Kurtosis	 0.00/0.80	 0.00/0.89 0.00/0.42 0.00/0.68 0.00/0.00	 0.02/0.24
2	 Variance	 1.00	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59	 1.00Kurtosis	 0.00/0.00	 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.78 0.00/0.00	 0.02/0.00
3	 Variance	 0.00	 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00	 0.19Kurtosis	 0.00/0.61	 0.00/0.34 0.00/0.73 0.00/0.10 0.00/0.00	 0.02/0.10
4	 Variance	 0.00	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	 0.00Kurtosis	 0.00/0.00	 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.00 0.00/0.20	 0.00/0.00
Notes:	Variance	denotes	the	p‐value	of	an	F‐test	on	equal	variance	of	the	results	based	on	the	original	data	
compared	 to	 the	 standardized	data;	 first	 value	 of	 kurtosis	 denotes	 the	p‐value	 of	 an	 F‐test	 on	 ሺexcessሻ	
kurtosis	for	the	original	data,	second	value	refers	to	the	standardized	data.	
The relevance of accounting for heterogeneity diminishes when we investigate housing 
crises. The variance of the results is significantly lower only for two of the four years. To some 
extend this result is not surprising. It supports our hypothesis that accounting for 
heterogeneity is particular useful for samples that exhibit a considerably degree of 
heterogeneity. Since our sample of housing crises is much more homogeneous than our 
sample of financial crises the gains from standardization are lower. The relevance of 
accounting for heterogeneity also diminishes when we investigate the impact of financial 
crises on the output gap. Since estimating an output gap is already some form of accounting 
for heterogeneity, this supports our hypothesis, too. However, it depends strongly on the 
specific research question whether to use trend-adjusted data is appropriate. Moreover, when 
using trend-adjusted data the results considerably depend on the method applied for the 
trend-adjustment.   
Overall, we find that accounting for heterogeneity in the panel by standardizing the data 
can change the results dramatically when we compare the shape of different types of severe 
economic crises, which are only available for different panels. Moreover, the estimated 
shapes of severe economic crises could be considerably more dependent on the underlying 
sample for original data than for standardized data. The result that the relevance of 
accounting for heterogeneity diminishes, when we use a more homogeneous panel of severe 
economic crises, i.e. as in the case of housing crises, or when we use an alternative method of 
accounting for heterogeneity, i.e. as in the case of the output gap, supports our hypothesis 
that accounting for heterogeneity is particular useful when the panel of severe economic 
crises exhibits a considerable degree of heterogeneity. However, in dependence on the 
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specific research question in several cases it might not be feasible or appropriate to use a 
homogeneous sample or alternatively to use trend-adjusted data.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The analysis of severe economic crises, like financial crises or housing crises, often relies on 
large panel data sets, as these events are rarely observed. This raises the problem of 
heterogeneity in the panel, e.g., when very different countries are included or very long time 
periods are used. This, in turn, can lead to biased or imprecise estimates. In some cases, the 
problem of heterogeneity might be dampened by restricting the data set to a homogeneous 
group of countries or by using some kind of standardization of the variables of interest. 
However, the feasibility and appropriateness of these strategies strongly depend on the 
research question and on the available number of observations of severe economic crises.  
In this context, we propose a standardization approach that can considerably reduce the 
problem of heterogeneity. When the panel data set is highly heterogeneous with respect to 
the overall macroeconomic conditions, the institutions, or the economic policy regimes 
across different countries and over time periods this should show up in the average GDP 
growth rate and the volatility of GDP. Therefore, we suggest using time dependent mean 
growth rates and volatilities of GDP to account for heterogeneity when estimating the costs of 
severe economic crises and when estimating the shape of severe economic crises. 
In this paper, we have shown that these two measures have explanatory power for the 
estimated costs of financial crises, that they increase the forecasting power for costs of crises 
significantly, and that accounting for heterogeneity usually increases the correlation between 
different costs measures—even though not significantly at conventional significance levels. 
Moreover, we illustrate that it can make a huge difference to standardize the data before 
estimating the shape of severe economic crises, e.g. when we compare the shape of different 
types of crises. We illustrate, that the estimated shape of financial crises is significantly more 
robust to the composition of the sample of crises and produces considerably less extreme 
results when we account for heterogeneity and use standardized data. However, our results 
show also that the gains of our approach are lower in particular circumstances. Overall, it 
depends strongly on the specific research question and the available data set, whether our 
approach is a useful tool for analyzing severe economic crises. 
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4 Costs of Housing Crises: International Evidence31 
4.1 Introduction 
The severe recessions of 2008/2009 in almost all industrialized countries renewed interest in 
the analysis of economic crises. Since these recessions were mainly perceived to be triggered 
by a financial crisis, the literature initiated by the work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) 
usually focuses on the consequences of financial crises.32 However, the recession in the 
United States was preceded by a boom and bust cycle in the housing market. Other countries, 
such as the United Kingdom or Spain, also experienced a boom and bust cycle in their housing 
markets. Therefore, it is necessary to build not only on the experience of historical financial crises 
but also on the experience of historical housing crises to gain further insights into the 
behavior of an economy during and after the time of severe economic decline. Claessens et al. 
(2008) and Jannsen (2010) analyze the consequences of housing crises on the economy and 
document that housing crises usually lead to long-lasting and deep recessions (see also IMF 
2003). However, these studies conduct non-parametric analysis and do not deal with the 
links between the housing market and overall economic activity, through which a housing crisis 
leads to recessions, or with what economic conditions cause a housing crises to have higher costs. 
Several links between the housing market and general economic activity exist. Wealth 
effect’s that describe a positive relationship between the wealth of private households and 
their consumption activity constitute a first possible. Since housing wealth usually accounts 
for the bulk of the overall wealth of private households, fluctuations in house prices should 
influence private consumption. Case et al. (2005) find for the United States and a set of 
industrialized countries that housing wealth, of all the classes of household wealth, is the 
most important determinant of private consumption. Using micro data, the studies of Bostic et 
al. (2009) and of Gan (2010) also find a close link between housing wealth and consumption in 
the United States and Hong Kong. Accordingly, the negative impact of a housing crisis which 
is usually defined as an exceptional strong decline of house prices might relate to a negative 
wealth effect. However, the link between consumption and housing is not confirmed by all 
____________________ 
31 This Chapter is based on the paper: C. Aßmann, J. Boysen-Hogrefe, and N. Jannsen (2011). Costs of Housing 
Crises: International Evidence. Bulletin of Economic Research, forthcoming. 
32 Overall, these papers conclude that financial crises lead to particularly long-lasting and deep recessions 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a and 2009b, IMF 2009a, Cecchetti et al. 2009) and to permanent output losses (Cerra 
and Saxena 2008, IMF 2009b, Furceri and Mourougane 2009). 
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studies. The relation between housing wealth and private consumption seems to be less 
pronounced especially in most European countries (see, e.g., European Commission 2008).33 
A second possible link between the housing market and economic activity discussed in the 
literature is a direct link via the construction sector. In general, according to Tobin’s q, 
residential investment should decrease when the worth of the housing stock decreases 
relative to its construction costs. Therefore, housing crises should be accompanied by a 
considerable decrease in residential investment as construction costs presumably do not 
decline as strong as house prices. Leamer (2007) stresses the close relation between 
residential investment and overall economic activity for the United States, where residential 
investment typically leads the business cycle. Further, he observes that sales of new homes 
are much more volatile than real house prices and he argues that the housing sector follows a 
volume cycle rather than a price cycle.34 When house prices start to fall, large volume 
adjustments might be necessary to stop prices from falling further. Therefore, during housing 
crises, economic activity should be damped considerably by depressed construction activity. 
Ghent and Owyang (2010) challenge the link between residential investment and the 
business cycle by investigating regional data for the United States spanning from 1984 to 
2008. On a regional basis, they find no close link between housing permits—as a measure of 
construction activity—and GDP, but on a nationwide level they do find such a link. The 
authors conclude that other links between housing and economic activity should exist and 
argue that their findings might point to the importance of wealth effects. Girouard and 
Böndal (2001) analyze the importance of both of the described links between housing and 
economic activity for a panel of OECD countries. They find strong evidence for the 
importance of wealth effects and somewhat weaker evidence for the importance of 
construction activity. Note that the two described links between the housing market and 
economic activity so far have been investigated only in general, but not during housing crises. 
Additionally, there is at least one further possible link that might be of particular 
importance during housing crises, namely a link via the banking sector. Activity in the 
housing market, i.e., construction or purchases of houses, usually goes hand in hand with a high 
degree of leverage financed by the banking sector. Since houses usually serve as collateral for 
this leverage, a sharp decrease in house prices occurring during housing crises deteriorates 
collateral considerably, which could mark the beginning of a banking crisis, as noted by 
____________________ 
33 While the empirical evidence for a general link between housing wealth and consumption is mixed, Buiter 
(2010) generally denies the existence of housing wealth effects, based on theoretical arguments, since home buyers 
are negatively affected by increases in house prices. 
34 Even though large price adjustments in houses during housing crises are observed, there is a priori no reason 
that this relationship should not hold during such crises. 
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Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Related to this, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show that 
exceptional severe banking crises have been accompanied by a boom-and-bust cycle in the 
housing market (see also Leaven and Valencia 2008). Banking crises have been proved to have 
severe consequences for overall economic activity. Therefore, it seems reasonable that housing 
crises that spread over to the banking sector are more severe than housing crises that do not. 
In order to investigate the circumstances making housing crises particularly costly, we 
assess in our model cross terms between the housing crisis indicator and proxies capturing 
the relevance of the three described links between the housing market and economic activity. 
To estimate the relevance of the link via the construction sector, we consider a cross term of 
the housing crisis indicator and the change of residential investment relative to GDP in the 
year of the peak at the housing market.35 If the boom-bust of housing investment would be 
the main driver we argue that a high acceleration during the boom should be an indicator for 
the resulting costs of the bust. Thus, one underlying assumption is that housing crises are 
particularly costly when an oversized construction sector needs rescaling. To assess the 
relevance of the wealth effect, we use a cross term of the housing crisis indicator and the 
share of homeowners. Thereby, we assume that the more people in a country own housing 
wealth, the more house price declines dampen private consumption. In contrast, in countries 
where housing wealth is more concentrated to relatively few people or houses are more often 
owned by firms or communities, the wealth effect should be less important during housing 
crises. An implicit assumption behind this is that the housing wealth elasticity of private 
consumption diminishes with increasing wealth. Therefore, a higher homeownership rate 
might translate into a stronger aggregate wealth effect. For a robustness check of the 
importance of the wealth effect, we also use the change of private consumption relative to 
GDP in the cross term, which is more symmetric to our proxy for measuring the relevance 
of the construction sector. We test for the relevance of the link via the banking sector by 
using an indicator taking value one when a housing crisis was accompanied by a banking 
crisis and zero otherwise. Thereby, we are able to test directly whether stress at the banking 
sector worsens the effect of a housing crisis.36 
To measure the costs of housing crises, we deviate from the existing literature in using a 
parametric framework rather than a nonparametric framework. We apply a differences-in-
____________________ 
35 Besides the specification with the year-to-year change in the year of the peak we also consider specifications 
that monitor the change of housing for three years before the peak. Further, we also considered levels as well 
as Hodrick-Prescott filtered gaps. All specifications reveal similar results. 
36 Measuring the costs of housing crises in terms of loss in GDP growth is a common approach in the literature 
(see, e.g., Claessens et al. 2008), but not the only one. Other approaches include adding up the difference 
between the hypothetical potential output path and observed GDP as long as observed GDP is below the 
hypothetical potential output (Boyd et al. 2005). 
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differences specification incorporating structures for latent heterogeneity and serial correla-
tion. The robustness of results is checked against potential endogeneity of crises via an extended 
panel treatment model with random coefficients. Also alternative crisis definitions are 
assessed yielding similar results. By including control variables into our model that capture 
influences on GDP growth other than the crises, we are able to provide parameter estimates 
capturing the direct impact of defined crisis events on economic growth. Since growth 
persistence in terms of positive first-order autocorrelation is identified, the parameter 
estimates do not reflect costs in terms of cumulated output losses to the full extent.37 
We find that the costs of housing crises on average amount to roughly 2 percent of GDP in 
the first year after crisis occurrence and an additional 1.5 percent in the second year after the 
crisis. A housing crisis that is accompanied by a banking crisis leads to a loss of GDP that is 
1.4 percent higher in the first year after crisis and for which an extensive prolongation of 
reduced growth can be observed even in the second year after crisis. We find limited evidence 
for the importance of wealth effects. While countries with a higher homeownership rate 
suffer, on average, a higher loss of GDP during a housing crisis, specifications that control for 
the effect of the homeownership rate do not explain the variation in observed growth 
significantly better than models that include only the crisis dummies. Our results are robust 
against alternative crisis definitions and no evidence for selection bias is found. However, the 
only weak evidence in favor of housing wealth effects does not deny their importance. As 
Aron et al. (2006) and Aron et al. (2010) argue, financial institutions play an important role 
for wealth effects. Such institutions have been developed mainly in recent years, see IMF 
(2008). The sample data used for the empirical analysis mainly covers housing crises from 
periods where less developed financial institutions prevailed. Thus, during the current 
housing crises in the US or the UK, wealth effects may have played an important role. Finally, 
we find no evidence for a special role of the construction sector. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data set applied in this analysis 
as well as the methodology used to define a housing crisis. Section 4.3 reassesses the 
relationship between housing crises and recessions. Section 4.4 presents the panel model and 
our results, while robustness checks are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes our 
results and concludes. 
____________________ 
37 An assessment of overall cumulated output losses could be based on a simulation study involving assumptions 
concerning dynamic interactions between all of the (presumably weak) exogenous regressors. See Aßmann (2008) 
for an application in the context of current account reversals and currency crises. 
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4.2 Data Description 
Our data set includes data for 15 industrial countries.38 In addition to real house prices taken 
from a database of the Bank of International Settlements, house prices for France (Existing 
Houses & Apartments, I.N.S.E.E.), the United States (House Price Index - All Transactions, 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise), as well as land prices for Japan (Nationwide Land 
Price Index, Japan Real Estate Institute) deflated by consumer prices, were taken from the 
national statistical agencies. Data for GDP, residential investment, private consumption, 
short- and long-run interest rates, and the inflation rate based on consumer prices from 1970 
to 2007 were taken, when available, from the OECD Economic Outlook Database. Residential 
investment for Spain and Switzerland was taken from Quarterly National Accounts from the 
OECD. The homeownership rates were collected from several national and international 
sources: mainly from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the European 
Mortgage Federation, and national statistical offices.39 
Following Ahearne et al. (2005) and IMF (2003), we identify housing crises as turning 
points in real house prices followed by large price declines, i.e., a housing crisis is defined as a 
peak in house prices within a rolling window of eight years, followed by a price decline of at least 
7.5 percent (baseline definition).40 Using quarterly data for real house prices between 1970 
and 2004, we can identify 23 housing crises in our data set.41 The starting year of a housing 
crisis is defined as the year that includes the quarter of the price peak. Besides for France and 
for Belgium, we identify for each country in our sample at least one housing crisis (Table 4.1). 
Most of the housing crises cluster within certain time periods, namely between 1973 and 1976, 
between 1979 and 1981, and between 1989 and 1991. When considering further explaining 
variables, which are not all available for all countries and the whole time span under 
consideration in the regression analysis, only 18 of the identified housing crises can be used 
____________________ 
38 These are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, The 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and The United States. For Germany house prices are not 
available on a quarterly basis. Thus, Germany is only considered when using a annual timing methodology for 
housing crisis as a robustness check. 
39 The homeownership rate was not available for several countries for each single year between 1970 and 2004. In 
these cases, the time series were interpolated, which is a straightforward approach, given that the homeownership 
rate usually changes very smoothly over time. 
40 In doing so, we deviate slightly from the approach used in Ahearne et al. (2005), which identifies the beginning 
of housing crises as price peaks within a rolling window of six years. However, since we are more interested in 
housing crises than in cyclical house price movements, we impose a restriction on the minimum size of the 
following price decline. 
41 While in general, it is not obvious whether the identification of housing crises on a quarterly or an annual 
basis is more appropriate, for our baseline results we use the identification on a quarterly basis, because it allows 
a more timely identification of the crises and we use the quarterly for the empirical investigation in section 3. For a 
robustness check we also use a corresponding identification method based on annual data, see Appendix for the 
results. Due to the identification with annual data Germany can be included into the analysis. The main results 
stay the same. 
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for inference on the (unbalanced) panel model. The starting year of a housing crisis is defined 
as the year that includes the quarter of the price peak. Nevertheless, since our identification 
method is rather ad hoc, we provide robustness checks of our results using the identification 
method from Ahearne et al. (2005) (loose definition) which yield similar findings.42 
Table	4.1:		
Timing	of	Housing	Crises	and	Recessions	
 
	 Housing	crises Recessions
JP	 1973,	1991 1973,	1993,	1997,	2001
FR	 1974,	1992
US	 1979 1973,	1980,	1981,	1990
UK	 1973,	1980,	1989 1973,	1974,	1979,	1990
CN	 1976,	1981,	1989 1981,	1990
ES	 1991 1978,	1980,	1992
AU	 1974,	1981,	1989 1974,	1981,	1990
NL	 1978 1974,	1979,	2003
BG	 1974,	1980,	1992
SD	 1979,	1990 1970,	1976,	1980,	1990
SW	 1973,	1989 1974,	1981,	1990,	1991,	2002	
DK	 1979,	1986 1973,	1979,	1986,	1992,	2003	
NW	 1987 1988
FN	 1989 1975,	1990
IR	 1979 1982,	1985
Notes:	The	figures	denoted the	year	a	housing	crisis	or
a	recession	started	in	according	to	the	timing	methods
described	in	the	text. 
Banking crises are usually identified as historical episodes with bank runs or closures of 
relevant financial institutions. We rely on the chronology of banking crises published in 
Reinhard and Rogoff (2009a), and thus have 15 banking crises in our sample. We define a 
housing crisis as being accompanied by a banking crisis if the banking crisis starts at least 
two years before the housing crisis and at most two years after the housing crisis. According 
to this definition, 8 out of 23 housing crisis were accompanied by a banking crisis. While it is 
not straightforward and beyond the scope of this paper to reveal the causality between these 
housing crises and banking crises, it turns out that none of these 8 housing crises started 
after the respective banking crises. Specifically, two housing crises started in the same year as 
the banking crisis, 3 housing crises started one year before the banking crisis, and three 
housing crises started two years before the banking crisis. Therefore, for most of the housing 
____________________ 
42 A tight crisis definition as applied by IMF (2003) reduces the number of housing crises such that a econometric 
analysis, especially regarding the cross terms, is rarely meaningful anymore. However, concerning the crisis 
dummies results are in line with the other crisis definitions. 
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crises accompanied by a banking crisis, house prices already started to fall before the banking 
crisis began. This is at least descriptive evidence that it is not likely that the housing crises in 
our sample are systematically triggered by banking crises. 
4.3 Housing Crises and Recessions 
There is broad evidence in the literature that a housing crisis usually goes hand in hand with 
a slowdown of economic activity (see, e.g., IMF 2003). In particular, Leamer (2007) points at 
the close link between housing crises and the business cycle in the US, and Jannsen (2010) 
shows the impact of housing crises on the business cycle on an international level. We 
broaden this evidence by analyzing the link between housing crises and recessions. In 15 out 
of the 23 cases a recession started within one year after the start of the housing crises.43 
Recessions are defined according to the Bry-Boschan algorithm for quarterly GDP data. The 
Bry-Boschan algorithm identifies peaks and troughs via analyzing several moving averages of 
the log level series. The algorithm identifies a peak (trough) when the moving averages of the 
following period are lower (higher) and the corresponding business cycle phases comply with 
some conditions concerning the minimum duration of business cycles.44 Overall, the data set 
contains 45 recessions. To check whether this seemingly connection is not just a random 
phenomenon, we perform a simulation exercise to derive a distribution for the number of 
recessions that are connected to housing crises. In the simulation, we assume that the 
occurrence of the 23 housing crises is random and not correlated to the recessions. We 
generate 10,000 random draws. In each draw, 23 housing crises are distributed on a sample 
of the same size as the original one. The drawn set of housing crises thereby has to fulfill 
some conditions to be accepted as a draw for the distribution: a minimum distance between 
two crises is assumed for example. Otherwise, an unrealistic case can occur in which housing 
crises start in consecutive years, which is not observed in the data.45 The random draws of 
the housing crises are then connected with the observed recessions and the number of joint 
housing crises and recessions is calculated as for the original sample. In the 10,000 random 
draws, the event that 15 housing crises or more are followed by a recession virtually never 
occurred, which thus provides evidence for a clear relation between housing crises and 
recessions. 
____________________ 
43 The dates of housing crises and recessions respectively are given in Table 4.1. 
44 For further details, see Bry and Boschan (1971), and for the quarterly version, Watson (1994). 
45 Note that due to these restrictions (dependency structure) a typical x2-test is not applicable. 
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We further assess this relation by comparing the properties of a recession following a 
housing crises and those without a housing crisis, see Table 4.2. We do not find differences 
between both types of recessions according to the mean growth rate of GDP during a 
recession. The mean growth rate is slightly higher in recessions with a housing crisis but the 
differences are not significant according to the common levels. However, we do find evidence 
that recessions with housing crises last longer, namely 5.5 quarters on average, compared to 4 
quarters in a recession without housing crisis, see Table 4.2. We conclude that recessions are 
often preceded by housing crises and that recessions preceded by housing crises lead to longer 
lasting output reductions than other recessions. 
In the following section we discuss a parametric approach to grasp the costs of housing 
crises and to ask which circumstances might be particularly adverse. 
Table	4.2:	
Mean	Growth	Rates	and	duration	in	Recessions	
	 With	housing	
crisis
Without	housing	
crisis
t‐value	of	
difference	
p‐value
Mean	quarterly	growth	rate	 –0.689 –0.631 –1.569	 0.124
Duration	in	quarters	 5.467 4.000 5.159	 0.000
	
4.4 Costs of Housing Crises 
To assess the costs of a housing crisis in terms of output growth, we set up a differences-in-
differences specification (see Bertrand et al. 2007). The model for GDP growth takes the form 
 ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ߙଵሺ௜ሻݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚሺ௜ሻ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ ൅ ∑ ݕ௝ଶ௝ୀଵ ܫ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௝ଶ௝ୀଵ ܫ௜,௧ି௝ ൈ ܼ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ݑ௜,௧ (4.1) 
where ݕ௜,௧ represents the GDP growth of country i in year t. The variable ܫ௜,௧ି௝ indicates 
whether a housing crisis started in the year before or two years before. In a second term, the 
crisis indicator is multiplied by the variable ܼ௜,௧ି௝  assess what economic conditions 
increase the costs of housing crises. To assess such conditions, we use a proxy measure of the 
impact of housing prices on consumption, namely the homeownership rate, a measure for the 
impact on construction, namely the change of the share of housing investment in real GDP, 
and a measure for the impact of stress in the banking sector, namely a banking crisis 
dummy variable. Furthermore, lagged GDP growth and additional standard control 
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variables, namely short and long term interest rates and inflation rates, represented by 
௜ܺ,௧ିଵ  are included to capture other influences on GDP growth. We specify the error term ݑ௜,௧ 
as an moving average process of order one, 
 ݑ௜,௧ ൌ ߩ݁௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ݁௜,௧        with  ݁௜,௧ 	∼ 	ࣨሺ0, ߪଶሻ (4.2) 
allowing for serial dependence within the unobserved component. To take possible 
heteroscedasticity in the panel into account, a random coefficient approach is specified. 
Analysis reveals that the consideration of a random coefficient for the persistence term ߙଵ 
and the coefficient for the long term interest rates is sufficient to control for heteroscedasticity 
in the panel. Thus, we assume that ߙଵሺ௜ሻ is a random variable following a normal distribution 
with parameters ߤఈଵ	 and ߪఈଵ, and for one of the ߚ, we assume that it follows a normal 
distribution with parameters ߤఉଷ and ߪఉଷ, while all other parameters are constant in ݅. 
Estimation of this basic differences-in-differences specification is done via the maximum 
likelihood method (Beck and Katz 2007). 
The estimated effects of specified crisis events using the differences-in-differences 
specification are given in Table 4.3. Robustness checks concerning possible endogeneity and 
definition and timing methodology of the crises are provided in Section 4.5. We estimate the 
(unbalanced) panel model in equation 4.1 in several specifications with respect to the crisis 
dummies and cross terms, thus conditioning on a given set of control variables. Note, that all 
models with contemporaneous impacts of housing crises and cross terms were not preferred 
according to likelihood ratio tests and are thus not reported. Specification I takes into 
account the crisis indicators only and no cross terms. A housing crisis has a significant 
impact on growth in both years after its occurrence. In the first year, the growth rate is 
dampened by 2.0 percentage points and in the second year by an additional negative impact 
of 1.5 percentage points. Specifications II through V all control for a single additional cross 
term. In specification II, the cross term of the change in the share of housing investment and 
the crisis indicator is added, but no significant impact is revealed. Thus, we find no evidence 
that a boom-bust cycle in the construction sector is the main driver of costs induced by 
housing crises. In specification III, the homeownership rate cross term is included and turns 
to be highly significant. However, it does not improve the model fit according to Akaike’s  
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Table	4.3:	
Costs	of	Housing	Crises:	Baseline	Crisis	Definition	and	Quarterly	Timing	Methodology	
	 I 	II 	III 		IV	 	V VI VII
ߙ଴	 Constant 2.5743 2.5362 2.5513 2.5726	 2.4930 2.4239 2.42455.6217 5.5942 5.7721 5.6131	 5.5387 5.3942 6.2077
ߤఈభ	 ∆	GDP	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.1699 0.1745 0.1686 0.1692	 0.1849 0.1914 0.18661.7829 1.7835 1.7887 1.8770	 1.7543 1.8319 2.0296
ߪఈభ	 0.1390 0.1387 0.1391 0.1401	 0.1366 0.1333 0.13653.3824 3.3168 3.2335 3.3250	 3.1622 2.4915 2.8739
ߚଵ	 short	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 	–0.2970 –0.3028 –0.2976 –0.2939	 –0.2888 –0.2872 –0.2899–5.6735 –5.7657 –5.5674 –5.6513	 –5.2760 –5.2646 –5.3057
ߚଶ	 inflation	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 	–0.0171 –0.0181 –0.0165 –0.0158	 –0.0180 –0.0320 –0.0303–0.4763 –0.5271 –0.4857 –0.4374	 –0.4865 –0.9190 –0.8771
ߤఉయ	 long	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.2645 0.2730 0.2673 0.2612	 0.2619 0.2738 0.27793.8032 4.2965 3.9958 3.7781	 3.9251 3.8211 4.1387
ߪఉయ	 0.0395 0.0384 0.0437 0.0383	 0.0390 0.0428 0.04601.4220 1.4696 1.6543 1.1262	 1.5169 1.4503 1.5845
ߛଵ	 crisis	ሺt	‐1ሻ 	–2.0353 –1.9748 0.0026 –1.9794	 –1.6955 –1.5486–5.0922 –4.9753 0.0039 –4.9923	 –3.2568 –3.1623
ߜଵሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	∆	shi	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.5293 	–0.9931 	
ߜଵሺଶሻ	 crisis	x	hor	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –3.4631 	 –2.7665–3.3676 	 –3.2061
ߜଵሺଷሻ	 crisis	x	∆	cr	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.4821	0.7577	
ߜଵሺସሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 	 –0.9667 –1.3674 –0.7914	 –1.1333 –1.7526 –1.6328
ߛଶ	 crisis	ሺt	‐2ሻ –1.4714 –1.4519 –1.4849 –1.4711	 –1.4640 –0.7712 –1.1907–3.7458 –3.6728 –3.4162 –3.5443	 –3.5862 –1.4795 –1.6080
ߜଶሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐2ሻ	 	 –1.8274 –1.8370	 –2.2960 –2.1096
ρ	 0.2303 0.2238 0.2241 0.2317	 0.2101 0.1889 0.1890
2.6885 2.4994 2.6430 2.8093	 2.2429 1.8666 2.2206
σ	 1.6368 1.6361 1.6323 1.6362	 1.6344 1.6215 1.6194
34.2816 32.4375 32.9248 33.2248	 33.3580 33.0352 34.3187
Log	likelihood 	–968.5 –968.0 –967.8 –968.1	 –967.6 –964.7 –964.4
AIC	 1.9809 1.9840 1.9836 1.9843	 1.9833 1.9807 1.9807
LR‐test	Treatmenta 0.96 1.05 0.99 	1.11	 0.89 0.32 0.23
Notes:	∆	shi:	change	in	share	of	housing	investment;	hor:	rate	of	homeownership;	∆	cr:	change	in	consumption	ratio;	bc:	banking	crisis.	aThe	probit	part	
of	 the	 treatment	model	 yields	 a	 log	 likelihood	 of	 –76.2	 if	 estimated	 separately.	 The	 probit	model	 contains	 the	 following	 list	 of	 regressors:	 lagged	
growth,	short	interest	rates,	long	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	consumption	ratio.	
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information criteria (AIC).46 The cross term including the change in the share of consump-
tion (specification IV) does not provide any improvement of the model fit. In specification V, 
we include an additional dummy that identifies housing crises accompanied by banking 
crises. Again the overall fit is not improved by this specification, compared to specification I. 
However, the additional inclusion of a two period lagged banking crisis cross term in specifi-
cation VI provides a significantly better model fit compared to specification V. According to 
this specification, a housing crisis depresses growth by 1.5 percentage points in the first year 
after its occurrence and has an additional impact of –0.8 percentage points in the second 
year after. If a banking crisis accompanies the housing crisis, the first year effect amounts to –
2.9 percentage points and the recession is substantially prolonged with an additional 
dampening effect of –2.6 percentage points. The best of all considered specifications is 
specification VII, where compared to specification VI, the first year dummy for the housing 
crisis is replaced by the cross term with the homeownership rate. The impact of the 
homeownership rate is lower when controlling for banking crises than in specification III, which 
might indicate that the homeownership rate is not a pure proxy for wealth effects. Collateral 
effects may interact. Our model specifications provide evidence that certain economic 
conditions potentially worsen the effect of a housing crisis on economic growth. 
Overall, given that banking crises induce a substantial additional reduction of GDP growth 
and the disability of all other cross terms to provide additional explanatory power, we 
conclude that the banking sector is a channel that is important in transmitting the housing 
crisis to overall economic activity. Non-performing loans and loss in value of collaterals as a 
consequence of falling house prices seem to loop back to the economy with the banks’ balance 
sheets. A connection between housing wealth and output via consumption seems comparably 
less important. However, this study mainly captures housing crises in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Financial tools that enable house owners to transmit wealth increases into additional 
consumption were less developed than they are today.47 No special impact of the size of the 
construction sector could be found. 
____________________ 
46 t-values might be misleading, as the joint inclusion of cross terms and dummies induces the problem of multi-
collinearity. 
47 Aron et al. (2006) and Aron et al. (2010) point at the importance of the development status of the credit 
channel for the link between housing prices and consumption. 
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4.5 Robustness Checks 
Empirical results given in Table 4.3 are conditional on the crisis definition, i.e., dating with 
quarterly data and assuming a minimum price decline of 7.5 percent (baseline crisis 
definition). Three kinds of robustness checks are considered. Results on the robustness 
checks are presented, see Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. The first robustness check considers a 
dating of housing crisis based on annual price data, which allows also to include Germany, 
see Table 4.4. As a next robustness check, we apply the definition of Ahearne et al. (2005) 
(loose crisis definition) thereby varying the minimum price decline needed to identify a 
housing crisis. This leads to 26 identified housing crises. Results for both quarterly and 
annual timing methodology are given in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 respectively. The main 
results are merely unchanged when applying the loose crisis definition or the dating based on 
annual data. The effect of banking crises are even a bit more pronounced in the latter case. 
Finally, all specifications including those considered as robustness checks are checked 
against the possible endogeneity or selection bias. Factors causing the occurrence of a 
housing crisis may be correlated with unobserved factors influencing growth. This correlation 
leads when ignored to biased parameter estimates. Although we find no contemporaneous effect 
of the crisis, endogeneity of the crisis indicators may be problematic due to autocorrelated 
errors. Thus, the model in equation 4.1 is enhanced with a second equation, 
 ߜ௜,௧∗ ൌ ߦሺ௜ሻ࣫௜,௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧ (4.3) 
where ߦሺ௜ሻ comprise individual specific random coefficients. In addition to lagged growth, 
short interest rates, long interest rates, inflation and the consumption ratio are included in 
ܳ௜,௧. The analysis suggests that this variable is connected to a random coefficient. ߳௜,௧ denotes an 
autoregressive process of order one, i.e., ߳௜,௧ ൌ ߮߳௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߥ௜,௧. Further, ߥ௜,௧ and ݁௜௧  (error in 
equation 4.1) are modeled as bivariate normal with contemporaneous correlation ߰. This 
serial correlation structure in the errors implies a possible dependence of growth on all past 
shocks in the crisis equation, while the process for crises depends on past growth via the 
inclusion of lagged growth rates. Thus, even when no contemporaneous crisis dummy is 
included, a treatment model might be needed. For a more detailed description of the implied 
correlation structure and estimation thereof, see Aßmann (2008). Our model is closely related 
to treatment framework established in the seminal work of Heckman (1979). Estimation is 
performed using the maximum likelihood method, where the corresponding likelihood function  
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Table	4.4:	
Costs	of	Housing	Crises:	Baseline	Crisis	Definition	and	Annual	Timing	Methodology	
	 I II III IV	 V VI VII
ߙ଴	 Constant 2.4202 2.3359 2.3820 2.3638	 2.2791 2.3477 2.33066.1725 6.0371 5.5823 5.8139	 5.3292 5.8721 5.3832
ߤఈభ	 ∆	GDP	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.2012 0.2228 0.2095 0.2148	 0.2351 0.2086 0.21082.4924 2.6108 2.3781 2.6053	 2.5304 2.3638 2.4626
ߪఈభ	 0.1256 0.1244 0.1251 0.1263	 0.1214 0.1282 0.12772.9005 3.2085 3.5513 3.7633	 2.9770 2.8397 2.8090
ߚଵ short	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.2843 –0.2759 –0.2825 –0.2800	 –0.2728 –0.2813 –0.2836–5.9152 –5.0125 –5.1675 –5.2646	 –4.8855 –5.3968 –5.3226
ߚଶ inflation	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.0070 –0.0123 –0.0070 –0.0086	 –0.0121 –0.0234 –0.0225–0.2073 –0.3494 –0.2207 –0.2587	 –03467 –0.6723 –0.6315
ߤఉయ  long	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.2471 0.2463 0.2476 0.2466	 0.2462 0.2599 0.26303.4862 3.7694 3.7055 3.5380	 3.4565 3.7163 3.5915
ߪఉయ 0.0361 0.0328 0.0398 0.0348	 0.0354 0.0444 0.04641.1886 1.1535 1.5514 1.3411	 1.3963 1.4847 1.8775
ߛଵ crisis	ሺt	‐1ሻ –1.7950 –1.9273 0.0778 –6.2939	 –1.3934 –1.2495–5.1107 –4.9811 0.1167 –1.5721	 –2.7388 –2.4807
ߜଵሺଵሻ crisis	x	∆	shi	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.7958 	–1.7459 	
ߜଵሺଶሻ crisis	x	hor	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –3.2493 	 –2.2453–2.9195 	 –2.8838
ߜଵሺଷሻ crisis	x	∆	cr	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.0804	1.1253	
ߜଵሺସሻ crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 	 –1.3115 –1.6423 –0.8069	 –1.4699 –1.8701 –1.8793
ߛଶ crisis	ሺt	‐2ሻ –1.3441 –1.3436 –1.3642 –1.3504	 –1.3596 –0.8055 –1.5143–3.9114 –3.4691 –3.8059 –3.5919	 –3.6334 –1.7054 –2.0200
ߜଶሺଵሻ crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐2ሻ	 	 –1.7264 –1.7478	 –2.2367 –2.1406
ρ 0.2177 0.1937 0.2040 0.1998	 0.1758 0.1940 0.1886
2.9276 2.2645 2.1862 2.5467	 1.8760 2.4781 2.1107
σ 1.6149 1.6122 1.6112 1.6132	 1.6103 1.5956 1.5928
29.7087 31.7383 31.3625 30.4562	 30.2033 31.9179 33.3109
Log	likelihood 			–1012.3 –1010.8 –1011.6 –1012.2	 –1010.6 –1007.7 –1007.4
AIC	 1.9626 1.9635 1.9651 1.9662	 1.9632 1.9615 1.9609
LR‐test	Treatmenta 0.63 0.65 0.60 0.78	 0.42 0.67 0.60
Notes:	∆	shi:	change	in	share	of	housing	investment;	hor:	rate	of	homeownership;	∆	cr:	change	in	consumption	ratio;	bc:	banking	crisis.	aThe	probit	part	
of	 the	 treatment	model	 yields	 a	 log	 likelihood	 of	 –86.4	 if	 estimated	 separately.	 The	 probit	model	 contains	 the	 following	 list	 of	 regressors:	 lagged	
growth,	short	interest	rates,	long	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	consumption	ratio.	
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Table	4.5:	
Costs	of	Housing	Crises:	Loose	Crisis	Definition	and	Quarterly	Timing	Methodology	
	 I II III IV	 V VI VII
ߙ଴	 Constant 2.5267 2.5262 2.5305 2.5178	 2.4437 2.3823 2.38185.4042 5.4023 5.9948 5.8240	 5.5199 5.6204 4.9623
ߤఈభ	 ∆ GDP	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.1802 0.1802 0.1722 0.1823	 0.1998 0.2007 0.19651.8075 1.8081 1.6806 1.6806	 1.9236 2.1835 1.9364
ߪఈభ	 0.1402 0.1402 0.1454 0.1410	 0.1364 0.1373 0.14003.4473 3.4479 3.2913 3.3673	 2.8310 3.1109 3.3539
ߚଵ	 short	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.2848 –0.2848 –0.2864 –0.2815	 –0.2757 –0.2759 –0.2768–5.5615 –5.5618 –4.9667 –5.4719	 –4.7809 –4.9169 –5.2077
ߚଶ	 inflation	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.0200 –0.0200 –0.0209 –0.0202	 –0.0217 –0.0321 –0.0325–0.5871 –0.5874 –0.5932 –0.5891	 –0.6009 –0.9115 –0.9824
ߤఉయ	 long	interests	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.2592 0.2592 0.2633 0.2569	 0.2556 0.2688 0.27153.8031 3.8041 3.7992 3.6771	 3.6029 3.8010 3.9724
ߪఉయ	 0.0410 0.0410 0.0478 0.0393	 0.0395 0.0435 0.04621.4459 1.4460 1.8420 1.2967	 1.4272 1.6472 1.6442
ߛଵ	 crisis	ሺt	‐1ሻ –2.1289 –2.1286 1.0189 –2.0860	 –1.8678 –1.7492–5.6563 –5.6555 1.5697 –5.2568	 –3.6487 –3.6554
ߜଵሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	∆	shi	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –0.2283 	–0.2267 	
ߜଵሺଶሻ	 crisis	x	hor	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 –5.2409 	 –3.0863–5.1185 	 –3.8677
ߜଵሺଷሻ	 crisis	x	∆	cr	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 0.4647	0.7493	
ߜଵሺସሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐1ሻ	 	 0.8540 –1.2147 –1.0365	 –0.9302 –1.4716 –1.3779
ߛଶ	 crisis	ሺt	‐2ሻ –1.4773 –1.4770 –1.5043 –1.4743	 –1.4608 –0.8645 –0.8986–3.6641 –3.66635 –3.7627 –3.7975	 –3.8619 –1.7251 –1.8652
ߜଶሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	‐2ሻ	 	 –1.7597 –1.7679	 –2.1549 –2.0498
ρ	 0.2154 0.2153 0.2176 0.2167	 0.1924 0.1767 0.1775
2.2266 2.2252 2.2099 2.5125	 1.8855 1.9327 1.7636
σ	 1.6267 1.6267 1.6176 1.6257	 1.6251 1.6138 1.6077
31.8834 31.8836 29.1939 29.4515	 31.7388 33.9514 34.2050
Log	likelihood 					–965.8 –965.8 –964.3 –965.5	 –965.1 –962.3 –961.2
AIC	 1.9757 1.9797 1.9766 1.9791	 1.9783 1.9765 1.9744
LR‐test	Treatmenta 1.86 2.60 1.96 2.08	 1.90 1.97 1.99
Notes:	∆	shi:	change	in	share	of	housing	investment;	hor:	rate	of	homeownership;	∆	cr:	change	in	consumption	ratio;	bc:	banking	crisis.	aThe	probit	part	
of	 the	 treatment	model	 yields	 a	 log	 likelihood	 of	 –81.0	 if	 estimated	 separately.	 The	 probit	model	 contains	 the	 following	 list	 of	 regressors:	 lagged	
growth,	short	interest	rates,	long	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	consumption	ratio.	
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Table	4.6:	
Costs	of	Housing	Crises:	Loose	Crisis	Definition	and	Annual	Timing	Methodology	
	 I II III IV	 V VI VII
ߙ଴	 Constant 2.3685 2.3679 2.3060 2.3618	 2.2167 2.2167 2.23976.0143 5.4680 5.0898 5.8792	 5.1042 4.7873 5.4308
ߤఈభ	 ∆ GDP	ሺt	–1ሻ	 0.2134 0.2132 0.2249 0.2147	 0.2490 0.2304 0.23442.4947 2.4963 2.5158 2.2616	 2.5733 2.4526 2.4975
ߪఈభ	 0.1263 0.1262 0.1283 0.1260	 0.1216 0.1258 0.12753.3503 3.0536 3.4829 2.6998	 3.0866 3.1050 3.3737
ߚଵ	 short	interests	ሺt	–1ሻ	 –0.2702 –0.2702 –0.2655 –0.2696	 –0.2581 –0.2630 –0.2615–5.1481 –4.9573 –4.6866 –5.2340	 –4.6349 –4.8568 –4.8584
ߚଶ	 inflation	ሺt	–1ሻ	 –0.0122 –0.0121 –0.0133 –0.0116	 –0.0161 –0.0241 –0.0249–0.3504 –0.3543 –0.4228 –0.3396	 –0.4899 –0.6980 –0.7374
ߤఉయ	 long	interests	ሺt	–1ሻ	 0.2440 0.2440 0.2446 0.2434	 0.2428 0.2523 0.25413.6704 3.3252 3.2915 3.7369	 3.6066 3.4338 3.6508
ߪఉయ	 0.0429 0.0424 0.0477 0.0416	 0.0405 0.0456 0.04802.0361 1.4239 1.6794 1.5946	 1.5420 1.6709 1.7301
ߛଵ	 crisis	ሺt	–1ሻ –1.8273 –1.8289 0.9147 –1.8233	 –1.5022 –1.4043–5.6518 –6.1313 1.2187 –5.2691	 –3.8252 –3.2270
ߜଵሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	∆	shi	ሺt	–1ሻ	 –0.4893 	–0.4839 	
ߜଵሺଶሻ	 crisis	x	hor	ሺt	–1ሻ	 –4.7087 	 –2.5463–3.6871 	 –3.3345
ߜଵሺଷሻ	 crisis	x	∆	cr	ሺt	–1ሻ	 0.4821	0.7577	
ߜଵሺସሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	–1ሻ	 	 –1.3165 –1.5870 –1.4383	 –1.6513 –1.8854 –1.8860
ߛଶ	 crisis	ሺt	–2ሻ –1.4264 –1.4258 –1.4530 –1.4249	 –1.4396 –1.0359 –1.0528–4.3439 –4.2743 –4.2724 –4.1418	 –4.3679 –2.5227 –2.6777
ߜଶሺଵሻ	 crisis	x	bc	ሺt	–2ሻ	 	 –1.8274 –1.5574	 –2.2960 –1.8594
ρ	 0.2018 0.2025 0.1814 0.1996	 0.1534 0.1651 0.1606
2.6006 2.2670 1.8172 1.9918	 1.5478 1.6507 1.8872
σ	 1.5994 1.6006 1.5920 1.5998	 1.5953 1.5830 1.5792
31.6827 30.8858 30.4045 30.1050	 30.4184 32.7127 30.9168
Log	likelihood 			–1008.6 –1007.8 –1007.0 –1007.9	 –1006.7 –1004.1 –1003.1
AIC	 1.9556 1.9840 1.9564 1.9581	 1.9558 1.9546 1.9528
LR–test	Treatmenta 1.63 1.54 2.52 2.47	 2.44 2.56 2.62
Notes:	∆	shi:	change	in	share	of	housing	investment;	hor:	rate	of	homeownership;	∆	cr:	change	in	consumption	ratio;	bc:	banking	crisis.	aThe	probit	part	
of	 the	 treatment	model	yields	a	 log	 likelihood	of	–100.0	 if	 estimated	 separately.	The	probit	model	 contains	 the	 following	 list	of	 regressors:	 lagged	
growth,	short	interest	rates,	long	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	consumption	ratio.	
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involves high dimensional integrals. Hence, a simulation-based estimator is used based on the 
GHK importance sampling proposed by Geweke (1989), Hajivassiliou (1990), and Keane 
(1992). To ensure numerical precision of the likelihood evaluations, a set of common random 
numbers with a size of 500 has been found sufficient. Overall, likelihood ratio test statistics 
given in the last column of Tables 4.3 and 4.4–4.6 suggest that no selection mechanism or 
endogeneity of crisis is present in the data set and different crisis definitions. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence for a close link between housing crises and severe contractions 
of overall production at the level of industrialized countries. Housing crises are often 
followed by recessions that are longer than other recessions. Using a panel study, we assessed 
the costs of housing crises. They diminish GDP growth in the following year by about 2 
percentage points on average and have an additional detrimental effect of roughly 1.5 
percentage points in the second year after the outbreak of the housing crisis. We could not 
observe any significant contemporaneous effects of housing crises. 
The economic conditions that may lead to particular costly housing crises are analyzed via 
several cross terms. We find no evidence that a high increase in the share of housing 
investment prior to a crisis has a particular impact. Thus, we conclude that a housing crisis 
does not simply indicate a boom-bust cycle in the construction sector. A detrimental wealth 
effect does not seem to be the driver of costs, since we find no evidence for a boom-bust in 
consumption either. However, there is some evidence that a higher rate of homeownership 
increases costs. This may indicate an asymmetric behavior. While homeowners might feel a 
loss in wealth due to decreasing house prices, potential home buyers do not translate 
decreased prices into a positive wealth effect in times of economic stress or even recessions. 
Due to multicollinearity, this result should be interpreted with care. Finally, we analyzed the 
growth effect of housing crises that are connected to banking crises. A joint occurrence of a 
banking and housing crisis increases costs. While the difference between housing crises with 
and without banking crises is rather moderate in the first year, banking crises play a major 
role in the second year after the house price peak. We conclude that the effect of housing 
crises on the banking sector seems to be an important channel on output. 
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5 The Ugly and the Bad: Banking and Housing Crises 
Strangle Output Permanently, Ordinary Recessions Do 
Not48 
5.1 Introduction 
The Great Recession of 2008/2009 has renewed interest in the analysis of business cycle 
fluctuations. In particular, the analysis of the shape of recessions and subsequent recoveries, 
leading to the question whether recessions have permanent effects, has been received greater 
attention. While there has been some consensus that recessions in general are usually 
followed by particularly strong recoveries and thus do not have permanent effects on output, 
a growing literature concludes that this is not the case with recessions associated with severe 
economic crises. On the contrary such recessions depress output permanently. 
This result was already documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who found, based 
on a panel of countries, that recessions associated with financial crises systematically turn 
out to have particularly severe long-lasting effects. Similarly Cerra and Saxena (2005) 
showed that six Asian countries suffered permanent output losses from the Asian crisis 
beginning in 1997. However, despite case studies concerning the financially driven decade-
long slump in Japan and the banking crises in the Nordic countries in the 1990s, it was the 
Great Recession of 2008/2009 that brought the analysis of recessions back into the focus of 
macroeconomic research and subsequently led to the hypothesis that not all recessions are 
alike, even in industrialized countries.  
A number of recent studies on recessions associated with severe crises and the following 
recoveries, indeed, have come to this assessment. Starting from the proposition that severe 
crises break away from the ordinary, linear course of events, these studies abandon linear 
empirical methods of analysis. In an effort to separate the extraordinary courses of events 
from the ordinary courses of events (Cecchetti et al. 2009), they typically start by identifying 
periods of severe crises, which are usually banking, financial, housing, currency, or political 
crises. They proceed by determining similarities and typical patterns between these periods. 
Sparked partly by Reinhart’s and Rogoff’s (2008) attempt to draw lessons for the course of 
the US financial crises from historical episodes with financial crises in other countries across 
the last centuries, a number of recent studies have investigated recessions associated with 
____________________ 
48 This Chapter is based on the paper: J. Boysen-Hogrefe, N. Jannsen, and C.-P. Meier (2010). The Ugly and the 
Bad: Banking and Housing Crises Strangle Output Permanently, Ordinary Recessions Do Not. Kiel Working 
Papers 1586, Kiel Institute for the World Economy. 
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severe crises and their aftermath (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a and 2009b, Cecchetti et al. 
2009, Haugh et al. 2009). The general finding of these studies is that severe crises usually 
trigger deep and long-lasting recessions. While this literature only dealt indirectly with long-
term effects, such effects were explicitly investigated in a series of papers (Boyd et al. 2005, 
Cerra and Saxena 2008, Furceri and Mourougane 2009, IMF 2009b). They find that severe 
crises, on average, do indeed dampen the level of output permanently.  
While this finding is in line with the earlier literature initiated by the work of Nelson and 
Plosser (1982), Campbell and Mankiw (1987), and Hamilton (1989), which finds that 
recessions have large permanent effects on output, it challenges the consensus of the more 
recent empirical business cycle literature. The more recent literature finds that recessions in 
the United States are followed by particularly strong recoveries and thus have only small or 
even no permanent effects on the level of output. Beaudry and Koop (1993) showed 
empirically for the United States that once nonlinear effects are allowed for, evidence can be 
found that recessions are followed by a bounceback of GDP—or alternatively by quarters with 
particular high growth rates of GDP—that quickly brings GDP back to its pre-recession level 
and usually does not dampen output permanently. The finding that recoveries following 
recessions are particularly strong and exhibit on average significantly higher growth rates of 
GDP than expansions was confirmed by Sichel (1994) and Kim et al. (2005), among others. 
While there is strong evidence for this finding in the United States, the evidence for other 
countries is mixed. Balke and Wynne (1996) find evidence for strong recoveries following 
recessions for the G-7 countries as an aggregate. However, Bradley and Jansen (1997), who 
applied the approach of Beaudry and Koop (1993) to the G-7 countries, find evidence for 
strong recoveries only for the United States, Italy and to a lesser degree for Germany. Kim et 
al. (2005) find the bounceback effect to be much smaller for several other industrial 
countries.  
In this study, we integrate the empirical business cycle literature with the literature on 
recessions associated with severe crises. In particular, we explicitly evaluate the strength of 
recoveries following recessions associated with severe crises compared to ordinary recessions 
that are not associated with severe crises. This enables us to draw conclusions about the long-
term effects of these both kinds of recessions in a second step. To differentiate between 
ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe crises, we define banking crises 
and housing crises as severe crises and all recessions that were not associated with these 
crises as ordinary recessions. While banking crises have been frequently analyzed in the 
literature on severe crises, housing crises have been much less frequently analyzed, and not at 
all in the literature concerning the long-run effects of severe crises. However, housing crises 
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have been proved to have severe consequences when they are associated with recessions 
(Claessens et al. 2009). We do not include currency crises, equity price busts, or political 
crises in our sample of severe crises, as the assessment of the literature seems to be that these 
types of crises have relatively mild consequences, on average, compared to banking crises and 
housing crises (see, e.g., Cerra and Saxena 2008, Claessens et al. 2009, Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009b). Our study follows Claessens et al. (2009) and IMF (2009a) and exclusively focuses 
on recessions and recoveries in industrial countries. We find that ordinary recessions and 
recessions associated with severe crises differ sharply in terms of the subsequent recovery. 
While ordinary recessions are usually followed by strong recoveries, recoveries following 
recessions associated with severe crises are not particularly strong. Consequently, the latter 
lead to large permanent output losses. Even though recoveries following ordinary recessions 
are stronger the deeper the recession was, we also find that ordinary recessions can lead to 
permanent output losses. However, these losses turn out to be of a much smaller magnitude 
than in the case of recessions associated with severe crises. In a series of tests, we prove our 
main results to be robust with respect to several modifications of our baseline model. Overall, 
we show that the findings in the literature that indicate that severe crises have large 
permanent effects and the findings in the literature that indicate that recessions are followed 
by strong recoveries can be reconciled by differentiating between ordinary recessions and 
recessions associated with severe economic crises.  
The structure of the remaining paper is as follows. Section 5.2 presents our estimation 
strategy. Section 5.3 describes the data set. Section 5.4 presents our estimation results and 
illustrates them graphically. Section 5.5 reports the results of several robustness checks and 
Section 5.6 summarizes the results and concludes. 
5.2 Methodology 
As is common in the literature on the long-run effects of severe crises, we rely on an 
autoregressive panel model of GDP growth. To account for nonlinear dynamics following 
recessions—independently whether they are ordinary or associated with severe crises—we 
augment the model by the current-depth of recessions ( cdr ) term introduced by Beaudry 
and Koop (1993). The cdr  term is defined as the deviation of current GDP from its former 
maximum: 
 tjjtt yycdr   0)(max ,  (5.2) 
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where 0)max(  jjty  refers to the peak of log real GDP until year t. When real GDP falls below 
its former maximum or alternatively when real GDP growth is negative, the cdr  term 
becomes positive; otherwise, it is equal to zero. Therefore, during recessions, tcdr  usually 
becomes positive until the output loss is regained. During expansions tcdr  is usually equal to 
zero.  
By using the cdr  term, we deviate from the existing literature on severe crises initiated by 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) and largely inspired by Romer and Romer (1989), which estimates 
long-run effects by means of dummy variables that take the value one during phases of severe 
crises. Thereby, we focus exclusively on the recovery phase and do not try to estimate the 
average depth of severe crises in terms of GDP by means of dummy variables, but rather 
interpret economic crises as shocks that can have very different sizes. Moreover, the 
approach of Beaudry and Koop (1993) is more flexible than using dummy variables, since it 
allows the recovery to evolve more strongly the deeper the recession was. Finally, we do not 
have to predetermine how many lags of the dummy variable to include to estimate the 
strength of the recovery phase, since the length of the recovery phase as investigated here is 
determined automatically and it ends when GDP reaches its former maximum. 
For a panel dataset with i countries and t years of observation, the core model is given by 
 ititiit cdrLyL ,,, ]1)([)( εΩαΔΦ  , (5.1) 
where ty  denotes real GDP growth in year t, the lag polynomial of Φ  measures the 
autoregressive structure of GDP growth, and i  accounts for country-specific fixed effects. 
The lag polynomial of   measures the impact of the cdr  term. If the sum of all coefficients 
is positive, economic growth will on average be faster during recoveries than during 
expansions when the cdr  term is zero.  
To assess the impact of banking crises and housing crises on recoveries, we define 
interaction terms for banking crises, bccdr , and for housing crises, hccdr , which take on the 
value of the cdr  term if a recession was accompanied by a banking crisis or a housing crisis 
and are zero otherwise. We estimate the effects of severe crises by including the interaction 
terms, bcitcdr, , and, 
hc
itcdr, , in equation 5.2. The panel model then is given as 
 it
hc
it
bc
ititiit cdrLcdrLcdrLyL ,,,,, ]1)([]1)([]1)([)(   , (5.3) 
where the lag polynomial of Θ and Π measures the impact of severe crises on the strength of 
the recovery. If the sum of all coefficients for the respective interaction terms is negative, the 
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hypothesis that recoveries following recessions that were associated with severe crises are 
weaker will be supported.  
5.3 Data 
The panel consists of 16 OECD countries, namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. We focus exclusively on industrial countries 
even though the majority of severe economic crises, at least when we think about financial 
crises, did not occur in these countries but rather in emerging or developing countries. 
Emerging and developing countries, thus, provide a wealth of empirical evidence regarding 
the effects of severe crises. However, exploiting this evidence may come at the cost of blurring 
or biasing estimation results by mixing data from countries with sharply differing market 
structures, institutions, risk perceptions, etc. In contrast to a number of recent studies, we 
therefore refrain from adding data from nonindustrialized countries to our sample. The time 
span covered is 1970 to 2006, and the indicator we use to represent economic activity is 
annual real GDP as taken from the OECD’s Economic Outlook (2009).  
In the literature, housing crises are usually identified by real house price developments. 
They are indicated either by phases of sharply falling prices (Ahearne et al. 2005, Jannsen 
(2010), or IMF 2003) or by periods in which prices are far below their long-run trend 
(Detkens and Smets 2004 or Bordo and Jeanne 2002). We rely on the former identification 
scheme. Building on Ahearne et al. (2005), Jannsen (2010) and IMF (2003), we define a 
housing crisis as a period when real house prices fall by 7.5 percent or more over a period of 
at least four years. The starting year of the crisis is defined by the peak of real house prices 
within a rolling nine-year window.49 Data on real house prices come from the Bank of 
International Settlements. With respect to banking crises, historical episodes with bank runs 
or closures of relevant financial institutions are usually used for identification. We rely on the 
chronology of banking crises of Reinhard and Rogoff (2009a), which in turn is based on 
chronologies from other sources. Throughout this paper, we define a recession as a period of 
negative GDP growth, this seems appropriate for industrial countries and annual data. 
According to this criterion, we have 41 recessions in our sample. In addition we have 29 
housing crises and 16 banking crises in our sample.  
The data we use for estimation is presented in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. For each country in our 
sample, we show log real GDP and the cdr
 
term. Since we identify 41 recessions in the 
____________________ 
49 The results are considerably stable with respect to the length of the rolling window and the price decline required. Below, 
we provide robustness checks of our results when using various dating schemes for housing crises. 
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sample, we can also observe 41 phases with positive cdr  terms. We also indicate (with a 
vertical line) the years that mark the start of a banking crisis or a housing crisis. Note that 
several of the banking crises and housing crises were followed by recessions, as is indicated 
by the positive values of cdr to the right of a vertical line. 
As we are interested in the existence and the strength of bounceback effects both following 
ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe crises, we have to differentiate 
between these two types of recessions. Therefore, we consider a recession to be associated 
with a banking crisis or a housing crisis if it begins within a period of two years after the crisis 
began.50 It turns out that eight out of the 16 banking crises and 21 out of the 29 housing crises 
were followed by a recession. Furthermore, seven out of eight banking crises were 
accompanied by a housing crisis.  
The only banking crisis not accompanied by a housing crisis, according to our criteria, took 
place in Australia in 1989. Since real house prices in this period declined by 7.2 percent, 
which is considerably close to our criterion of 7.5 percent, two types of crises seem to be 
reflected in our sample: housing crises that were accompanied by banking crises and (pure) 
housing crises. In the following, the expression banking crisis denotes a banking crisis 
accompanied by a housing crisis, if not otherwise mentioned. 
5.4 Results  
We first discuss the estimation results. After that we proceed by assessing the dynamic effects 
of recessions and severe crises graphically using impulse response functions. 
5.4.1 Estimation Results 
We adopt an AR(2) process as our baseline model. Preliminary tests show that the first two 
lags of GDP growth are highly significant in virtually any specification, while higher lags are 
usually not. In the first specification, we estimate model (2) by allowing for one lag of the cdr
term. We find a slightly positive parameter value, which is not significantly different from 
zero (Table 5.1). Thus, there seems to be no evidence in the data indicating that recessions in 
general are followed by particularly strong recoveries. Including the second lag of the cdr
term does not alter this result (specification II). 
____________________ 
50 We test the robustness of the results with regard to this definition in Section 5. 
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Figure	5.1:	
GDP,	Indicator	of	Current	Depth	of	Recession	and	Banking	Crises		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
Notes:	Vertical	lines	indicate	the	year	in	which	a	banking	crisis	began.	
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Figure	5.2:	
GDP,	Indicator	of	Current	Depth	of	Recession	and	Housing	Crises		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:	Vertical	lines	indicate	the	year	in	which	a	housing	crisis	began.
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In specification III, we allow for heterogeneity among recessions and augment the first 
specification by the first lag of the interaction term for banking crises and housing crises. The 
parameter value of the cdr  term, as well as the t-value, increases considerably. After an 
ordinary recession, GDP growth gets an extra boost, on average, of 139 percent of the overall 
output loss as long as GDP is below its former maximum level. Hence, in the absence of 
further negative shocks, GDP generally reaches its old level already after one year. When the 
recession was caused by a banking crisis, this effect vanishes completely and the parameter 
value of the interaction term becomes –1.42. When the recession was caused by a housing 
crisis, the parameter value is –1.18, which suggests that some bounceback effect occurs, but it 
is considerably weaker. The F-test confirms the hypothesis that the parameter values of cdr
and the interaction term for banking crises are of equal size (p-value: 0.79). For housing 
crises, the evidence is somewhat weaker. The corresponding p-value is 0.08. Thus, when a 
recession is accompanied by one of the two types of crises, the bounceback effect observed 
following ordinary recessions is almost or even completely offset.  
Table	5.1:		
Estimation	Results		
	 I II III IV	
ity ,1 	 0.43	ሺ9.7ሻ 0.44	ሺ8.6ሻ 0.49	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.50	ሺ9.8ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0.16	ሺ3.6ሻ –0.16	ሺ3.5ሻ –0.17	ሺ4.1ሻ –0.21	ሺ4.3ሻ	
itcdr ,1 	 0.11	ሺ1.4ሻ 0.14	ሺ1.1ሻ 1.39	ሺ4.7ሻ 1.48	ሺ4.9ሻ	
itcdr ,2 	 –0.04	ሺ0.3ሻ –0.52	ሺ1.7ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –1.42	ሺ4.7ሻ –1.76	ሺ5.4ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.82	ሺ2.4ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –1.18	ሺ3.9ሻ –1.17	ሺ3.6ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.36	ሺ1.1ሻ	
AIC	 2163.0 2164.8 2143.9 2142.2	
F‐Test		 0.79	/	0.08 0.92	/	0.24	
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	parenthesis.	 First	 values	of	 F‐tests	 indicate	 the	p‐value	of	 the	
hypothesis	 that	 the	 parameter	 values	 for	 the	 cdr	 terms	 and	 the	 banking	 crises	
interaction	 terms	 are	 identical.	 Second	 values	 refer	 to	 the	 housing	 crises	
interaction	term	cdr	terms.			
In specification IV, we augment the model by a second lag for each cdr  term. It turns out 
that the business cycle effects in the first year following a recession are even more 
pronounced than in specification III. For the second year, the parameter values have the 
opposite sign, indicating some repercussion effect for each type of recession, with or without 
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a severe crisis. Overall, the effects are qualitatively similar to those in specification III. Taken 
together, the parameter values of the first two lags of the cdr term are not significantly 
different from one, indicating that the output loss during an ordinary recession is completely 
offset in the following recovery. This is not the case when the recession was associated with a 
banking crisis (p-value: 0.92) or a housing crisis (p-value: 0.24).  
The Akaike Information Criteria favors the specifications that include the interaction terms 
for banking crises and housing crises and exhibit the lowest value for the specification IV, 
which includes two lags of each variable. A likelihood-ratio test indicates that specification IV 
fits the data better than specification I (p-value: 0.00), specification II (p-value: 0.00), and 
specification III (p-value: 0.05).    
5.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis 
We graphically illustrate the short- and long-run effects of recessions on GDP implied by our 
estimates. For linear models, it is sufficient to compute a single, representative impulse 
response function. Unfortunately, this is not true for nonlinear models, where the shape of 
the impulse response function may depend on the sign and the size of the shock. Since the 
models estimated above are nonlinear under negative GDP shocks and we are interested only 
in these kind of shocks, we compute impulse response functions for negative shocks of 
various sizes. We begin with a size of minus one percent and proceed with integer steps up to 
minus nine percent. 
To account for negative shocks that may hit the economy after the shock in the initial 
period, we employ impulse response functions in line with Potter (2000). First, we derive the 
steady state GDP growth of an average industrial economy in our panel. Therefore, we 
calculate the unconditional mean of GDP growth in our sample, which is 2.6 percent. 
Consequently, only negative shocks of more than minus 2.6 percent lead to negative GDP 
growth rates in the initial period and thus to nonlinear dynamics. Based on the steady state, 
we calculate a baseline forecast in the absence of any shock in the initial period and a forecast 
given a negative shock. For both forecasts, we allow the economy to be hit by further shocks 
beginning from the second period onwards. These shocks are drawn randomly from a 
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and the estimated standard deviation over all residuals 
of the model, which is 1.7. Finally, the difference between the baseline forecast and the 
forecast given a shock in the initial period is calculated for a horizon of 10 periods. This 
process is repeated 1,000 times. The average of the differences at each point in time yields 
the impulse response function. 
The Ugly and the Bad: Banking and Housing Crises Strangle Output Permanently, Ordinary 
Recessions Do Not 
78 
 
For the calculations of the impulse response functions, we employ specification IV because 
the pairwise LR-tests favor this as the best performing model. When simulations are run for 
an ordinary recession, the interaction terms between the cdr  term and the severe crisis 
dummies are supposed to be zero and we remain with the model  
 tttttt ucdrcdryyy   2121 52.048.121.050.07.1 , (5.4) 
where the constant 1.7 equals the average over all country-specific fixed effects.  
When the recession is associated with a banking crisis or housing crisis, the interaction 
terms are at work. We use the Wald test to test the hypothesis that the parameter values of 
the cdr  term and each of the interaction terms taken together are zero and find that the 
hypothesis is not rejected. Therefore, we simplify the model by excluding the cdr  terms until 
the initial recession is over. Thereby we have the same model for both, recessions associated 
with banking crises and recessions associated with housing crises.51 When the economy is hit 
by negative shocks later on, cdr  dynamics are allowed for again. Thus, impulse responses are 
calculated using simulations from the following equation: 
 





else ,52.048.121.050.07.1
 time  first for thezero  becomes   until ,21.050.07.1
2121
21
ttttt
tttt
t ucdrcdryy
cdruyy
y  (5.5)  
Figure 5.3 compares the resulting impulse response functions for GDP growth following an 
ordinary recession and a recession associated with a severe crisis. All impulse response 
functions are normalized by the absolute value of the initial shock. As mentioned before, the 
impulse response functions are identical for the first two shocks because GDP growth does 
not become negative in this case. For shocks stronger than minus two percent, GDP growth 
following ordinary recessions is considerably higher than following recessions associated 
with severe crisis in the first two years of the recovery. Furthermore, ordinary recessions lead 
to higher growth rates than in the baseline during the recovery and thus to a bounceback of 
GDP. By contrast, GDP growth in the first two years following a recession associated with a 
severe crisis is lower than in the baseline. Due to nonlinearity, the bounceback effect 
following an ordinary recession is (relatively) more pronounced the stronger the initial shock.  
In terms of the level of GDP, the economy catches up to the baseline rapidly in the case of an 
ordinary recession (Figure 5.4). However, as the confidence interval indicates, GDP is still 
____________________ 
51 The alternative is to include either the interaction term for banking crises or for housing crises in the model. Both 
alternative specifications lead to virtually the same results as with model (5). 
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likely to remain permanently below the baseline for all considered shocks.52 Therefore, 
recessions have small but permanent effects on economic activity, even if a bounceback 
occurs. When a recession is associated with a severe crisis, GDP permanently stays below the 
baseline, at roughly 1.5 times the size of the shock. Additionally, GDP in this case is always 
significantly lower than in the case of an ordinary recession. 
Figure	5.3:		
GDP	Growth:	Deviation	from	Baseline	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
52 Beginning with a shock of roughly minus 15 percent, the long-run GDP level is not significantly below the baseline 
anymore. However, shocks of this size are very unlikely to be observed in industrial countries, in particular when the 
recession is not associated with a banking or housing crisis.  
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Figure	5.4:		
GDP	Level:	Deviation	from	Baseline		
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 compares the relative strength of the bounceback effect following ordinary 
recessions in terms of level of GDP for different sizes of the initial shock. It turns out that the 
bounceback effect becomes relatively stronger with increasing size of the negative shock. 
Beginning with an initial negative shock of 4 percent, the permanent effect of a recession is 
lower than the initial size of the shock. However, the additional “strength” of the bounceback 
effect diminishes with increasing size of the shock. 
Similar patterns can be observed when comparing the recovery following an ordinary 
recession and a recession associated with a severe crisis (Figure 5.6). The recovery following 
an ordinary recession becomes relatively stronger with increasing size of the initial shock. 
Again, this effect diminishes with increasing size of the shock. 
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Notes:	Impulse	response	functions	are	calculated	as	the	difference	to	the	baseline	and	are	calculated	as
the	mean	over	1,000	bootstrap	simulations.	Impulse	response	functions	are	scaled	by	the	absolute	value
Notes:	Impulse	response	functions	are	calculated	as	the	difference	to	the	baseline	and	are	calculated
as	the	mean	over	1,000	bootstrap	simulations.	Impulse	response	functions	are	scaled	by	the	absolute
value	of	the	respective	shock.	
Figure	5.5:		
GDP	Level:	Deviation	from	Baseline	in	the	Case	of	a	Recession	
  
 
 
 
Figure	5.6:		
GDP	Level:	Deviation	between	an	Ordinary	Recession	and	a	Recession	associated	with	a	Severe	Crisis	
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5.5 Robustness Checks 
To assess the stability of our results, we perform a number of robustness checks. First, we 
check whether our results are driven by the influence of some outliers in our sample of 
recessions. Then, we check whether our results are robust when using alternative criteria for 
identifying housing crises. Therefore, we first perform a grid search to determine the criteria 
for identifying a housing crisis endogenously and second, we use alternative identification 
criteria for housing crises taken from the literature. In addition, we address the importance 
of non modelled or “global” developments for our estimation results, and we check whether 
the results are valid when we use quarterly data. Furthermore, we discuss the possible 
endogeneity of housing crises. Finally, we check whether our results are robust, when we 
allow for more heterogeneity between countries. Overall, our main results remain valid for all 
the robustness checks.  
Regarding the issue of outliers, a comparison of the recessions in our sample reveals that 
the recession in Finland beginning in 1991 and the recession in Switzerland beginning in 1975 
were, indeed, exceptionally strong in terms of length and output loss. Since both recessions 
were preceded by a housing crisis, and the recession in Finland was additionally associated 
with a banking crisis, one might argue that our results are driven mainly by these two cases. 
To check the robustness of our results with respect to these two potential outliers, we 
included dummy variables for each of the two recessions in the model. The estimation results 
show that the parameter value of the cdr term and the t-value increase considerably (Table 
5.2). Thus, the results of our baseline specifications (specifications I and II) seem to be driven 
to some extent by these two recessions. Therefore, a bounceback effect following recessions is 
usually observable in the data, even when we do not account for further banking crises or 
housing crises in our sample. The results of the augmented specifications (III and IV), where 
we do account for the other crises, are still valid. The bounceback effect following an ordinary 
recession is much stronger than on average. When the recession is associated with a severe 
crisis, the bounceback is much weaker or even vanishes completely.  
Further, we check whether our results are driven by the ad hoc method we use to identify 
housing crises. Therefore, first we vary the minimum house price decline required to identify 
a housing crisis as well as the rolling window of years that we use to identify a housing crisis 
to check whether other criteria provide a better model fit than our ad hoc criteria of a 
minimum price decline of 7.5 percent after a price peak within a rolling window of nine years. 
Running a grid search over different criteria, we find very similar results compared to our ad- 
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Table	5.2:		
Estimation	Results	for	Outlier	Analysis		
	 I II III IV	
ity ,1 	 0.50	ሺ10.5ሻ 0.51	ሺ9.6ሻ 0.52	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.52	ሺ9.9ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0.16	ሺ3.8ሻ –0.20	ሺ3.8ሻ –0.17	ሺ4.0ሻ –0.20	ሺ4.0ሻ	
itcdr ,1  0.82	ሺ4.1ሻ 0.88	ሺ4.0ሻ 1.47	ሺ4.9ሻ 1.53	ሺ5.0ሻ	
itcdr ,2  –0.26	ሺ1.2ሻ –0.53	ሺ1.7ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –1.18	ሺ2.9ሻ –1.35	ሺ3.1ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.66	ሺ1.5ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.81	ሺ2.1ሻ –0.90	ሺ2.2ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.46	ሺ1.1ሻ	
1991
1
FN
tdum   –0.86	ሺ4.1ሻ –1.3	ሺ4.7ሻ –0.32	ሺ1.0ሻ –0.56	ሺ1.5ሻ	
1991
2
FN
tdum  	 0.24	ሺ0.6ሻ	
1975
1
SW
tdum   –0.66	ሺ3.0ሻ –0.62	ሺ2.3ሻ –0.49	ሺ1.5ሻ –0.37	ሺ1.0ሻ	
1975
2
SW
tdum  –0.09	ሺ0.2ሻ	
AIC	 2150.2 2149.7 2144.7 2146.3	
F‐Test		 0.36	/	0.04 0.37	/	0.12	
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	parenthesis.	First	values	of	F‐tests	 indicate	 the	p‐value	of	 the	
hypothesis	 that	 the	 parameter	 values	 for	 the	 cdr	 terms	 and	 the	 banking	 crises	
interaction	 terms	 are	 identical.	 Second	 values	 refer	 to	 the	 housing	 crises	
interaction	term	cdr		terms.	݀ݑ݉ிேଵଽ	is	a	dummy	variable	for	the	starting	year	of	
the	recession	in	Finland	ሺ1991ሻ.		݀ݑ݉ௌௐଵଽ଻ହ	is	a	dummy	variable	for	the	starting	
year	of	the	recession	in	Switzerland	ሺ1975ሻ.		
	
hoc criteria to be optimal. Second, we apply two alternative but related identification criteria 
proposed in the literature. When we follow the criterion of Ahearne et al. (2005), namely that 
all periods following price peaks within a rolling window of nine years are presumed to be 
housing crises, the results virtually do not change. Alternatively, when we follow the criterion 
of the IMF (2003), namely that only those 25 percent of price peaks followed by the strongest 
price declines qualify as housing crises, the bounceback effect following ordinary recessions 
is estimated to be considerably smaller. However, there are two reasons, why this robustness 
check should not be considered decisive. First, the AIC of the model when using the IMF 
identification criteria of housing crises is rather low. This indicates that too many “non-
ordinary” recessions switched sides. Second, the moderate bounceback effect is largely driven 
by the fact that the housing crisis in Switzerland that began in 1975 cannot be considered one 
of the most severe housing crises in terms of price declines and therefore is considered to be 
an ordinary recession. Once we control for this recession via a dummy variable, the bounce-
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back effect is estimated to be considerably higher again. Overall, our results are in general 
robust with respect to the method used to identify housing crises.53  
Furthermore, to verify that our results are not driven by non modelled or “global” develop-
ments, we re-estimate the baseline specification using methods that allow such developments 
to be controlled for in different ways. Specifically, we use the following methods: estimation 
of the panel model with time fixed effects, incorporation of a variable that controls for global 
GDP growth, and estimation of a system of country-specific equations by seemingly unrelated 
equations. For all three methods the results are similar. The bounceback effect following an 
ordinary recession is estimated to be somewhat lower, but close to 100 percent of the former 
output loss. When the recession is associated with a severe crisis, this effect is offset to a large 
degree or even completely. Therefore, the baseline results are qualitatively robust to the 
consideration of global business cycle dynamics.54 
An important issue when interpreting our results is whether the severe economic crises we 
use can be interpreted as exogenous events or whether they were triggered at least to some 
extent by business cycle developments. To address this issue, we concentrate exclusively on 
housing crises, since nearly all the banking crises in our sample that were associated with a 
recession were associated with a housing crisis as well. Furthermore, our identification 
criteria for housing crises reach four years into the future, which increases the risk that an 
identified housing crisis could have been triggered by a recession. We test for the robustness 
of the exogeneity assumption for housing crises by modifying the identification criteria of 
housing crises. In a first step, we require a minimum distance between the start of the 
housing crisis and the following recession to consider them to be associated and thereby 
reduce the probability that a housing crisis is triggered by an associated recession. Even if we 
require a minimum distance of two years between a housing crises and a recession, our 
results are qualitatively identical.55 In a second step, we apply alternative identification 
____________________ 
53 The detailed robustness check regarding the identification of housing crises can be found in Appendix A. 
54 The detailed robustness check regarding the influence of non modelled or “global” developments can be found in 
Appendix B. 
55 In contrast, to require a minimum distance between housing crises and associated recessions to ensure that housing crises 
are exogeneous in our model one could require a maximum distance as well to ensure that severe economic crises are related 
to the following recessions. According to our baseline specification, a recession is classified as being associated with a severe 
crisis when it occurs within two years after the beginning of the crisis. To assess the robustness of our results with respect to 
this classification, we check the impact of alternative definitions on the estimation results. We re-estimate the model both 
under the assumption that the recession occurs within one year following the outbreak of a crisis and under the assumption 
that it occurs within three years. While the results are robust with regard to the time window of three years, they change if we 
allow for a time window of only one year. The recovery following an ordinary recession is estimated to be considerably 
weaker than in the baseline model. Furthermore, it does not matter anymore whether the recession was associated with a 
housing crisis or not. The assumption that the beginning of the recession and the crisis have to lie within a time window of 
one year seems to be rather restrictive and in contrast to the literature on business cycle effects of housing crises (see, e.g., 
IMF 2003, Ahearne et al. 2005, or Claessens 2009). Therefore, the results of the baseline model are reasonable with respect 
to consideration of alternative maximum lag lengths for the construction of the interaction term. Detailed results can be made 
available on request. 
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criteria that the grid search in Appendix A.1 showed would lead to comparable results to our 
baseline identification criteria. Namely, we identify a housing crisis as a price peak within a 
rolling window of three years followed by a minimum price decline of 3 percent in the first 
year following the price peak. Even if we require a minimum distance of two years between 
the housing crises identified by the alternative criteria and a recession, which means we 
identify a housing crisis before the associated recession started, our results are qualitatively 
identical to our baseline results. We conclude that we can interpret housing crises as 
exogenous events and that our results are robust with respect to the issue of possible 
endogenous housing crises.56 
Finally, we check whether our results are robust when we allow for more heterogeneity 
across countries. In our baseline model, we use the fixed effects model, assuming that only 
the average growth rate varies across countries and assuming that the other parameters are 
homogeneous. In a first step, we relax these assumptions by allowing the autoregressive 
parameters of GDP growth to vary across countries and estimate the model using the 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method. Our results turn out to be qualitatively robust 
to this modification. In a second step, we allow also the parameters of the cdr terms to vary 
across countries by applying a random coefficient approach. We use the random coefficient 
model of Swamy (1970) and model the constant, the dynamic parameters, and the cdr term 
as random. Due to the fact that some countries did not experience crises we do not model the 
interaction terms as random. The recovery is again quite strong. The impact of the crises is 
much weaker. This result can be explained by the fact that some of the heterogeneity that is 
due to the crises is already captured by the random coefficient. Since the number of crises per 
country varies, the model can hardly discriminate between a pure crises effect and country-
specific heterogeneity. It is a strong argument in favour of our main results that they prevail 
even in this setup.57 
5.6 Conclusion 
We provide empirical evidence for industrialized countries that ordinary recessions are 
typically followed by a strong recovery. This bounceback effect is nonlinear in the size of the 
negative shocks and becomes relatively stronger, the larger the shock is. In contrast, when a 
recession is associated with a banking crisis or a housing crisis, the bounceback of GDP will 
____________________ 
56 The detailed robustness check regarding the issue of exogeneity can be found in Appendix C. 
57 The detailed results can be found in Appendix D. 
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be almost or even completely offset. Consequently, recessions associated with banking crises 
or housing crises lead to considerably higher permanent output losses than ordinary 
recessions. Our results remain valid when several robustness checks are applied.  
Our results are relevant in several respects. We confirm empirical results that were 
obtained in the literature concerning the effects of banking crises and housing crises by using 
nonparametric methods, but we do so by using parametric methods, and we further provide a 
rationale for analyzing ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe crises 
separately. In addition, we provide evidence in favor of nonlinear adjustment paths in the 
sense of Beaudry and Koop (1993) following ordinary recessions. By implication, theoretical 
business cycle models should allow for nonlinear business cycle dynamics. Moreover, policy-
makers should be aware that recovery paths following recessions can be quite different from 
one another, necessitating different policy responses. Finally, since banking crises and 
housing crises can usually be recognized during or even before a recession, our results have 
practical implications for forecasting recessions and, in particular, for forecasting recoveries. 
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5.8 Appendices:  Robustness Check 
In the Appendices, we check the robustness of our results with respect to the identification 
criteria for housing crises, the influence of global business cycle developments, the use of 
quarterly data to re-estimate some of our specifications, the assumption that severe economic 
crises are exogenous to the business cycle, and the assumption of homogeneity across 
countries.     
5.8.1 Appendix A.  Identification of Housing Crises 
We check the robustness of our results with respect to the identification criteria for housing 
crises by running a grid search over alternative identification criteria and by using alternative 
identification criteria taken from the literature. 
Appendix A.1  Endogenous Threshold for Identifying Housing Crises 
In the baseline scenario, we define the starting year of a housing crisis as the peak in real 
house prices within a rolling window of nine years followed by a price decline of at least 7.5 
percent within the subsequent four years. Even though this method provides reasonable and 
stable results with respect to other identification criteria used in the literature, it is rather ad 
hoc. Therefore, we further test the robustness of the results with respect to the identification 
of housing crises by determining the identification criteria for housing crises endogenously. 
We run a grid search over a range of possible thresholds for the required house price decline 
to identify a housing crisis. We do so not only in peaks of real house prices within a rolling 
window of nine years, but also for rolling windows of eleven, seven, five and three years. 
We perform the grid search as follows. We allow the threshold variable for the minimum 
house price decline required to identify a housing crisis to take a value between 0 and 20 
percent. The grid search is applied for steps of 0.1 percentage points. Given the identified 
housing crises for a certain threshold, we identify a housing crisis to be associated with a 
recession if it begins in the same period or within the next two years after the crisis began. 
Then we run our regression model and choose the threshold that results in the regression 
model with the lowest value for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). For simplicity, we 
compare only models that include the first lag of the cdr term and the interaction term. 
Furthermore, we do not differentiate between banking crisis that are associated with housing 
crises and (pure) housing crises. 
It turns out that the grid search for a rolling window of nine years leads to a threshold that 
is very close to our ad hoc criterion of 7.5 percent, namely a threshold between 8.7 and 8.9 
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percent. Further, the estimation results for both criteria are nearly indistinguishable from 
each other and the AICs are nearly identical (Table 5.A1). The results for the longer and 
shorter rolling windows indicate that the identification criteria for a rolling window of nine 
years with a threshold variable between 8.7 and 8.9 percent lead to the best model in terms of 
the AIC. However, our estimation results are absolutely robust to changes in the rolling 
window. 
Table	5.A1:	
Grid	Search	for	Best	Threshold	and	Estimation	Results	
Rolling	windows	 11	 		9 7 5 			3												 baseline
threshold	 8.7–8.9	 8.7–8.9 9.7–10.6 9.7–10.6 3.0–3.1	 7.5
AIC	 2147,7	 2141,1 2144.0 2144.2 2144.8	 2141.4
no.	of	crises	 25	 28 22 20 31	 29
ity ,1 	 0.49	ሺ10.6ሻ	 0.49	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.50	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.50	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.49	ሺ10.7ሻ	
0.49	
ሺ10.8ሻ
ity ,2 	 –0.16	ሺ3.8ሻ	 –0.16	ሺ3.9ሻ –0.16	ሺ3.7ሻ –0.16	ሺ3.7ሻ –0.17	ሺ4.0ሻ	
–0.16	
ሺ3.9ሻ
itcdr ,1 	 1.05	ሺ4.3ሻ	 1.55	ሺ5.0ሻ 1.38	ሺ4.7ሻ 1.37	ሺ4.7ሻ 1.52	ሺ4.7ሻ	 1.54	ሺ5.0ሻ
hc
itcdr
 all
,1 	
–0.99	
ሾ0.00ሿ	
–1.48	
ሾ0.00ሿ
–1.30	
ሾ0.00ሿ
–1.29	
ሾ0.00ሿ
–1.44	
ሾ0.02ሿ	
–1.47	
ሺ4.8ሻ
Notes:	t‐values	in	brackets;	p‐values	in	square	bracket;	p‐values	for	the	interaction	term	were	calculated	
by	simulations	with	1,000	draws.	
 
Appendix A.2  Alternative Identification Criteria of Housing Crises 
In the baseline model, we follow Jannsen (2010) and Aßmann et al. (2011) and define the 
starting year of a housing crisis as the peak of real house prices within a rolling window of 
nine years followed by a price decline of at least 7.5 percent within the subsequent four years. 
Even though these criteria provide reasonable and stable results, it is rather ad hoc. 
Therefore, we test the robustness of the results by modifying our identification criteria with 
respect to two alternative but related identification criteria applied in the literature. First, we 
modify our identification criterion to include all price peaks that occur within a rolling 
window of nine years. This is in accordance with Ahearne et al. (2005), who use a similar 
criterion for quarterly data. Using this modified criterion, we identify 34 housing crises in our 
sample. Since 29 of these 34 housing crises were already identified as crises in our baseline 
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scenario the results are rather stable with respect to this modification (Table 5.A2). Second, 
we modify our identification criteria according to IMF (2003), such that only the 25 percent 
most severe house price declines following one of the 34 identified price peaks are identified 
as a housing crisis.58 Since the identification criteria of the IMF leave us with only 4 ‘pure’ 
housing crises, for this robustness check we consider all banking crises and all housing crises 
in separate models, respectively.59 Our results are qualitatively stable with respect to this 
modification (specification III and IV). However, the bounceback effect following ordinary 
recessions is estimated to be much weaker than in the baseline model. 
Table	5.A2:		
Estimation	Results	for	Alternative	Housing	Crises	Identification	Criteria	
	 All	peaks	 Most	severe	
	 I	 II III IV V	 VI
ity ,1 	 0.49	ሺ10.7ሻ	 0.50	ሺ9.7ሻ 0.45 ሺ10.0ሻ 0.46 ሺ9.9ሻ 0.50	ሺ10.7ሻ	 0.48	ሺ10.2ሻ
ity ,2 	 –0.17	ሺ4.1ሻ	 –0.21	ሺ4.3ሻ –0.16	ሺ3.8ሻ –0.16 ሺ3.7ሻ –0.17	ሺ3.9ሻ	 –0.16 ሺ3.7ሻ
itcdr ,1 	 1.38	ሺ4.7ሻ	 1.47	ሺ4.8ሻ 0.33 ሺ2.9ሻ 0.30 ሺ2.5ሻ 1.05	ሺ4.6ሻ	 0.73 ሺ3.4ሻ
itcdr ,2 	 	 –0.52	ሺ1.7ሻ 	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –1.41	ሺ4.7ሻ	 –1.75	ሺ5.4ሻ –0.38 ሺ2.7ሻ –1.06	ሺ4.5ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 	 0.81	ሺ2.4ሻ 	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –1.17	ሺ3.9ሻ	 –1.16	ሺ3.6ሻ 	 –0.69 ሺ3.2ሻ
hc
itcdr ,2 	 	 0.36	ሺ1.1ሻ 	
hcall
itcdr
,
,1 	 	 –0.31	ሺ2.1ሻ 	
1975
1
SW
tdum  	 –0.89	ሺ3.6ሻ	 –0.54	ሺ2.4ሻ
AIC	 2144.1	 2142.5 2157.6 2160.2 2146.3	 2156.2
F‐Test		 0.78	/	0.07	 0.92	/	0.05 0.62 0.91 0.91	 0.74
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	 parenthesis.	 First	 values	 of	 F‐tests	 indicate	 the	 p‐value	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	
parameter	values	for	the	cdr	terms	and	the	banking	crises	interaction	terms	are	identical.	Second	values	
refer	to	the	housing	crises	interaction	term.	
 
For both specifications, the bounceback effect is only about a quarter of the size obtained 
for the baseline model, but it still vanishes completely in case of a banking crisis or a housing 
crisis. The moderate bounceback effect result obtained for the specifications with the most 
severe housing crises is largely driven by the fact that the housing crisis in Switzerland that 
____________________ 
58 Each of the remaining 9 housing crises was accompanied by a decline in real house prices of at least 32.5 
percent.  
59 Furthermore, we consider only the model with one lag of the cdr term and the interaction term to save space. 
The results are robust when we include also the second lag of both terms in the model. 
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began in 1975 cannot be considered one of the most severe housing crises in terms of price 
declines and therefore enters into the sample of ordinary recessions. Once we control for this 
recession via a dummy variable, the bounceback effect is estimated to be 100 percent of the 
former output loss in case we consider banking crises (specification V) or 70 percent in case 
we consider housing crises (specification VI). 
5.8.2 Appendix B.  Accounting for Global Factors 
Country-specific business cycle dynamics are certainly influenced by the global economy 
(Kose et al. 2003). Therefore, one might argue that our results are driven by global or other 
non-modelled developments, for which we do not control in our relatively parsimonious 
model, rather than by domestic business cycle dynamics. We check the robustness of the 
results in this regard by modifying our model in three different ways: including time-fixed 
effects, introducing a global GDP variable, and estimating the model using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) method. 
B.1  Time Fixed Effects 
One method of capturing the influence of global developments on the results is to introduce 
time-fixed effects. However, as this would involve estimating another 33 parameters, we do 
not use time fixed effects in our baseline model. 
The introduction of time fixed effects confirms the baseline results. While the parameter 
values and t-values are in general smaller, the results are qualitatively identical (Table 5.B1). 
Ordinary recessions are followed by a bounceback effect that is now below, but close to, 100 
percent of the preceding output loss. Banking crises completely offset this effect. Pure 
housing crises, on the other hand, weaken the bounceback effect considerably, but not as 
strongly. 
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Table	5.B1:		
Estimation	Results	with	Time	Fixed	Effects	
	 I	 II III IV	
ity ,1 	 0.43	ሺ9.7ሻ 0.41	ሺ7.6ሻ 0.46	ሺ9.7ሻ 0.45	ሺ8.3ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0,16	ሺ–3.6ሻ –0.07	ሺ1.5ሻ –0.10	ሺ2.1ሻ –0.11	ሺ2.2ሻ	
itcdr ,1 	 0.11	ሺ1.4ሻ 0.07	ሺ0.6ሻ 0.89	ሺ3.4ሻ 0.89	ሺ3.3ሻ	
itcdr ,2 	 0.08	ሺ0.7ሻ –0.27	ሺ1.0ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.86	ሺ3.3ሻ –1.12	ሺ3.9ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.56	ሺ1.9ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.65 ሺ2.5ሻ –0.67	ሺ2.4ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.25	ሺ0.9ሻ	
AIC	 1960.9 1962.3 1952.3 1951.9	
F‐Test		 0.77	/	0.02 0.46	/	0.06	
Notes:	t‐values	in	parentheses.	First	values	of	F‐tests	indicate	the	p‐value	of	the	
hypothesis	 that	 the	 parameter	 values	 for	 the	 cdr	 terms	 and	 the	 banking	 crises	
interaction	 terms	 are	 identical.	 Second	 values	 refer	 to	 the	 housing	 crises	
interaction	term.	
B.2  Global GDP Variable  
As a second method of controlling for the influence of the global business cycle dynamics, we 
include a global output variable in the baseline model. We calculate global output for each 
country individually as export weighted GDP growth of the other 15 countries in our 
sample.60 Since the most important industrial countries are included in our sample, the 
calculated global variable should be a reasonable approximation of the global business cycle 
from the perspective of each individual country. Including the global variable  ty , the model 
is defined as 
  itithcitbcititiit yLcdrLcdrLcdrLyL ,,,,,, ]1)([]1)([]1)([)(    (5.B5) 
We assume that each country is small compared to the world and allow therefore for 
contemporaneous effects of the global economy on domestic GDP growth.61  
____________________ 
60 Export data were taken from the International Financial Statistics Database of the IMF.  
61 This assumption is obviously questionable for the United States, but reasonable for the other countries in our sample. The 
method of calculating the global term is inspired by a growing literature that uses export-weighted or, alternatively, trade-
weighted foreign variables to account for global developments (see Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) and Pesaran et al. (2004)). 
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The global GDP variable is highly significant and improves the fit of the model 
considerably (Table 5.B2). The qualitative results of the baseline model are confirmed. We 
can still observe a bounceback effect following an ordinary recession, even though the 
parameter values and t-values are smaller than in the baseline model. Subsequent to a 
banking crisis, we do not observe a particularly fast recovery. Following a housing crisis, the 
bounceback effect is at least considerably weaker or even completely offset. 
Table	5.B2:		
Estimation	Results	with	Global	Variables		
	 I II III IV	
ity ,1 	 0.47	ሺ10.7ሻ 0.46 ሺ9.4ሻ 0.50	ሺ11.2ሻ 0.49	ሺ9.9ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0,08	ሺ2.4ሻ –0.08	ሺ2.1ሻ –0.09	ሺ2.7ሻ –0.11	ሺ2.9ሻ	
itcdr ,1 	 0.12	ሺ1.8ሻ 0.10	ሺ1.0ሻ 0.77	ሺ3.2ሻ 0.82	ሺ3.3ሻ	
itcdr ,2 	 0.02	ሺ0.2ሻ –0.39	ሺ1.6ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.73	ሺ3.0ሻ –0.99	ሺ3.7ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.62	ሺ2.3ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.57	ሺ2.3ሻ –0.61	ሺ2.3ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.35	ሺ1.3ሻ	
 ity , 	 0.81	ሺ17.0ሻ 0.81	ሺ17.0ሻ 0.78	ሺ16.4ሻ 0.78	ሺ16.3ሻ	

 ity ,1 	 –0.33	ሺ6.0ሻ –0.33	ሺ5.9ሻ –0.32	ሺ5.8ሻ –0.31	ሺ5.5ሻ	
AIC	 1925.0 1927.0 1919.5 1919.2	
F‐Test	 0.68	/	0.05 0.46	/	0.11	
Notes:	t‐values	 in	parentheses.	First	values	of	F‐tests	 indicate	the	p‐value	of	 the	
hypothesis	 that	 the	 parameter	 values	 for	 the	 cdr	 terms	 and	 the	 banking	 crises	
interaction	 terms	 are	 identical.	 Second	 values	 refer	 to	 the	 housing	 crises	
interaction	term.	
B.3  Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
If global business cycle dynamics are relevant in our model, their neglect directly translates 
into cross-correlation of the error terms if we estimate our model country-wise using 
ordinary least squares. This would lead to inefficient estimation results. A direct way to 
address this problem is to estimate the system of equations using the seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) method, which explicitly accounts for the cross-correlation in the error 
terms. A disadvantage of SUR is that we have to estimate the covariance matrix and therefore 
additional 1202)15*16(   parameters. For a dataset containing 592 observations, this is 
highly demanding and could lead to imprecise parameter estimates. Even though SUR seems 
to be an appropriate method for our estimation exercise in general, we refrain for this reason 
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from using it for the baseline estimates. To test if there is still a common nonlinear effect 
concerning the recovery following a recession, we restrict the parameters of the cdr terms 
and the interaction terms such that they are equal across all the countries in our panel. 
Further, to make the results as comparable as possible to the panel estimation results, we 
also restrict the autoregressive terms such that they are equal across countries.62  
The baseline results are qualitatively confirmed by SUR estimation. The bounceback effect 
following ordinary recessions is estimated to be weaker than in the baseline model, but with a 
parameter value of 0.88 in the specification with one lag this is still high (Table 5.B3). When 
a recession is associated with a crisis, the bounceback effect does not occur at all (banking 
crisis), or is at least considerably weaker (housing crisis).  
Table	5.B3:			
Seemingly	Unrelated	Regression	Estimation	Results	
	 I	 II III IV
ity ,1 	 0.40	ሺ10.2ሻ	 0.40	ሺ9.6ሻ 0.41	ሺ10.6ሻ 0.41	ሺ10.4ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0,14	ሺ3.8ሻ	 –0.14	ሺ3.5ሻ –0.13	ሺ3.5ሻ ‐0.16	ሺ4.4ሻ	
itcdr ,1 	 0.05	ሺ1.0ሻ	 –0.02	ሺ0.2ሻ 0.88	ሺ6.2ሻ 0.95	ሺ6.5ሻ	
itcdr ,2 	 	 0.08	ሺ1.1ሻ ‐0.55	ሺ3.8ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.95	ሺ6.2ሻ –1.33	ሺ8.3ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.95	ሺ5.9ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.75	ሺ5.1ሻ –0.88	ሺ6.1ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.54	ሺ3.3ሻ	
	Note:	t‐values	in	parentheses.		
5.8.3 Appendix C.  Exogeneity of Housing Crises  
We consider a recession to be associated with a housing crisis if it begins in the same year or 
within the next two years after the crisis began. It turns out that of the 20 housing crises that 
according to this definition are associated with a recession, only one begins in the same year 
as the recession. Eight housing crises started one year before the respective recession and 11 
started two years before the respective recession.    
Our estimation results are qualitatively robust for setting a minimum distance between a 
housing crisis and a recession considered to be associated. When we set a minimum distance 
of two years, the parameter estimate of the cdr term takes a value of 1.0 and is highly 
significant (Table 5.C1). The bounceback effect is nearly completely offset when a recession is 
____________________ 
62 The results are qualitatively the same if we do not restrict the autoregressive terms such that they are equal. 
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associated with a housing crisis.63 A minimum distance of two years between the beginning 
of a housing crisis and the beginning of a recession seems to be reasonable to consider a 
housing crisis to be exogenous of the recessions. This is particularly true because we do not 
relate the recession itself to the housing crises, but rather the recoveries that start by 
definition in our model one year after the recession. 
Table	5.C1:		
Estimation	Results	for	Different	Minimum	Distances	between	
Housing	Crises	and	Recessions	
Minimum	distance	 0 1 2	
no.	of	recessions	
starting	in	year			 1 8 11
no.	of	crises 20 19 11
ity ,1 0.49	ሺ10.8ሻ 0.49	ሺ10.6ሻ 0.50	ሺ10.6ሻ
ity ,2 –0.16	ሺ3.9ሻ –0.17	ሺ3.9ሻ –0.18	ሺ4.1ሻ
itcdr ,1 1.54	ሺ5.0ሻ 1.29	ሺ4.4ሻ 1.03	ሺ4.3ሻ
hc
itcdr
 all
,1 	 –1.47	ሺ4.8ሻ –1.21	ሺ4.2ሻ –0.97	ሺ4.0ሻ
Note:	t‐values	in	parentheses.	
	
In Section 5.2, we showed that our results are robust to alternative identification criteria. 
In particular, we show that we receive qualitatively the same results when a housing crisis is 
identified as a price peak within a rolling window of three years followed by a minimum price 
decline of 3 percent in the first year after a house price peak. Therefore, we also run the 
former robustness check for housing crises identified by these alternative identification 
criteria. Even if we require a minimum distance of two years between the housing crises 
identified by the alternative criteria and a recession, that means, we identify a housing crisis 
before the associated recession started, our results are qualitatively identical to our baseline 
results. The results are again robust to alternative minimum distances between the beginning 
of housing crises and recessions (Table 5.C2).  
  
____________________ 
63 The results do not change when the three housing crises for which the recession starts three years after the crises began are 
included in the interaction term.  
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Table	5.C2:	
Estimation	Results	for	Different	Minimum	Distances	between	
Housing	Crises	and	Recessions	for	an	Alternative	Identification	
Scheme	of	Housing	Crises		
Minimum	distance	 0 1 2	
no.	of	recessions	
starting	in	year			 1 7 10
no.	of	crises 18 17 10
ity ,1 0.49	ሺ10.7ሻ 0.49	ሺ10.5ሻ 0.49	ሺ10.3ሻ
ity ,2 –0.17	ሺ4.0ሻ –0.17	ሺ4.0ሻ –0.17	ሺ4.0ሻ
itcdr ,1 1.52	ሺ4.7ሻ 1.24	ሺ4.0ሻ 0.92	ሺ3.7ሻ
hc
itcdr
 all
,1 	 –1.44	ሺ4.5ሻ –1.16	ሺ3.8ሻ –0.86	ሺ3.4ሻ
Note:	t‐values	in	parentheses.	
5.8.4 Appendix D.  Heteorgeneity  
We test for the robustness of our results when we allow for more heterogeneity across 
countries by allowing the autoregressive parameters of GDP growth to vary across countries 
and additionally by allowing the parameters of the cdr term to vary across countries by 
means of the random coefficient approach. 
Appendix D.1  Heterogeneity of the Autoregressive Parameters of GDP Growth 
In our baseline model, we allow only the average growth rates to vary across countries, while 
the parameters for lagged GDP growth are assumed to be homogeneous. Even though, these 
assumptions can be justified by the empirical circumstances, i.e., using annual data and 
including only industrial countries in the panel, they are apparently rather strong. In a first 
step, we check whether these assumptions are crucial for our estimation results by allowing 
the autoregressive parameters of GDP growth to vary across countries. We estimate our 
model as a system of equations using SUR and restrict only the parameters of the cdr terms 
and the interaction terms to be homogeneous across countries. 
Compared to the estimation results based on SUR with the autoregressive parameters 
restricted to be equal across countries, the parameter estimates for the cdr terms and the 
interaction terms are slightly lower (Table 5.D1). However, our baseline results are 
qualitatively confirmed.   
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Table	5.D1:	
Seemingly	Unrelated	Regression	Estimation	Results	
	 I	 II III IV
itcdr ,1 	 0.04	ሺ0.6ሻ	 0.11	ሺ1.2ሻ 0.76	ሺ5.0ሻ 0.84	ሺ5.2ሻ	
itcdr ,2 	 	 –0.08	ሺ0.9ሻ ‐0.31	ሺ2.0ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.83	ሺ4.8ሻ –1.06	ሺ5.2ሻ	
bc
itcdr ,2 	 0.47	ሺ2.6ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,1 	 –0.67	ሺ4.4ሻ –0.68	ሺ4.1ሻ	
hc
itcdr ,2 	 0.22	ሺ1.3ሻ	
Note:	t‐values	in	parentheses.	
Appendix D.2  Random Coefficient Model 
A fixed effects model restricts the dynamic parameter and the parameters of the cdr terms 
and the crises to be equal among all countries. It might be assumed that the autoregressive 
dynamics may be heterogeneous between countries. Further, Bradley and Jansen (1997) and 
Kim et al. (2005) argue that the cdr effect and the bounceback effects are heterogeneous 
between countries, too. Note that the crisis specification we propose provides a first step in 
explaining the latter form of heterogeneity. Since recessions and crises are rare events, a 
different number of crises may explain seemingly country specific differences in the post-
recession period. However, it cannot be denied that beyond this explained heterogeneity, 
further country-specific impacts concerning the post-recession periods can exist. To deal with 
this issue, we additionally apply the random coefficient model proposed by Swamy (1970). 
We do a Bayesian analysis for the random coefficient model, since the FGLS approach as 
proposed by Swamy (1970) performs weakly in smaller samples such as ours. We estimate 
the posterior distributions using the Gibbs Sampler and assume Gaussian priors with zero 
mean and a variance of 10 for all mean parameters and an exponential prior for each variance 
parameter. The posterior means as well as the 95 % confidence bands show results in 
accordance to those from the fixed effects model (Table 5.D2). The mean of the first cdr 
parameter is well above one, while the mean of the coefficient of crisis variable is clearly 
negative.   
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Table	5.D2:		
Estimation	Results	for	Random	Coefficient	Model	
	 mean std.	dev.
2.5	
percentile 97.5	percentile	
constant	 1.558 0.217 1.129 1.984	
ity ,1 	 0.522 0.109 0.321 0.736	
ity ,2 	 –0.206 0.099 –0.401 –0.010	
itcdr ,1 	 1.483 0.370 0.754 2.216	
itcdr ,2 	 –0.310 0.365 –1.025 0.419	
hcall
itcdr
,
,1 	 –0.869 0.440 –1.746 –0.008	
hcall
itcdr
,
,2 	 0.368 0.434 –0.498 1.210	
 
Our main results prevail also when estimating the model with this approach, since it would 
presumably be hard to disentangle the heterogeneity captured by the random coefficient of 
the cdr terms and the heterogeneity between countries that is due to differing number of 
crises hitting the economies.  
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6 International Recessions, Crises, and the Dynamics of 
Recoveries64 
6.1 Introduction 
The worldwide Great Recession of 2008/2009 is an outstanding example of an 
internationally synchronized recession. However, while the strength of the recession was 
already quite heterogeneous across the individual countries, the recoveries that followed 
apparently exhibited an even higher degree of heterogeneity. Some countries that were 
directly affected by a severe economic crisis, as a financial crisis or a housing crisis, such as 
the United States, Great Britain, or Spain, experienced a relatively sluggish recovery that was 
by far not strong enough to bring GDP back to its pre crisis growth path. Some countries that 
were apparently not directly affected by a severe economic crisis, like some East Asian 
emerging economies or Germany, experienced a strong recovery that brought GDP back 
relatively close or even completely to its pre crisis growth path. Other countries that were 
apparently not directly affected by a severe economic crisis, like Canada, nonetheless 
experienced a sluggish recovery. Given these heterogeneities, I analyze the extent to which 
the strength of recessions and the dynamics and the strength of recoveries are affected when 
recessions and severe economic crises are internationally synchronized. 
While there is a rich literature that studies the international business cycle 
synchronization, the literature that studies particularly the relevance of international 
synchronization during recessions and recoveries for the strength of recessions and 
recoveries is scarce. Claessens et al. (2009) show that internationally synchronized recessions 
are considerably longer and deeper than recessions that are not internationally synchronized. 
The IMF (2009) shows, in a similar study, that recoveries following internationally 
synchronized recessions are particularly weak. Cerra et al. (2009) find no evidence that 
foreign GDP growth has a significant additional effect on the strength of domestic recoveries 
that goes beyond the normal transmission mechanism for industrial countries.65 Jorda et al. 
(2011) show that internationally synchronized financial crises are deeper than not 
internationally synchronized financial crises or ordinary recessions.  
However, from a theoretical point of view it is not obvious whether internationally 
synchronized recessions and recoveries are stronger or weaker than not internationally 
____________________ 
64 This Chapter is based on the paper: N. Jannsen (2011). International Recessions, Crises, and the Dynamics of 
Recoveries. Mimeo. 
65 They find a significant additional impact for developing countries and for a sample that comprises all countries.  
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synchronized recessions or recoveries. Increasing trade and financial linkages among 
countries could lead to the hypothesis that internationally synchronized recessions as well as 
recoveries are stronger. The empirical literature indeed provides some evidence that bilateral 
trade linkages and financial linkages lead to increasing business cycle co-movements across 
countries (compare, e.g., Baxter and Kouparitsas 2005, Imbs 2004). However, when a 
country experiences a recession and in particular when it experiences a severe economic 
crisis, the depreciation of the currency could stabilize the economy by stimulating exports 
and thus leading to stronger recoveries. When several countries experiencing recoveries at 
the same time, a considerable depreciation of the currency is much less likely and 
internationally synchronized recoveries therefore might be weaker. Moreover, when 
internationally synchronized recessions are caused by global shocks, as for example oil price 
shocks, the strength of the recession and the following recovery in a country might depend 
crucially on how vulnerable this country is to such shocks and how economic policy in this 
country reacts to them. In this context, several studies find evidence in favour of a world 
business cycle that affects national business cycles considerably, but also find country-
specific factors still to be highly important for national business cycles (Kose et al. 2003, 
Canova et al. 2007, Kose et al. 2008). 
Even though the results of Jorda et al. (2011) might be not easy to apply to the Great 
Recession, because they identified only phases of global financial crises before World War II, 
they bring up an important issue: the impact of international synchronization on the depth of 
recessions and the strength and dynamics of recoveries might depend on whether the 
recessions are associated with severe economic crises or not. This hypothesis is underpinned 
by the literature on national recessions and recoveries. For example, Beaudry and Koop 
(1993), show that recessions in the United States are usually followed by strong recoveries 
that bring GDP back close or even completely to its old growth path. In contrast, the 
literature on severe economic crises concludes that they lead to particularly deep and long-
lasting recessions that have permanent effects on GDP (see, e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2008 
or Cerra and Saxena 2008). Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) reconcile these opposing results by 
differentiating between recessions that are associated with severe economic crises and 
recessions that are not (ordinary recessions). They show that ordinary recessions are usually 
followed by strong recoveries, while recessions associated with severe economic crises are 
not. Consequently, ordinary recessions exhibit much smaller or even no permanent effects on 
GDP.  
This analysis contributes to the literature by providing stylized facts on whether 
internationally synchronized recessions and recoveries are different from not internationally 
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synchronized recessions and recoveries. In particular, it differentiates between ordinary 
recessions and recessions associated with severe economic crises when analyzing the impact 
of international synchronization. Recessions and recoveries are investigated independently of 
each other. First, I analyze whether internationally synchronized recessions are deeper than 
other recessions. To do so, I build on the work of Claessens et al. (2009) and the IMF (2009) 
and use additional measures of international synchronization. Second, I investigate how the 
strength and the dynamics of recoveries are affected when they are internationally 
synchronized. Therefore, I augment the empirical model of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) to 
an open economy model. I estimate the strength of recoveries following ordinary recessions 
or severe economic crises in a panel framework for 16 industrial countries. The empirical 
results are used to run simulations to analyze the strength and the dynamics of recoveries in 
several scenarios. I analyze these scenarios using a stylized two-region model consisting of a 
(domestic) small open economy that is subject to international business cycle developments 
and a foreign ‘rest-of-the-world’ economy, which I model basically as a closed economy. The 
scenarios include cases in which the domestic and the foreign economy are hit by an ordinary 
recession or a severe economic crisis. 
 I find some evidence that internationally synchronized recessions are stronger than not 
internationally synchronized recessions. However, the results depend considerably on how 
the degree of international synchronization is measured and whether I control for outliers in 
the sample. Countries hit by severe economic crises tend to be more vulnerable to 
internationally synchronized recessions. Ordinary recessions seem to have larger 
international spillover effects. Moreover, I find that internationally synchronized recoveries 
tend to be stronger than not internationally synchronized recoveries. However, a country 
benefits only significantly from internationally synchronized recoveries when the foreign 
recoveries are following ordinary recessions, but not when they are following recessions 
associated with severe economic crises. The benefits are larger when the country itself was hit 
by a severe economic crisis. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data set used. 
Section 6.3 presents the results for internationally synchronized recessions. Section 6.4 
presents the estimation and simulation results for internationally synchronized recoveries. 
Section 6.5 summarizes the results. 
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6.2 Data Set and Identification of Recessions and Severe Economic 
Crises 
The empirical literature on the effects of severe economic crises relies on panel data sets, 
because such crises are rare events, what makes it difficult to estimate meaningful time series 
models for single countries. For our analysis I focus on a panel of 16 industrial countries, 
namely Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. 
The panel is restricted by the fact that I want to investigate besides recessions and financial 
crises also housing crises, but data for real house prices, which I use to identify housing 
crises, are only available for a limited number of countries. While data on financial crises are 
available for a lot of emerging economies or developing countries the restriction to industrial 
countries might have the advantage that countries with considerably different market 
structures, risk perceptions, institutions, etc are not mixed up. This dampens the risk that the 
results are biased by investigating a very heterogeneous set of countries. 
 I use real GDP data from the OECD’s Economic Outlook (2011). Financial crises are 
usually identified as episodes of bank runs or closures of big financial institutions. I use the 
chronology of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Housing crises are identified based on real house 
price developments. Data on real house prices come from the Bank for International 
Settlements. Since financial crises and housing crises are usually identified on an annual 
basis and our data set for real house prices is on an annual basis as well, I use annual data 
throughout our analysis. The time span covered is 1970 to 2009, the longest possible time 
span for that all necessary data are available. Since the available times series data do not 
allow a conclusive assessment of the recessions and recoveries during the Great Recession, I 
do not include them in the analysis. 
 I follow the literature and identify housing crises as periods of sharp real house price 
declines (Ahearne et al. 2005, Jannsen 2010, or IMF 2003). In this literature a housing crisis 
is identified as real house price decline after prices have reached a peak within a rolling 
window of eight to ten years. The former literature differs in how much real house prices 
have to decline to be considered as a housing crisis. While sometimes only the most severe 
house price declines are considered to be housing crises (IMF 2003), sometimes all house 
price declines following a house price peak within a rolling window are considered to be 
housing crises (Ahearne 2005), and sometimes the house price decline has to pass a certain 
threshold to be considered housing crisis (Jannsen 2010). I follow the latter identification 
scheme and identify the beginning of a housing crisis as house price peak within a rolling 
window of nine years followed by a minimum house price decline of 7.5 percent within the 
next four years. A minimum price decline as identification criterion ensures that only 
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exceptional developments at the housing market are identified as a housing crisis on the one 
hand and that a sufficient number of housing crises for our empirical investigation is 
identified on the other hand. Even though these identification criteria are rather ad-hoc, the 
former literature that uses these criteria has shown that their results are robust to 
modifications of these criteria, e.g. modifications in the minimum house price decline 
required (Jannsen 2010, Boysen-Hogrefe et al. 2010, and Aßmann et al. 2011). 
I identify recessions as periods with negative GDP growth rates. This identification strategy 
is not unique in the literature, but frequently used. Compared to other frequently used 
identification strategies as strategies based on the output gap or the Bry-Boschan algorithm 
(adjusted to yearly data), the strategy used here usually identifies only recessions that would 
have been identified by the alternative strategies as well, but identifies fewer recessions. 
Overall, the strategy used here is relatively strict and identifies only relatively severe 
recessions. This identification strategy is convenient for the analysis, because the strength of 
recoveries following recessions is modeled by means of a current-depth of recession (cdr) 
term. The cdr term is defined as difference between current GDP and the historical 
maximum of GDP: 
 tjjtt yycdr   0)(max .  (6.1) 
As long as GDP does not decrease the cdr term is equal to zero. When an economy is in a 
recession and GDP growth is negative the cdr term becomes positive until GDP reaches its 
former maximum again. Beaudry and Koop (1993) showed that the cdr term has a 
singnificant positive impact on GDP growth in the United States and thus that recessions in 
the United states are followed by particular strong recoveries that are the stronger the deeper 
the preceding recession was. Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) provide similar evidence on an 
international basis for ordinary recessions. Overall 41 recessions, i.e. 41 periods with positive 
cdr terms, 29 housing crises, and 16 financial crises are identified in the panel. The identified 
housing crises and banking crises, GDP, and the cdr term are presented in Figures 6.1 and 
6.2. 
I differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions that are associated with severe 
economic crises. Therefore, a simple timing criterion is implemented that considers a 
recession to be associated with a housing crisis or a banking crisis when it begins in the same 
year or the two consecutive years after the crisis begins.66 According to this criterion 21 
____________________ 
66 Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) demonstrate that their results are robust to modifications of this criterion. 
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Figure	6.1:	
GDP,	Indicator	of	Current	Depth	of	Recession	and	Banking	Crises		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	
	
	
	
	
	
Notes:	Vertical	lines	indicate	the	year	in	which	a	banking	crisis	began.	
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Figure	6.2:	
GDP,	Indicator	of	Current	Depth	of	Recession	and	Housing	Crises		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes:	Vertical	lines	indicate	the	year	in	which	a	housing	crisis	began.
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housing crises and eight financial crises are associated with a recession. Moreover, seven out 
of the eight financial crises associated with a recession are associated with a housing crisis as 
well.  
6.3 Internationally Synchronized Recessions 
 I investigate whether recessions that are highly internationally synchronized are more severe 
than recessions that are less internationally synchronized. Therefore, I extract recessionary 
years, i.e., years with negative GDP growth, from the panel data set and use several measures 
of the degree of international synchronization to estimate its impact on the strength of 
recessions. Finally, I differentiate between ordinary recessions and severe economic crises to 
analyze, on the one hand, whether they are differently vulnerable to foreign recession and, on 
the other hand, whether they have a different impact on the strength of foreign recessions. I 
begin by providing some basic descriptive statistics for ordinary recessions and severe 
economic crises that serve as useful background information for the following analysis.  
6.3.1 Basic Descriptive Statistics 
A recession is defined as a period of one year or several consecutive years with a negative 
GDP growth rate. Overall, there are 41 recessions and 55 recessionary years (years with 
negative GDP growth rates) in the sample.  
On average, 1.2 recessions per year can be observed in the sample. In those years that 
exhibit at least one recession, on average 3.6 recessions can be observed. To check whether 
recessions are usually at least to some extent internationally synchronized or whether the 
cluster of recessions in certain years is just random, I perform a simulation exercise. In the 
simulation exercise, it is assumed that recessions are not internationally synchronized and 55 
recessionary years are distributed on a sample with the same size as the original sample. For 
each draw the average number of recessions in one year is calculated for those years that 
exhibit at least one recession. When 10,000 draws are generated, I find for virtually no draw 
an average of 3.6 recessions per year. The average for all draws is 1.9 recessions. Therefore, 
the observation that recessions are at least to some extent internationally synchronized is not 
random, but a typical pattern.  
On average, a recessionary year exhibits a growth rate of GDP of -1.2 percent (Table 6.1, 
specification I). The growth rate does not depend systematically on the year when the 
recession occurred. When a variable that controls for the year of the recession is included in a 
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regression analysis, the parameter is close to zero (II). Recessions that are associated with 
severe economic crises exhibit on average a—at the ten percent-level—significantly lower 
growth rate of GDP. While an ordinary recession usually exhibits a growth rate of -0.8 
percent, in a recession that is associated with a severe economic crisis the growth rate is -0.7 
percentage points lower (III).  
Table	6.1:		
Basic	statistics	for	GDP	Growth	during	Recessions	
	 I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
Constant	 1.2	ሺ6.6ሻ	 1.5	ሺ2.5ሻ 0.8	ሺ3.2ሻ 0.9	ሺ9.5ሻ 1.1	ሺ3.5ሻ	 0.8	ሺ6.1ሻ
dum	FN/SW		 no	 no no yes yes	 yes
Year	 	 ‐0.0	ሺ0.5ሻ ‐0.0	ሺ0.7ሻ	
Crisis	 	 0.7	ሺ1.8ሻ 	 0.2	ሺ0.8ሻ
AIC	 189.9	 191.6 188.6 119.3 120.8	 120.5
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	brackets;	dum	FN/SW	denotes	dummy	variables	 for	Finland	 in	 the	years	1991,	1992,	
and	1993	and	for	Switzerland	in	the	years	1975	and	1976.	
Figure	6.3:	
GDP	Growth	during	Recessions	
 
 
However, the results are driven by two exceptional strong recessions that are associated 
with severe economic crises. When GDP growth during the recessions in the sample is 
plotted, it becomes obvious that the recessions in Finland beginning in 1991 and in 
Switzerland beginning in 1975 are by far stronger than the other recessions in our sample 
(Figure 6.3). Once, I control for these two recessions, recessions that are associated with 
severe economic crises exhibit no longer significantly lower growth rates than ordinary 
recessions (VI) and recessionary years exhibit on average a growth rate of -0.8 percent (IV).67 
____________________ 
67 The recession in Finland lasts three years and the recession in Switzerland last two years. To be consistent, I 
control for these recessions not only by building dummy variables for the years with exceptional low growth rates, 
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Besides the particularly strong recessions in Finland and Switzerland, recessions usually 
exhibit growth rates from -2.5 percent to close to zero. 
Even though recessions associated with severe economic crises do not exhibit systematic-
ally lower growth rates when it is controlled for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland, it 
might be the case that they are usually longer and thereby deeper than ordinary recessions 
when the depth of a recession is measured as the maximal deviation from the former peak of 
GDP. On average the recessions in the sample exhibit a depth of 1.6 percent (Table 6.2, 
specification I). When I control for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland the average 
depth decreases to 1.2 percentage points (IV). The depth of a recession does not depend on 
the year when it occurs (II and V). Recessions associated with severe economic crises are 
significantly deeper by 1.1 percentage points (III). However, again this result is driven by the 
exceptional strong recessions in Finland and Switzerland. Once, I control for these two 
recession, there is no evidence that recessions associated with severe economic crises are 
significantly deeper (VI).  
Table	6.2:		
Basic	Statistics	for	Depth	of	Recessions	
	 I	 II	 III IV V	 VI
Constant	 1.6	ሺ4.8ሻ	 1.8	ሺ1.7ሻ 1.0 ሺ2.1ሻ 1.2 ሺ7.6ሻ 1.5	ሺ2.9ሻ	 1.0	ሺ4.5ሻ
dum	FN/SW		 	 yes yes	 yes
Year	 	 ‐0.0	ሺ0.2ሻ ‐0.0	ሺ0.6ሻ	
Crisis	 	 1.1	ሺ1.7ሻ 	 0.4	ሺ1.2ሻ
AIC	 179.0	 181.0 177.9 116.4 117.9	 116.9
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	 brackets;	 dum	 FN/SW	 denotes	 dummy	 variables	 for	 the	 depth	 of	 the	 recession	 in	
Finland	beginning	in	1991	and	for	the	recession	in	Switzerland	beginning	in	1975.	
6.3.2 Are Internationally Synchronized Recessions More Severe? 
The question whether recessions that are highly internationally synchronized are more severe 
than recessions that are less internationally synchronized has attracted some attention 
during the Great Recession of 2008/2009, when most industrial countries fell into a 
recession. Claessens et al. (2009) and the IMF (2009) analyze this question and find that 
internationally synchronized recessions are more severe and that the following recoveries are 
sluggish. I re-examine their analysis for our data set and extend it by using alternative 
measures of internationally synchronized recessions. In doing so, I regress GDP growth in a 
recessionary year iyΔ  on control variables that measure the degree of international 
____________________ 
but for all years of the respective recessions. However, the results remain basically unchanged when I control only 
for the years with exceptional low growth rates.   
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synchronization of recessions ix  and on a set of deterministic terms c  that can include 
dummy variables controlling for outliers, e.g. for the recessions in Finland in 1991 and in 
Switzerland in 1975: 
 iii xy εcΔ    (6.1) 
I use three types of control variables to measure the degree of international synchroniza-
tion. First, I follow Claessen et al. (2009) and the IMF (2009) and impose a threshold of 50 
percent of all countries in the sample that have to be in recession at the same time to consider 
recessions to be internationally synchronized.68  Second, I weight the countries in the panel 
based on their GDP denominated in dollars and identify a recession as internationally 
synchronized when the share in world GDP of the countries in a recession passes a certain 
threshold. Third, I take the perspective of a single country experiencing a recession and 
calculate the share of all other countries that experience a recession in the same year. In 
doing so the share is calculated, on the one hand, as share in world GDP and, on the other 
hand, as the share in exports of the country. 
In a first steps, I follow Claessens et al. (2009) and the IMF (2009) and identify recession 
as internationally synchronized when at least 8 out of 16 countries in the sample are in a 
recession in the same year. In the sample, this is the case in two years, namely 1975 and 1993 
(Figure 6.4). According to this identification criterion every third recession in the sample is 
internationally synchronized.  
I construct a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when a recession is internationally 
synchronized and 0 otherwise and use the dummy variable as regressor ix  in equation (6.1). 
The results show that internationally synchronized recessions are not significantly more 
severe than other recessions (Table 6.3, specification II). This result is robust when I control 
for the most severe recessions in Finland and in Switzerland (VII) or when I just use the 
share of countries in a recession as regressor instead of a threshold of at least 50 percent (I 
and VI). Similarly, when I use a grid search over all possible threshold values of the share of 
countries hit by a recession in the same year to identify internationally synchronized 
recessions, I do not find any evidence that such recessions are more severe (III and VII). 69 
____________________ 
68 The IMF (2009) actually identifies an internationally synchronized recession when 10 out of 21 countries are at 
the same time in a recession. 
69 The grid search finds that a threshold value between 38 to 43 percent leads to the best model fit in our baseline 
model and a threshold value between 13 and 18 percent when I control for the recessions in Finland and 
Switzerland. However a bootstrap simulation with 1,000 draws shows that in both cases the parameter values are 
not significantly different from zero.  
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Figure	6.4:	
Share	of	Countries	Facing	a	Recession	and	Share	of	These	Countries	in	World	GDP	
 
Second, I calculate what the share in world GDP is of the countries experiencing a 
recession. Therefore, I approximate world GDP as the sum of nominal GDP converted to 
dollars of the 16 countries in our panel and calculate the share in world GDP of the countries 
in the sample. In the year 1975 countries representing a share of more than 75 percent in 
world GDP were hit by a recession. Adjusting the definition of Claessen et al. (2009) and the 
IMF (2009) that a recession is internationally synchronized when at least half of the 
countries are in a recession leads to a definition that a recession is internationally 
synchronized when countries representing at least 50 percent of world GDP are in a 
recession. Besides 1975 this was the case in the years 1974 and 1982. I do not find evidence 
for internationally synchronized recessions being more severe when I use this threshold 
neither when I account for the recessions in Finland and in Switzerland as outlier (XI) nor 
when I do not (V). The result does not change, when I run a grid search over all possible 
threshold values (VI and XII).70 However, when I use the share of countries in a recession as 
a regressor instead of a certain threshold, I find some evidence that internationally 
synchronized recessions are more severe. The parameter that captures the degree of 
international synchronization is close to conventional significance levels—even though with a 
p-value of 0.12 not significant at the 10 percent level—and the model fit improves compared 
to the models that use the measures of internationally synchronized recessions described
____________________ 
70 The grid search finds that a threshold value between 44 to 48 percent leads to the best model fit in our baseline 
model and a threshold value between 15 and 17 percent when I control for the recessions in Finland and 
Switzerland. However a bootstrap simulation with 1,000 draws shows that in both cases the parameter values not 
significantly different from zero.  
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Table	6.3:		
International	Impact	on	Recessions	Estimated	With	Shares	in	World	GDP	of	Countries	Facing	a	Recession	
	 I II	 III IV V VI VII	 VIII IX X XI XII
Constant	 0.9 ሺ2.1ሻ	 1.2	ሺ5.1ሻ	 1.0	ሺ3.9ሻ 0.8 ሺ2.4ሻ 1.1	ሺ4.6ሻ 0.9	ሺ3.5ሻ 0.8	ሺ3.4ሻ	 0.9	ሺ7.6ሻ 0.7	ሺ3.0ሻ 0.6	ሺ3.7ሻ 0.8	ሺ6.6ሻ 0.7	ሺ5.1ሻ	
dum	FN/SW	 	 	 yes	 yes yes yes yes yes	
No.		 0.0 ሺ0.8ሻ	 	 0.0	ሺ0.7ሻ	 	
No.	threshold	
ሺ50%ሻ	 	 0.1	ሺ0.3ሻ	 	 0.0	ሺ0.1ሻ 	
No.	threshold	
grid	 	 	 0.5	ሾ0.62ሿ 	 0.3	ሾ0.67ሿ 	
Share	 	 	 1.1	ሺ1.6ሻ 	 0.7	ሺ1.8ሻ 	
Share	
threshold	
ሺ50%ሻ	 	 	 0.4	ሺ1.0ሻ 	 0.2	ሺ0.9ሻ 	
Share	
threshold	grid 	 	 0.7	ሾ0.69ሿ 	 0.4	ሾ0.80ሿ	
AIC	 191.3	 189.3	 * 186.9 188.5 * ‐93.4	 120.3 * 116.7 118.0 *	
Notes:	t‐values	in	brackets;	p‐values	in	square	bracket;	p‐values	for	the	recession	dummy	defined	by	a	grid	search	were	calculated	by	simulations	with	1000	
draws;	dum	FN/SW	denotes	dummy	variables	for	Finland	in	the	years	1991,1992,	and	1993	and	for	Switzerland	in	the	years	1975	and	1976;	No.	denotes	the	
share	of	countries	in	a	recession;	share	denotes	the	share	in	world	GDP	of	countries	in	a	recession;	threshold	denotes	a	dummy	variable	that	is	equal	to	one	
when	at	least	50	percent	of	countries	are	in	a	recession;	threshold	grid	denotes	a	dummy	variable	that	is	build	for	the	threshold	found	by	a	grid	search. 	
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above (IV). When I control for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland as outliers the 
parameter value is significant at the 10 percent level (X). The growth rate of GDP in a 
recessionary year is 0.7 percentage points lower when all countries in the world are in a 
recession in the same year. 
Third, I take the perspective of a single country experiencing a recession and calculate the 
share of all other countries that experience a recession in the same year. In doing so the share 
is calculated, on the one hand, as share in world GDP and, on the other hand, as the share in 
exports of the country. The variables that measure the international synchronization of 
recessions jty  are calculated for each country j individually by using the export share or the 
share in world GDP jktw  for a foreign country k in year t:  
 kt
k
jktjt xwy 

 
16
1
    (6.2) 
where ktx  denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of one when the foreign country k 
experiences a recession. In using this approach, I deviate from the approaches used in the 
first two steps, because I do not identify certain years of internationally synchronized 
recessions, but use a measure that is meant to capture the degree of international synchroni-
zation for each recession individually. However, those recessions that were identified as 
internationally synchronized before should be usually also those that are identified to be 
more synchronized by this approach.  
When I measure the international synchronization of recessions by using the shares in 
world GDP of countries in a recession, I find evidence that highly internationally 
synchronized recessions are more severe than less internationally synchronized recessions 
(Table 6.4). GDP growth during a recession is lower by 1.5 percentage points when all other 
countries are in a recession as well (specification I). The result is robust when I control for 
the recessions in Finland and Switzerland (VII). However, the parameter estimate shows that 
the impact of internal synchronization is then estimated to be somewhat lower. The results 
do not suggest that there is any threshold of the share of countries in a recessions beyond that 
the international synchronization of recessions lead to more severe recessions. This is neither 
the case when I impose according to Cleassens et al. (2009) or IMF (2009) an ad-hoc
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Table	6.4:		
International	Impact	on	Recessions	Estimated	With	Export	Share	and	Share	in	World	GDP	of	Countries	Facing	a	Recession	
	 I	 II	 III IV V VI VII	 VIII IX X XI XII	
Constant	 0.7 ሺ2.3ሻ	 1.1	ሺ5.0ሻ	 1.1	ሺ5.5ሻ 0.8	ሺ2.3ሻ 0.7	ሺ4.9ሻ 1.0 ሺ5.4ሻ 0.6	ሺ4.0ሻ	 0.8	ሺ7.4ሻ 0.6	ሺ3.6ሻ 0.6	ሺ3.6ሻ 0.8	ሺ8.6ሻ 0.8	ሺ8.6ሻ
dum	FN/SW	 	 	 yes	 yes yes yes yes yes
GDP	share	 1.5	ሺ2.2ሻ	 	 0.9	ሺ2.3ሻ	
Threshold	
ሺ50%ሻ		 	 0.5	ሺ1.3ሻ	 	 0.3	ሺ1.4ሻ
Threshold	
grid	search	 	 	
0.6	
ሾ0.59ሿ	 	
0.4	
ሾ0.79ሿ
Export	share 	 	 1.0	ሺ1.5ሻ 	 0.7	ሺ2.0ሻ
Threshold	
ሺ50%ሻ	 	 	 0.5	ሺ1.2ሻ 	 0.4	ሺ2.3ሻ
Threshold	
grid	search	 	 	
1.2	
ሾ0.66ሿ 	 0.8	ሾ086ሿ
AIC	 187.2	 190.3	 * 189.6 190.4 * 115.7	 119.1 * 116.9 115.8 *	
Notes:	t‐values	in	brackets;	p‐values	in	square	bracket;	p‐values	for	the	recession	dummy	defined	by	a	grid	search	were	calculated	by	simulations	with	1000	
draws;	dum	FN/SW	denotes	dummy	variables	 for	Finland	 in	 the	years	1991,1992,	and	1993	and	 for	Switzerland	 in	 the	years	1975	and	1976;	GDP	share	
denotes	share	in	world	GDP	of	countries	in	a	recession;	export	share	denotes	the	share	in	exports	of	countries	in	a	recession;	threshold	denotes	a	dummy	
variable	that	is	equal	to	one	when	at	least	50	percent	of	foreign	countries	are	in	a	recession;	threshold	grid	denotes	a	dummy	variable	that	is	build	for	the	
threshold	found	by	a	grid	search.	
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threshold of 50 percent nor when I run a grid search over all possible threshold values (II, III, 
VIII, and IX).  
When I measure the international synchronization of recessions by using export shares of 
countries in a recession, the results differ somewhat from the results described above. I do 
only find evidence for a significant impact of the international synchronization of recessions, 
once I control for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland (X). Moreover, there is some 
evidence that using an ad-hoc threshold value of 50 percent for the export share of countries 
in a recession improves the model fit according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(XI). However, when I run a grid search over all possible threshold values the evidence that 
internationally synchronized recessions are more severe when the export share of countries 
in a recession passes a certain threshold becomes somewhat weaker (XII). 71 
Finally, I differentiate between ordinary recession and recessions associated with severe 
economic crises and analyze on the one hand whether they are differently vulnerable to 
internationally synchronized recessions and on the other hand whether they are differently 
strong affect recessions in other countries. Therefore, I build export-weighted foreign GDP 
growth rates either when foreign economies are in an ordinary recession (foreign ordinary 
recession GDP) or in a severe economic crisis (foreign crisis GDP). 
I find that foreign ordinary recessions have a higher impact on GDP growth in a country 
that is in a recession than foreign severe economic crises. When I control for the recessions in 
Finland and Switzerland, foreign ordinary recessions have a highly significant impact, while 
this is not true for foreign severe economic crises (Table 6.5, specification II).  
GDP growth during ordinary recessions does not seem to be particularly vulnerable to 
internationally synchronized recessions (III). This result is confirmed when I differentiate 
between foreign ordinary recessions and foreign severe economic crises (IV). 
GDP growth during severe economic crises is apparently more vulnerable to 
internationally synchronized recessions. The parameter value for the impact of foreign 
recessions is with a t-value of 1.6 at least close to conventional significance levels (V). 
However, once I control for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland, the parameter value is 
highly significant (VI). When I differentiate between foreign ordinary recessions and foreign 
severe economic crises, I find evidence that foreign ordinary recessions have a higher impact 
on domestic GDP growth when the domestic economy is in a severe economic crisis than 
foreign severe economic crises. While the parameter value for the impact of foreign 
____________________ 
71 The grid search finds that a threshold value between 72 to 78 percent leads to the best model fit in our baseline 
model and a threshold value between 84 and 85 percent when I control for the recessions in Finland and 
Switzerland. However a bootstrap simulation with 1,000 draws shows that in both cases the parameter are not 
significantly different from zero for conventional significance levels.   
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recessions with a t-value of 1.6 is close to conventional significance levels (VII), it becomes 
highly significant once I control for the recessions in Finland and Switzerland (VIII). 
Table	6.5:		
International	Impact	on	Ordinary	Recessions	and	Housing	Crises		
	
Recessions	 Ordinary	Recessions Crises	
I	 II	 III IV V VI VII	 VIII
Constant	 1.0	ሺ3.4ሻ 0.8	ሺ5.1ሻ	 0.7	ሺ3.1ሻ 0.7	ሺ3.0ሻ 1.0 ሺ2.1ሻ 0.7 ሺ3.5ሻ	 1.0	ሺ2.0ሻ	 0.8	ሺ3.9ሻ
dum	FN/SW		 yes	 yes	 	 yes
R‐foreign	
GDP	 	 0.3	ሺ0.9ሻ 1.4	ሺ1.6ሻ 0.8	ሺ2.2ሻ	 	
Foreign	
ordinary	
recessions	
GDP	 0.9	ሺ1.5ሻ 0.7	ሺ2.3ሻ	 0.1	ሺ0.3ሻ 	 1.5	ሺ1.6ሻ	 1.0	ሺ2.6ሻ
Foreign	
Crises	GDP	 0.0	ሺ0.1ሻ 0.0	ሺ0.1ሻ	 0.5	ሺ0.8ሻ 	 0.8	ሺ0.4ሻ	 ‐0.3	ሺ0.4ሻ
Likelihood	 191.7	 117.5	 51.3 55.1 116.9 66.8 118.8	 65.6
Notes:	 t‐values	 in	brackets;	dum	FN/SW	denotes	dummy	variables	 for	Finland	 in	 the	 years	1991,1992,	
and	1993	and	for	Switzerland	in	the	years	1975	and	1976;	R‐foreign	GDP	denotes	foreign	GDP	growth	for	
those	foreign	economies	that	are	in	a	recession	weighted	with	export	shares.	
 
Overall, the results pertaining to whether recessions that are highly internationally 
synchronized are more severe than recessions that are less internationally synchronized are 
sensitive to the measure I use to estimate the degree of international synchronization of 
recessions and to outliers in the sample. When I follow the literature and use measures that 
calculate the share of countries in a recession at the same time, I find only limited evidence 
that internationally synchronized recessions are more severe than not internationally 
synchronized recessions. Only when I use the weight in world GDP of countries in a recession 
as measure of international synchronization and when I control for the recessions in Finland 
and Switzerland as outliers, I find some evidence that highly internationally synchronized 
recessions are more severe than less internationally synchronized recessions. 
When I deviate somewhat from the literature and estimate whether a recession in a 
particular country is the more severe the more other countries are in a recession as well—
weighted by their share in world GDP or by their export share—the evidence that highly 
internationally synchronized recessions are more severe than less internationally 
synchronized recessions is stronger. This is particularly true when I use the weight in world 
GDP to measure the degree of international synchronization. Usually, I do not find evidence 
that internationally synchronized recessions are more severe only when the degree of inter-
national synchronization passes a certain threshold.  
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When I differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe 
economic crises I find that countries facing a recession associated with a severe economic 
crisis are more vulnerable to internationally synchronized recessions than countries facing 
ordinary recessions. GDP growth in a country facing a recession associated with a severe 
economic crisis is the lower the more foreign countries are in a recession as well. Moreover, 
the effects of internationally synchronized recessions seem to be stronger when the foreign 
countries facing ordinary recessions than when they are facing recessions associated with 
severe economic crises. 
6.4 Internationally Synchronized Recoveries  
In this section, I analyze the relevance of international synchronization for the strength and 
the dynamics of recoveries. Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) show that ordinary recessions and 
recessions associated with severe economic crises differ notably in the following recovery: 
while an ordinary recession is usually followed by a particularly strong recovery that is 
stronger the deeper the preceding recession was, such a recovery is absent when a recession 
is associated with a severe economic crisis. Consequently, the strength of recoveries might 
depend not only on the degree of international synchronization, but also on the type of 
recessions that occurred before the recoveries. In this context, I analyze three cases. First, I 
analyze the strength and the dynamics of recoveries in an open economy when foreign 
economies are not in a recovery. Second, I analyze the strength and the dynamics of 
recoveries when they are internationally synchronized. Finally, I analyze whether 
internationally synchronized recoveries differ significantly from not internationally 
synchronized recoveries. I begin by re-examining the results of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) 
in an open economy context. 
6.4.1 Estimation Results 
I follow Boysen-Hogrefe et al (2010) and estimate the strength of a recovery by augmenting 
an otherwise standard autoregressive panel model with a cdr term: 
 ititiit cdrLyL ,,, ]1)([)( εΩαΔΦ  , (6.4) 
where GDP growth ty  is regressed on its own lags, country specific fixed effects i , and the 
cdr term. A positive sum of all coefficients   indicates that GDP growth during recoveries is 
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on average higher than during expansions. Consequently, a recession that is followed by a 
recovery that exhibits this so called bounceback effect has much lower (or even no) 
permanent effects on GDP compared to recessions followed by recoveries that do not exhibit 
such an effect. The bounceback effect is the stronger the deeper the preceding recession is. I 
differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe economic 
crises by building an interaction term citcdr ,  that takes the value of the cdr term when a 
recession is associated with a severe economic crises and zero otherwise:72 
 it
c
ititiit cdrLcdrLyL ,,,, ]1)([]1)([)(   . (6.5) 
Without loss of generality I simplify the model of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) somewhat 
and do not differentiate between housing crises associated with banking crises and ‘pure’ 
housing crises, but consider only housing crises in general.73 I extend model (6.5) with a 
variable that captures the influence of the global business cycle on a country. The influence is 
modeled by means of a the global business cycle variable  ty  that is calculated individually 
for each country as exported weighted GDP growth in the other 15 countries in our panel:74  
 
  ititcititiit yLcdrLcdrLyL ,,,,, ]1)([]1)([)(    . (6.6) 
 I interpret the domestic economy as small open economy and therefore allow foreign GDP 
growth to influence domestic GDP growth contemporaneously without taking any feedback 
effects into account. 
The results for the model (6.4) that does not differentiate between ordinary recessions and 
recessions associated with severe economic crises show only little evidence for a bounceback 
effect. After a recession with a negative GDP growth rate of 1 percent, GDP growth in the 
following year is only 0.13 percentage points higher than it would have been without the 
recession (Table 6.6, specification I).75 Moreover, with a t-value of 1.6 the parameter value is 
____________________ 
72 I consider a recession to be associated with a severe economic crisis when it starts in the same year as the 
housing crisis or within the following two years. Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) show that their results are robust 
when they consider a time span from three years between the beginning of a housing crisis and a recession. 
Considering a shorter time span, i.e. 1 year, would be not in line with the results of the literature on the effects of 
housing crises, which finds that housing crises usually dampen economic activity for several years, compare, e.g., 
Jannsen (2010).   
73 The results of Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) illustrate that housing crises associated with banking crises in this 
set up only slightly deviate from ‘pure’ housing crises.  
74 This approach to model the influence of global business cycle developments is well-established in the literature, 
compare, e.g., Abeysinghe and Forbes (2001) or Pesaran et al. (2004). 
75 This result differs slightly from the result in Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) due to data revisions.  
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hardly significantly different from zero. The results change dramatically when I differentiate 
between the two types of recessions. An ordinary recession is now followed by a recovery with 
GDP growth being 1.5 times the former loss in GDP higher than otherwise (II). Consequently 
the output loss is usually offset already in the first year after a recession.76 In contrast, when a 
recession is associated with a severe economic crisis the parameter value of the interaction 
term shows that the bounceback effect is nearly completely offset. An F-Test indicates that 
the parameter values of the cdr term and the interaction term are not significantly different 
from each other, with a p-value of 0.24.  
Table	6.6:		
Estimation	Results		
	 I II III IV	
ity ,1 	 0.43	ሺ9.6ሻ 0.48 ሺ10.6ሻ 0.48 ሺ10.9ሻ 0.50	ሺ11.3ሻ	
ity ,2 	 –0,14 ሺ3.3ሻ –0.15 ሺ3.6ሻ –0.07 ሺ2.0ሻ –0.08	ሺ2.2ሻ	
itcdr ,1 	 0.13 ሺ1.6ሻ 1.52 ሺ4.7ሻ 0.13 ሺ2.0ሻ 0.88	ሺ3.3ሻ	
c
itcdr ,1 	 	 ‐1.42 ሺ4.4ሻ –0.76	ሺ2.9ሻ	
 ity , 	 0.84 ሺ17.6ሻ 0.82	ሺ17.1ሻ	

 ity ,1 	 –0.36 ሺ6.4ሻ –0.36	ሺ6.3ሻ	
AIC	 2174.0 2155.9 1921.8 1915.1	
F‐Test	 0.24 0.09	
Notes:	t‐values	in	parentheses.	F‐tests	indicate	the	p‐value	of	the	hypothesis	that	
the	parameter	values	for	the	cdr	terms	and	the	housing	crises	interaction	terms	
are	identical.	
 
When I include foreign GDP growth in the model (6.6), the results remain qualitatively the 
same. The estimated parameter value for the cdr term is the same when I do not differentiate 
between types of recessions, even though it is now significantly different from zero according 
to conventional significance levels (III). When I differentiate between types of recessions, the 
results show that ordinary recessions are followed by strong recoveries, even though the 
parameter value of the cdr term is with 0.88 considerably smaller than in the model that does 
not include foreign GDP growth. The bounceback effect is again nearly completely offset 
when a recession is associated with a severe economic crisis (IV). An F-Test with a p-value of 
0.09 does not definitely indicate whether the parameter values of the cdr term and the 
interaction term are significantly different from each other. The Akaike Information Criterion 
____________________ 
76 This does not lead to the result that recessions cannot have permanent effects on GDP or even are beneficial, 
given a positive trend growth rate of GDP. 
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(AIC) illustrates that the models that differentiate between the two types of recessions fit the 
data considerably better than the models that do not.  
Given, that recessions are to some degree internationally synchronized and consequently 
recoveries are as well, the result that the bounceback effect is considerably smaller when I 
control for foreign GDP growth compared to the results for the closed economy model leads 
to the hypothesis that some of the bounceback effect that can be observed in the data is 
caused by foreign developments. Indeed, the result that ordinary recessions are followed by 
particularly strong recoveries and that foreign GDP growth has a strong contemporaneous 
impact on domestic GDP growth indicates that international synchronized recoveries are 
stronger—at least when they follow ordinary recessions.  
6.4.2 Impulse Response Analysis 
I illustrate our results by several impulse response analyses. In particular, I investigate the 
short-run dynamics of recoveries and the resulting long-run effects of recessions on GDP for 
the three scenarios described above. I begin, by introducing the methodology how to compute 
the impulse response functions. 
6.4.3 Methodology 
The impulse response functions are computed for an open economy model as it is given by 
equation (6). Because I am not only interested in the recoveries following domestic 
recessions, but also in domestic recoveries following foreign recessions, I model a foreign 
‘rest-of-the-world’ economy as well. The domestic economy is assumed to be a small open 
economy and the foreign economy to be a large economy. This implies that the foreign 
economy can influence the domestic economy contemporaneously while the domestic 
economy has no influence on the foreign economy. Consequently, I model the foreign “rest-
of-the-world” economy as closed economy as it is given by equation (5). 
When the impulse response functions are computed, it has to be taken into account that 
the model is nonlinear in the cdr terms so that the shape of the impulse response functions 
depends on the sign and the size of the shock. Therefore, the impulse response functions are 
computed for shocks of various sizes. Since I am interested in the dynamics of recoveries 
following recessions, I focus exclusively on negative shocks. Because the model is nonlinear 
in the cdr term, the impulse response functions are sensitive to shocks that may hit the 
economy after the initial period.  
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To account for shocks that hit the economy after the initial period, I employ impulse 
response functions in line with Potter (2000). I assume that the economy is in its steady state 
before it is hit by the initial shock. The steady growth rate for the domestic and the foreign 
economy is roughly 2.3 percent. Consequently only shocks larger than 2.3 percent lead to 
negative growth rates or as in our definition to recessions. I compute a baseline forecast for 
the domestic economy when neither the domestic economy nor the foreign economy is hit by 
a shock in the initial period. Then a forecast for domestic economy is made when either the 
domestic economy or both the domestic and the foreign economy is hit by a shock in the 
initial period. After the initial period, I allow in both forecast both economies to be hit by 
further shocks, which I draw randomly from a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a 
standard deviation calculated over all residuals of the respective model. Finally, I compute 
the impulse response functions by taking the difference between both forecasts. This process 
is repeated 1,000 times. I account not only for the uncertainty caused by the nonlinearity of 
the model, but also for the uncertainty given by the parameter estimates. Therefore, I draw in 
every repetition parameter estimates from a multivariate normal distribution, with the mean 
given by the point estimates and the variance covariance matrix given by the variance 
covariance matrix of regression coefficients.  
I run forecasts for the domestic economy based on the results of specification IV in Table 
6.4.1. The model is augmented by a constant term calculated as average over the estimated 
fixed effects terms. When simulations are computed for ordinary recessions, I set the 
interaction term between the cdr term and the dummy variable for severe economic crises 
equal to zero and remain with the model 
 ttttttt ucdryyyyy   1121 9.04.08.01.05.02.0 . (6.7) 
When simulations are computed for recessions associated with severe economic crises the 
interaction term is relevant. Even though, the result of the F-test on whether the parameter 
values of the cdr term and the interaction term are equal is not unique, I assume that they are 
equal. In doing so, I keep the model as simple as possible without a loss of generality of the 
results, because even if both terms would be included in the model the remaining bounceback 
effect would be considerably small. When computing the impulse response functions, I have 
to take into account that after the initial shock, the domestic economy might be hit by further 
recessionary shocks. I interpret these recessionary shocks as ordinary recessions once GDP in 
the domestic economy has reached its former maximum so that the bounceback effect is at 
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work again. Therefore, I switch to model (6.7) when the cdr term becomes zero again after 
the initial shock: 







else 9.04.08.01.05.02.0
first time  for the zero  becomes   until ,4.08.01.05.02.0
1121
121
tttttt
tttttt
t
ucdryyyy
cdruyyyy
y  (6.8)  
I model the foreign economy accordingly to the domestic economy. When impulse 
response functions are computed for an ordinary recession, I use the estimation results for 
the closed economy with the cdr term, given by specification II in Table 4.1: 
 ttttt
ucdryyy   121 5.12.05.06.1 , (6.9) 
where the constant term is calculated as the average of the estimated fixed effects terms. In 
case of a recession associated with a severe economic crisis, I use the model without the cdr 
term, since an F-test indicates that the parameter values of the cdr term and the interaction 
term are not significantly different from each other, and switch to model (6.9) once the cdr 
term has become zero for the first time: 
 




 

else ,5.12.05.06.1
first time  for the zero  becomes   until ,2.05.06.1
121
21
tttt
tttt
t
ucdryy
cdruyy
y  (6.10)  
Domestic Recoveries 
I begin by modeling the dynamics of a recovery following a domestic recession. Therefore, I 
combine the model of the foreign economy (6.9) with model (6.7) when I want to analyze the 
effects of an ordinary recession or with model (6.8) when I want to analyze the effects of a 
recession associated with an economic crisis. While the foreign economy is not hit by a shock 
in the initial period, in the following periods it is hit by randomly drawn shocks, as is the 
domestic economy. I calculate impulse response functions relative to the baseline of no initial 
shock and scale them by the absolute value of the initial size of the shock, so that in the first 
period the impulse response takes always a value of -1 for GDP and for GDP growth. In the 
following, I define a shock of, e.g., -1 percent to be a shock that leads to a GDP growth rate of 
-1 percent. Given that the trend growth rate of GDP in our sample is higher than 2 percent on 
average, a shock actually has to be larger to lead to the designated GDP growth rate. 
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However, since I am interested in recessions and the following recoveries, the results are 
easier to interpret when I use this definition.  
The estimation results show that the recovery following an ordinary recession is 
considerably stronger than following a severe economic crisis. A recovery following an 
ordinary recession is characterized by a bounceback effect that leads to GDP growth that is 
higher than it would have been without the recession (Figure 6.5). While the bounceback 
effect for a shock of -1 percent is relatively modest, it increases with the size of the initial 
shock, and beginning with -3 percent, it leads to a GDP growth rate above the baseline for a 
period of three to four years. In contrast, following a severe economic crisis, the recovery is 
sluggish and GDP growth stays below baseline for at least four years. 
Figure	6.5:	
GDP	Growth	Following	a	Domestic	Shock:	Deviation	from	Baseline	
 
 
A severe economic crisis causes a significant reduction in the level of GDP (Figure 6.6). The 
reduction in GDP is permanent and is larger than the initial shock itself. An ordinary 
recession initially causes a significant reduction in the level of GDP as well. However, 
depending on the size of the initial shock, the reduction in GDP lasts for only some years. 
Following a shock of -1 percent, GDP is still significantly below the baseline six years after the 
initial shock, whereas following a shock of three percent, GDP is not significantly lower than 
the baseline four years after the initial shock.  
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Figure	6.6:	
GDP	Following	a	Domestic	Shock	
 
Notes:	 Baseline	 calculated	 via	 steady	 sate	 growth	 rate.	 Impulse	 response	 functions	 are	 calculated	 over	
1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	
The long-run effects of an ordinary recession can be illustrated by means of the persistence 
factor of a shock that is calculated as the difference between GDP in the baseline (of no 
shock) and GDP in an ordinary recession calculated 10 years after the initial shock. As in 
Figure 6.5, the results are scaled again by the initial size of the shock.  
Because the strength of the bounceback effect increases in the size of the initial shock, the 
long-run effect of an ordinary recession on GDP decreases with increasing size of the shock. 
Beginning with a shock with a size of -2 percent the long-run effect of an ordinary recession 
on GDP is not significantly different from zero (Figure 6.7). When the shock reaches a size of 
-8 percent the point estimate of the persistence indicates no significant effect on GDP. 
However, shocks of such size are very rare in industrialized countries and occurred not even 
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one time in our sample.77 For positive shocks, our model is linear in the size of the shock and 
therefore the persistence factor is constant with a value of roughly 1.6.  
Figure	6.7:	
Persistence	Factor	Following	an	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	
 
Notes:	Persistence	factor	calculated	as	difference	between	baseline	and	ordinary	recession	ten	years	after	
the	 initial	 shock	 scaled	 by	 the	 size	 of	 the	 initial	 shock	 calculated	 over	 1,000	 simulations.	 Dotted	 lines	
indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	Value	for	the	persistence	factor	for	a	shock	of	size	zero	was	set	equal	to	
the	value	for	a	shock	of	size	0.1.	
When I calculate in accordance to the persistence factor the long-run effects of a severe 
economic crises compared to an ordinary recession as the difference in GDP 10 years after 
the initial shock, I find that GDP in case of a severe economic crisis is significantly lower than 
in case of an ordinary recession independently of the size of the shock (Figure 6.8). The 
difference between the long-run effects in GDP increases with the size of the shock.78  
 
____________________ 
77 The lower bound of a 95 percent interval for the size of negative GDP growth rates during recessions in the 
sample is roughly -3.9 percent.  
78 The unusual shape of the lower confidence interval is a consequence of the simulation strategy used to compute 
the impulse response functions. When an economy is hit by a severe economic crisis, once the cdr term is zero 
again, any further recessionary shock later on in the simulation period are interpreted as ordinary recession with 
the consequence that the cdr dynamics are at work again. However, when a recessionary shock hits the economy 
before the cdr term is zero again, it is assumed that the reasons that hinder the economy to recover strongly are 
still at work and the shock is interpreted as part of the crisis. Consequently the long-run impact of a randomly 
drawn negative shock at the beginning of the simulation period is much more severe in case of a severe economic 
crisis compared to an ordinary recession, when a negative shock can even strengthen the recovery due to the non-
linearity of the bounceback effect. Because the randomly drawn shocks are the more important for the long-run 
effect the smaller the shock in the initial period is, the lower confidence band plunge for shocks of small 
magnitude while this effect looses impact with the increasing size of the shocks. 
‐0,50
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
‐4,0 ‐3,5 ‐3,0 ‐2,5 ‐2,0 ‐1,5 ‐1,0 ‐0,5 0,0 0,5
persistence 
factor
shock
Internationally Synchronized Recoveries 
125 
 
Figure	6.8:	
Long‐run	Effects	on	GDP	after	a	Domestic	Shock:	Severe	Economic	Crisis	Compared	to	Ordinary	Recession		
 
Notes:	Calculated	as	difference	in	GDP	after	a	severe	economic	crisis	and	an	ordinary	recession	ten	years	
after	the	initial	shock	scaled	by	the	size	of	the	initial	shock	calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	
indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.		
Internationally Synchronized Recoveries 
In this section, I simulate the dynamics of a domestic recovery when the domestic economy 
and the foreign economy are in a recovery at the same time. In particular, I investigate how 
the domestic recovery is affected when the foreign economy was hit by an ordinary recession 
compared to the case when the foreign economy was hit by a severe economic crisis. Even 
though, recessions occurred to some extend internationally synchronized, usually domestic 
GDP growth was hit by a larger shock than the aggregated foreign GDP growth. In the 
following I assume in general that the foreign economy is hit by a recessionary shock with a 
quarter of the size of the domestic shock, which corresponds to the ratio between the 
domestic and the foreign cdr terms in the sample.  
First, I simulate a domestic recovery following an ordinary recession when the foreign 
economy is either hit by an ordinary recession or a severe economic crisis. Overall, I can 
observe a bounceback effect independently of the size of the shock (Figure 6.9). The strength 
of the bounceback effect in the second and the third year is dampened somewhat when the 
foreign economy is hit by a severe economic crisis. 
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Figure	6.9:	
GDP	Growth	Following	a	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	
  
GDP is usually significantly below the baseline of no shock for two or three years (Figure 
6.10). An exception is when the foreign economy is hit by a severe economic crisis and the 
initial shock is relatively small, e.g. 1 percent, and thus the bounceback effect is relatively 
weak. In this case GDP stays significantly below the baseline for at least six years. The point 
estimates indicate that GDP stays at least six years below the baseline when the foreign 
economy is hit by a severe economic crisis, but reaches roughly its old level again beginning 
with shocks of -4 percent when the foreign economy is hit by an ordinary recession. 
The difference in GDP when the foreign economy is hit by an ordinary recession and when 
it is hit by a severe economic crisis is significant for two to three years (Figure 6.11). While the 
point estimates indicate that GDP is always higher in case of a foreign ordinary recession, 
after at most four years the difference is not significantly different from zero. 
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Figure	6.10:	
GDP	Level	Following	a	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	
 
Notes:	 Baseline	 calculated	 via	 steady	 sate	 growth	 rate.	 Impulse	 response	 functions	 are	 calculated	 over	
1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	
Figure	6.11:	
Domestic	Ordinary	Recession:	Difference	between	Foreign	Ordinary	Recession	and	Foreign	Severe	
Economic	Crisis	in	GDP	Level	
 
Notes:	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	Calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	
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The long-run effects on GDP depend considerably on whether the foreign economy is hit by 
an ordinary recession or whether it is hit by a severe economic crisis. The persistence factor 
indicates that in case of a foreign ordinary recession, independently of the size of the initial 
shock no significant long-run effects on GDP can be observed (Figure 6.12). When the foreign 
economy is hit by a severe economic crisis, the persistence factor shows that no significant 
long-run effects on GDP can be observed beginning with shocks of a size of -1.5 percent. 
Given, that the recessionary shocks in our sample are usually smaller than -1.5 percent the 
likelihood that the domestic economy suffers a long-run loss in GDP when the foreign 
economy is hit by a severe economic crisis is considerably high. 
Figure	6.12:	
Domestic	Ordinary	Recession:	Persistence	Factor	for	Foreign	Ordinary	Recession	and	Foreign	Severe	
Economic	Crisis		
 
Notes:	Persistence	factor	calculated	as	difference	between	baseline	and	recession	ten	years	after	the	initial	
shock	scaled	by	the	size	of	the	initial	shock	calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	
confidence	interval.		
Second, I simulate a domestic recovery following a severe economic crisis when the foreign 
economy is either hit by an ordinary recession or a severe economic crisis. When comparing 
GDP growth during the recovery in both cases, the differences in the magnitudes are 
relatively small (Figure 6.13). However, when the foreign economy is hit by a severe 
economic crisis, GDP growth is usually below baseline for two years longer. 
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Figure	6.13:	
GDP	Growth	Following	a	Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis	
 
Figure	6.14:	
GDP	Level	Following	a	Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis	
 
Notes:	 Baseline	 calculated	 via	 steady	 sate	 growth	 rate.	 Impulse	 response	 functions	 are	 calculated	 over	
1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	
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GDP is significantly below baseline for at least six years independently whether the foreign 
economy is hit by an ordinary recession or a severe economic crisis (Figure 6.14). However, 
in case of a foreign ordinary recession the loss in GDP is smaller. 
A comparison between GDP in case of a foreign ordinary recession and in case of a foreign 
severe economic crisis shows that for shocks with a size from -1 percent to -4 percent GDP is 
always significantly higher when the foreign economy is hit by an ordinary recessions than 
when it is hit by a severe economic crisis (Figure 6.15). After the first two or three years of the 
recovery the difference between the levels of GDP does not increase any more. 
Figure	6.15:	
Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis:	Difference	between	Foreign	Ordinary	Recession	and	Foreign	Severe	
Economic	Crisis	in	GDP	Level	
 
Notes:	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	Calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	
The difference between both types of recessions in the foreign economy in the persistence 
factor illustrates that also the long-run effect on GDP is always lower when the foreign 
economy is hit by an ordinary recession (Figure 6.16). The difference increases only slightly 
with increasing size of the shock in the initial period. For shocks with a size that can be 
observed in the sample, the difference is roughly 0.3 percentage points. 
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Figure	6.16:	
Long‐run	Effects	on	GDP	after	a	Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis:	Foreign	Severe	Economic	Crisis	
Compared	to	Foreign	Ordinary	Recession		
 
Notes:	Calculated	as	difference	in	GDP	after	a	severe	economic	crisis	and	an	ordinary	recession	ten	years	
after	the	initial	shock	scaled	by	the	size	of	the	initial	shock	calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	
indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.		
Comparison of Internationally Synchronized Recoveries with Not 
Internationally Synchronized Recoveries 
In this section, I compare the strength and the dynamics of internationally synchronized 
recoveries with the strength and the dynamics of not internationally synchronized recoveries. 
Basically, I compare the results of both preceding sections. I differentiate between recoveries 
following domestic ordinary recessions and recoveries following domestic recessions 
associated with severe economic crises. For both types of recoveries I compare the strength 
and the dynamics of the domestic recovery when the foreign economy is not in a recovery 
(not internationally synchronized recovery) with the strength and the dynamics of the 
domestic recovery when the foreign economy is in a recovery either following an ordinary 
recession or a recession associated with a severe economic crisis (internationally 
synchronized recovery). 
First, I compare GDP growth during the first years of a recovery. As an example I compare 
the results for a shock with a size of -2 percent. However, the results are qualitatively the 
same for shocks of various sizes. Given the domestic economy is in a recovery following an 
ordinary recession, GDP growth is significantly higher for two years when the foreign 
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economy is in a recovery following an ordinary recession than when the foreign economy is 
not in a recovery (Figure 6.17). In contrast, the result for GDP growth during a domestic 
recovery when the foreign economy is in a recovery that follows a recession associated with a 
severe economic crisis is not significantly different from the result for GDP growth when the 
foreign economy is not in a recovery. 
Figure	6.17:	
GDP	Growth	after	a	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession:	Difference	Between	International	Synchronized	
Recovery	and	Not	Internationally	Synchronized	Recovery		
 
Notes:	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	Calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	
Figure	6.18:	
GDP	Growth	after	a	Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis:	Difference	Between	International	Synchronized	
Recovery	and	Not	Internationally	Synchronized	Recovery		
 
Notes:	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.	Calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	
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Given the domestic economy is in a recovery following a recession associated with a severe 
economic crisis, GDP growth is significantly higher for three years when the foreign economy 
is in a recovery following an ordinary recession than when the foreign economy is not in a 
recovery (Figure 6.18). Again, the result for GDP growth during a domestic recovery when the 
foreign economy is in a recovery following a recession that is associated with a severe 
economic crisis is not significantly different from the result when the foreign economy is not 
in a recovery.  
Second, I compare the difference in GDP in the long-run calculated 10 years after the 
initial shock. Given the domestic economy is in a recovery following an ordinary recession 
GDP is considerably lower when the foreign economy is not in a recovery than when the 
foreign economy is in a recovery following an ordinary recession (Figure 6.19). However, the 
differences are not significantly different from zero at a significance level of 95 percent. When 
the foreign recovery is following a recession that is associated with a severe economic crisis, 
the point estimates indicate that the level of GDP is considerably close to the case when the 
foreign economy is not in a recovery. 
Figure	6.19:	
GDP	after	a	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession:	Difference	Between	a	Domestic	Recovery	and	an	International	
Synchronized	Recovery		
	
Notes:	 Calculated	 as	 difference	 in	 GDP	 when	 the	 foreign	 economy	 is	 not	 in	 a	 recovery	 and	 when	 the	
foreign	 economy	 is	 in	a	 recovery	 ten	years	 after	 the	 initial	 shock	 scaled	by	 the	 size	of	 the	 initial	 shock	
calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.		
Given the domestic economy is in a recovery following a recession associated with a severe 
economic crisis, GDP is significantly lower when the foreign economy is not in a recovery 
than when the foreign economy is in a recovery following an ordinary recession for initial 
shocks that are lower than -0.5 percent (Figure 6.20). When the foreign recovery is following 
a recession that is associated with a severe economic crisis, the point estimates indicate that 
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the level of GDP is considerably close to the case when the foreign economy is not in a 
recovery. 
 
Figure	6.20:	
GDP	after	a	Domestic	Severe	Economic	Crisis:	Difference	Between	a	Domestic	Recovery	and	an	
International	Synchronized	Recovery	
	
Notes:	 Calculated	 as	 difference	 in	 GDP	 when	 the	 foreign	 economy	 is	 not	 in	 a	 recovery	 and	 when	 the	
foreign	 economy	 is	 in	a	 recovery	 ten	years	 after	 the	 initial	 shock	 scaled	by	 the	 size	of	 the	 initial	 shock	
calculated	over	1,000	simulations.	Dotted	lines	indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.		
6.5 Conclusion 
I analyze the impact of international synchronization of recessions and recoveries on the 
depth of recessions and the strength and the dynamics of recoveries. In particular, I 
differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe economic 
crises when I study the impact of international synchronization. 
When I analyze internationally synchronized recessions, I find that recessions are to some 
extent an international phenomenon and usually occur in several countries at the same time. 
However, the results pertaining to whether internationally synchronized recessions are more 
severe than other recessions are sensitive to the measure that is used to estimate the degree 
of synchronization and to outliers in the sample. When I follow the literature and use 
measures that calculate the share of countries in a recession at the same time, I only find 
some evidence that highly internationally synchronized recessions are more severe than less 
internationally synchronized recessions when I control for the recessions in Finland and 
Switzerland as outliers. When I estimate whether a recession in a particular country is more 
severe the more other countries are in a recession at the same time the evidence that highly 
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internationally synchronized recessions are more severe than less internationally 
synchronized recessions is stronger.  
When I differentiate between ordinary recessions and recessions associated with severe 
economic crises, I find that countries facing a recession associated with a severe economic 
crisis tend to be more vulnerable to internationally synchronized recessions. Moreover, the 
effects of internationally synchronized recessions seem to be stronger when the foreign 
countries are facing ordinary recessions than when they are facing recessions associated with 
severe economic crises. 
When I analyze internationally synchronized recoveries, I find that internationally 
synchronized recoveries tend to be stronger than not internationally synchronized recoveries. 
However a country benefits only from internationally synchronized recoveries when the 
foreign recoveries are following ordinary recessions, but not when they are following 
recessions associated with severe economic crises. The benefits are larger when the country 
itself was hit by a severe economic crisis. 
6.6 References 
Abeysinghe, T., and K. Forbes (2001). Trade-Linkages and Output-Multiplier Effects: A Structural 
VAR Approach with a Focus on Asia. NBER Working Paper 8600. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
Ahearne, A.G, J. Ammer, B.M. Doyle, L.S. Kole and R.F. Martin (2005). House Prices and Monetary 
Policy: A Cross-Country Study. International Finance Discussion Papers 841. Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.  
Aßmann, C., J. Boysen-Hogrefe and N. Jannsen (2011). Costs of Housing Crises: International 
Evidence. Bulletin of Economic Research, forthcoming. 
Baxter, M., and M.A. Kouparitsas (2005). Determinants of Business Cycle Comovement: A Robust 
analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 52 (1): 113–157. 
Beaudry, P., and G. Koop (1993). Do Recessions Permanently Change Output? Journal of Monetary 
Economics 31: 149–163. 
Boysen-Hogrefe, J., N. Jannsen and C.-P. Meier (2010). The Ugly and the Bad: Banking and Housing 
Crises Strangle Output Permanently, Ordinary Recessions Do Not. Kiel Working Papers 1586, Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy.  
Canova, F., M. Ciccarelli and E. Ortega (2007). Similarities and Convergence in G-7 Cycles. Journal of 
Monetary Economics 54 (3): 850–878. 
Cerra, V., U. Panizza and S.C. Saxena (2009). International Evidence on Recovery from Recessions. 
IMF Working Papers 09/183. International Monetary Fund, Washigton, D.C. 
Cerra, V., and S.C. Saxena (2008). Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic Recovery. American 
Economic Review 98 (1): 439–457. 
Claessens, S., M.A. Kose and M.E. Terrones (2009). What Happens During Recessions, Crunches and 
Busts? Economic Policy 24 (60): 653–700. 
International Recessions, Crises, and the Dynamics of Recoveries 
136 
 
Imbs, J. (2004). Trade, Finance, Specialization, and Synchronization. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 86 (3): 723–734. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2003). When Bubbles Burst. World Economic Outlook. April. 
Washington, D.C. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2009). From Recession to Recovery: How Soon and How Strong? 
World Economic Outlook. April. Washington, D.C. 
Jannsen, N. (2010). National and International Business Cycle Effects of Housing Crises. Applied 
Economics Quarterly 56 (2) 175–206. 
Jorda, O., M. Schularick and A.M. Taylor (2011). Financial Crises, Credit Booms, and External  
Imbalances: 140 Years of Lessons. IMF Economic Review 59 (2): 340–378. 
Kose, M.A., C. Otrok and C.H. Whiteman (2003). International Business Cycles: World, Region, and 
Country-Specific Factors. American Economic Review 93 (4): 1216–1239. 
Kose, M.A., C. Otrok and C.H. Whiteman (2008). Understanding the Evolution of World Business 
Cycles. Journal of International Economics 75 (1) 110–130. 
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) (2011). Economic Outlook. May. 
Paris.  
Pesaran, M.H., T. Schuermann and S.M. Weiner (2004). Modelling Regional Interdependencies Using 
a Global Error-Correcting Model. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 22 (2): 129–181. 
Potter, S.M. (2000). Nonlinear Impulse Response Functions. Journal of Economic Dynamics & 
Control 24: 1425–1446. 
Reinhart, C.M., and K.S. Rogoff (2008). Is the 2007 US Subprime Crises so Different? An Inter-
national Historical Comparison. American Economic Review 98 (2): 339–344. 
Reinhart, C.M., and K.S. Rogoff (2009). This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. 
Princeton.  
Stock, J.H., and M.W. Watson (2005). Understanding Changes in International Business Cycle 
Dynamics. Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (5): 968–1006. 
 	
Appendix: Differences between the Open and the Closed Economy Model 
137 
 
6.7 Appendix: Differences between the Open and the Closed Economy 
Model 
 I deviate from Boysen-Hogrefe et al. (2010) in estimating an open economy model instead of 
a closed economy model. In Section 6.4.1, I show that both models lead to qualitatively the 
same result, namely that ordinary recessions are followed by a strong recovery while 
recessions associated with severe economic crises are not. Here, I check whether both models 
can lead to significantly different results in terms of GDP by means of simulation exercises 
analogous to the simulation exercises of Section 6.4.2.  
Figure	6.A.1.1:	
Persistence	Factor	Following	an	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	for	the	Closed	and	the	Open	Economy	
Model	
 
Notes:	Persistence	factor	calculated	as	difference	between	baseline	and	ordinary	recession	ten	years	after	
the	 initial	 shock	 scaled	 by	 the	 size	 of	 the	 initial	 shock	 calculated	 over	 1,000	 simulations.	 Dotted	 lines	
indicate	95	%	confidence	interval.		
I start by comparing the persistence factors following an ordinary recession for both 
models. For the open economy model we assume that the foreign economy is not hit by a 
shock in the initial period. Overall, the persistence of ordinary recessions estimated for the 
open economy model is somewhat higher than estimated for the closed economy model 
(Figure 6.A.1.1). For the closed economy model the long-run effect of an ordinary recession 
on GDP is for shocks smaller than -1.5 percent not significantly different from zero, instead of 
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-2.0 percent for the open economy model. The point estimates show no long-run impact on 
GDP for shocks larger than -4 percent.  
In the following, I compare the models by calculating the difference between the results of 
both models. GDP growth following and ordinary recession in the closed economy model is 
only in the first year significantly higher than in the open economy model and beginning with 
the third year the difference is virtually zero for the point estimates independently of the size 
of the shocks (Figure 6.A.1.2). The size of the shock is somewhat more important for the 
difference of the level of GDP. The level of GDP following an ordinary recession is 
significantly higher in the closed economy model from one year (for a shock of -1) to two 
years (Figure 6.A.1.3). However, in the long-run the difference between both models is not 
significantly different from zero.  
When I compare the difference between both models for the long-run impact on the level 
of GDP of ordinary recessions compared to the impact of severe economic crises, I find that 
the difference is only significantly different from zero for the first year or for the first two 
years (Figure 6.A.1.4). The point estimates indicate that both models lead virtually to the 
same results in the long-run.  
Figure	6.A.1.2:	
Difference	of	GDP	Growth	Following	an	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	between	the	Closed	and	the	Open	
Economy	Model	
 
Notes:	 Dotted	 lines	 indicate	 95	%	 confidence	 interval.	 Confidence	 interval	 calculated	 over	 1,000	
simulations.	
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Figure	6.A.1.3:	
Difference	of	the	GDP	Level	Following	an	Domestic	Ordinary	Recession	between	the	Closed	and	the	Open	
Economy	Model	
 
Notes:	 Dotted	 lines	 indicate	 95	%	 confidence	 interval.	 Confidence	 interval	 calculated	 over	 1,000	
simulations.	
Figure	6.A.1.4:	
Difference	Between	the	Closed	and	the	Open	Economy	Model:	Effect	of	Ordinary	Recession	Compared	to	
Severe	Economic	Crisis	on	the	GDP	Level	
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